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ABSTRACT 
The most pressing global issues we face today include the influx of refugees to 
neighboring countries, the spread of terrorism, and climate change. The majority of refugees 
originate from fragile situations battered by protracted conflict. Similarly, terrorist groups form 
within fragile contexts. Fragile situations are the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
such as natural disasters. Financial aid continues to flow from donor countries to fragile 
situations to carry out peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas. Scholars have conflicting views 
on whether foreign aid can help build peace and others point out donors’ misguided aid 
allocation leading to failures in statebuilding.   
This study aims to determine how development aid impacts state-society resilience, and 
how such resilience impacts aid flows in fragile situations. It particularly examines if 
development aid builds state-society resilience in fragile situations listed in the harmonized list 
of World Bank, African Development Bank, and Asian Development Bank from 2006 to 2018. 
Results show that development aid causes a decrease in state-society resilience, while state-
society resilience causes an increase in aid flows. Aid for governance and human development 
weakens resilience. On the other hand, better governance and peace levels curb aid flows, while 
higher human development levels boost aid flows. Economic growth is neither relevant to 
resilience levels nor aid flows.  
This study highlights the strong causal link between aid for governance and human 
development and state-society resilience. Results show that aid hurts a fragile situation but not 
too painfully, and that fragility is mainly attributed to violent conflict, ethnic fractionalization, 
and natural disasters. The study concludes that the slight negative impact of aid can be reversed 
through altering the development approach from hierarchical to concentric. As an alternative to 
xv 
 
the hierarchical model of development, where one intervention progresses from one stage to 
another, a concentric model is proposed, where governance and human development are at the 
core, which can create a ripple effect to sustainable peace and economic growth. Targeted 
assistance is therefore needed, which is to strengthen governance by improving public policies 
and institutions, and enhancing human development by empowering the society to collaborate 
with the state in achieving sustainable development goals. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The world today faces a daunting task of addressing the millions of people forced to 
leave their homes, the spread of terrorism, and climate change. In June 2018, the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR, 2018) recorded that 68.5 million people have been forcibly displaced 
worldwide (40 million are internally displaced, 25.4 million are refugees, and 3.1 million are 
asylum-seekers.) About 57% of the refugees come from South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria, 
which are all fragile situations. On the other hand, the Global Terrorism Index, in 2016, 
identified the top five countries most impacted by terrorism, and these countries are in fragile 
contexts: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, and Pakistan (IEP, 2017). Fragile situations are also 
vulnerable to climate change or global warming that causes sea level rise, droughts, soil erosion, 
and catastrophic typhoons, among others. Sakaguchi, Varughese, and Auld (2017) reviewed 
studies linking climate change and violence and found that many of these studies conclude that, 
“climate variables are associated with higher levels of conflict” (p. 62). 
International and local policymakers recognize the need to develop fragile situations to 
make them more resilient to conflict and climate change. Since 2000, the international 
community has strived to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were 
replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by world leaders during the 
UN Sustainable Development Summit in 2015. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP, n.d.-a) defines SDGs as “a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and 
ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity,” and outlines 17 goals to achieve with the 
participation of governments, private sector, civil society, and citizens (Table 1.1). The SDGs are 
meant to build upon the MDGs, and new areas have been added, such as climate change, 
economic equality, innovation, sustainable consumption, and peace and justice (UNDP, n.d.-a). 
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Table 1.1: Sustainable Development Goals 
 
1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere. 
2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. 
3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. 
4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong opportunities for all. 
5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. 
6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. 
7.  Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. 
8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and 
decent work for all. 
9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster 
innovation 
10. Reduce inequality within and among countries. 
11. Make cities and human settlement inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.  
12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. 
13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. 
14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development. 
15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, 
combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss. 
16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for 
all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. 
17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable 
development. 
 
Source: United Nations Development Programme. (n.d.). Sustainable development goals. Retrieved from 
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html 
 
 
Fragile situations have been the major target for SDG 16, which is, to “promote peaceful 
and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build 
effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN, n.d.). Without such building 
blocks—peace, justice, inclusive societies, and effective institutions—the rest of the SDGs will 
be impossible to achieve.  
Though the UNDP reported some MDG achievements in 2015, most of the facts and 
figures are alarming despite the continual financial aid flows from wealthy nations to fragile 
situations. The number of people living in extreme poverty in these fragile situations continues to 
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rise.1  In 2015, fragile situations were home to 513.6 million people living in extreme poverty; by 
2030, this number could rise to 620 million people or more. In 2016, 63% of the world 
population was in extreme poverty, and this is expected to grow to 83% by 2030 (OECD, 2018). 
In 2016, nine extremely fragile countries were active in armed conflict: Afghanistan, Central 
African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen (OECD, 2018). The top ten most corrupt countries in the world are also in fragile 
contexts—with Somalia as the most corrupt, followed by South Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, 
Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, and North Korea (Transparency 
International, 2017). In terms of health and education, fragile states are also the last ones in the 
ranking (UNDP, 2016). Fragile states lag behind in important indicators such as infants 
exclusively breastfed, infants lacking immunization, child malnutrition, mortality rate, deaths 
due to malaria and tuberculosis, HIV prevalence, ratio of physicians to the population, and public 
health expenditure. In education, fragile states have the poorest records in literacy rate, gross 
enrollment ratio, and education quality. In 2015, eight fragile states were part of the top ten most 
gender unequal societies. They are Yemen, Chad, Niger, Mali, Cote d’ Ivoire, Afghanistan, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone (UNDP, 2016). In 2018, the top ten least 
peaceful countries in the world (except for Russia) are considered fragile—Syria as the least 
peaceful, followed by Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic (IEP, 2018). 
Between 2002 and 2014, total financial flows, which include official development 
assistance (ODA), to fragile situations increased by 206% (OECD, 2016). Between 2011 and 
2014, OECD (2016) reports that the average aid dependency among fragile contexts is 10.5% of 
 
1 The World Bank defines extreme poverty as living on less than US$ 1.9 a day. 
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gross national income, compared to 2.5% for non-fragile contexts. One of the key messages of 
the OECD States of Fragility 2018 is to “invest in more and smarter aid in fragile contexts.” A 
key question to be answered by this study is: is it indeed smarter to invest more in fragile 
contexts?  
The impact of development aid on fragile situations has to be measured over the long-
term to determine whether aid money is targeted strategically toward achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals, particularly SDG 16 (Table 1.1). Currently, aid is allocated based on the 
common agenda of donors and governments, but is usually volatile due to frequent changes of 
government administrations in fragile situations. Identifying where aid works best allows 
policymakers from both donor and recipient countries to decide on the most effective long-term 
strategies in aid allocation. Insights can be drawn from the study on how to provide smarter aid 
that can contribute to building resilience of states and societies in fragile situations. Building 
resilience, according to OECD (2013), entails “enhancing the capacity of individuals, 
communities and states to absorb, adapt and transform to the shocks and risks that they should 
normally be expected to deal with” (p. 1). Reflecting on this definition, building resilience is a 
collective effort of both the state and the society to prevent violent conflict (therefore averting 
forced displacement), contain terrorism, and manage the effects of climate change—hence the 
use of “state-society resilience” as the subject of this study.  
This study aims to determine how impactful development aid is on state-society 
resilience in fragile situations listed in the harmonized list of World Bank (WB), African 
Development Bank (AfDB), and Asian Development Bank (ADB). It seeks to explore which 
areas of development interventions (peacebuilding, governance, economic growth, human 
development) targeted through aid have impacted state-society resilience in fragile situations 
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most; and if any of these interventions are shown to explain resilience, how do such interventions 
impact state-society resilience? Do they make states and societies more resilient or more fragile? 
Why and how? 
The study also explores whether state-society resilience levels are related to aid flows. 
Are donors and recipient governments smart enough in development investments? This question 
particularly seeks to determine the trend of aid flows in situations where there is weak 
government, failing economy, low human development levels, and high levels of violent conflict. 
Identifying the trend of aid flow and the impact of aid will help donor and recipient government 
policymakers make decisions on aid allocations and lending and borrowing activities. 
Regression analyses identified the causal relationship between aid allocation and state-
society resilience levels in fragile situations by examining aid interventions in four themes: 
peacebuilding, governance, human development, and economic growth. The four themes are a 
result of a baseline research using the cognitive anthropology approach, which captures how a 
selected group of six development experts categorize development interventions. Taxonomy, pile 
sorting, and multidimensional scaling methods were applied to aggregate a sample of 694 
development projects into four domains. A total of 2,241 development projects implemented in 
the 35 fragile situations were analyzed. These projects were coded based on the four themes and 
the coded results were tested for reliability using inter-coder reliability and Cohen’s Kappa tests. 
Between 2006 and 2018, the World Bank identified a total of 55 fragile situations using 
its country policy and institutional assessment harmonized with the African Development Bank’s 
and the Asian Development Bank’s country performance assessments. From the 55 fragile 
situations, this study selected 35 fragile situations that consistently received financial support 
from the three multilateral development banks (AfDB, ADB, and WB) from 2006 to 2018. 
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Regression analyses were applied using the following variables: aid investments and state-
society resilience levels in peacebuilding, governance, economic growth, and human 
development. A composite resilience index was developed using the four themes as indicators. 
This study also conducted a case analysis of the impact of the 10-year Mindanao Trust Fund-
Reconstruction and Development Project (MTF-RDP) on the resilience of the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a region in the Philippines that has experienced 
protracted conflict for more than 40 years. The case analysis aims to provide a better 
understanding of the causal link between development aid and state-society resilience in a real-
life context.   
Results of the study intend to contribute to better decision making on aid allocation, more 
targeted interventions, and longer-term strategies in peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
Consequently, the study introduces a new model for evaluating aid effectiveness that can be 
replicated by development practitioners and researchers. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the definitions of development, aid, state-society resilience, and 
fragile situations, and how and why these concepts are used in this study. I also cover the 
concepts of governance, peacebuilding, human development, and economic growth, and the 
theories linking them to resilience. How development aid was conceived and how it has evolved 
since World War II is covered, including the recent efforts to improve development effectiveness 
in fragile situations. The harmonized list of fragile situations and how ADB, AfDB, and WB 
make funding decisions in fragile situations are also discussed. Chapter 3 discusses the theories 
linking development aid to peacebuilding and statebuilding, the gaps in the literature, and the 
study’s knowledge contribution.    
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Further, I elaborate on the research and design methodologies used, mainly cognitive 
anthropology, regression analysis, and case analysis in Chapter 4. This chapter discusses the 
definitions, rationale, and processes of the cognitive anthropology approaches used, which 
include taxonomy, pile sorting, multidimensional scaling, and inter-coder reliability and Cohen’s 
Kappa tests. Specific elements of the regression analyses are covered, such as sampling, focus 
and control variables and the theories behind them, the time elements considered in the analyses, 
reliability tests, and limitations of the study. On the case of Mindanao Philippines, in Chapter 5, I 
provide a background on fragility and conflict in Mindanao and details about the Mindanao Trust 
Fund-Reconstruction and Development Project, and tackle how the project has and has not 
contributed to Mindanao’s resilience, and whether Mindanao is a “donor darling.” Chapter 6 
discusses the regression analyses findings, linking them to the case analysis findings, while 
Chapter 7 delves into the implications of these findings to aid policies and practices—critiquing 
the current development approach and proposing a new development model based on the study’s 
findings. Chapter 7 also provides specific recommendations that would require changes in aid 
targeting and aid delivery mechanisms, as well as what further research is needed to create 
knowledge that will serve as a basis for discourses, policies, and practices on development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
2.1 Definition of Concepts 
The core concepts of this study are development, aid, fragile situations, and state-society 
resilience. The first three concepts have no single definition, and their definitions have been 
subject to various debates among scholars; while resilience, though it is not a new concept, has 
been an emerging theme in international aid. In this study, I have combined two actors in 
resilience building and treated them as one entity—the state and the society.  In this study, I use 
development aid as a phrase, but for the purpose of clarifying ambiguous terms, I am defining 
them as separate concepts. The four indicators of state-society resilience (human development, 
governance, economic growth, and peacebuilding) are also defined in this chapter. 
2.1.1 Aid 
There are different forms of aid given to a country; this could be military aid, 
humanitarian aid, or development aid. If aid is to be defined by its purpose, aid can be 
ambiguous in a sense that it is not clear what the motives of the donors and the state recipients 
are, what are the strings attached, and whether aid is helpful to a larger population. This study 
only refers to development aid and will use this terminology throughout the thesis. Others refer 
to this terminology as foreign aid, development assistance, international aid, or overseas aid. In 
his 1949 inaugural speech, US President Harry Truman used the phrase “assistance to 
underdeveloped areas” (Bilzen, 2015, p. 1). In 2018, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) provided a more complex definition of aid and delineated 
those that are not considered as official development assistance (See Table 2.1). This study 
adopts the OECD definition of development aid, and it does not include military, humanitarian, 
and peacekeeping aid (See Limitations of the Study in Chapter 4.3). To be more specific, in this 
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study, development aid refers to loans and grants provided by multilateral development banks 
(specifically the WB, AfDB, and ADB) to their member states, which aim to reduce poverty and 
promote socio-economic development. 
 
Table 2.1: Official Development Assistance Definition and Coverage 
Definition 
Official development assistance flows are defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of 
ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are:  
(i)  provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and 
(ii) each transaction of which: 
a. is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as its main objective; and 
b. is concessional in character. In DAC statistics, this implies a grant element of at least  
▪ 45 per cent in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of LDCs and other LICs 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 9 per cent). 
▪ 15 per cent in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of LMICs (calculated at 
a rate of discount of 7 per cent). 
▪ 10 per cent in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of UMICs (calculated at 
a rate of discount of 6 per cent). 
▪ 10 per cent in the case of loans to multilateral institutions (calculated at a rate of 
discount of 5 per cent for global institutions and multilateral development banks, and 6 
per cent for other organisations, including sub-regional organisations). 
Coverage 
Over the years the DAC has continuously refined the detailed ODA reporting rules to ensure fidelity to the 
definition and the greatest possible consistency among donors.  The boundary of ODA has been carefully 
delineated in many fields, including: 
• Military aid: No military equipment or services are reportable as ODA.  Anti-terrorism activities are 
also excluded.  However, the cost of using donors’ armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is eligible. 
• Peacekeeping: Most peacekeeping expenditures are excluded in line with the exclusion of military 
costs.  However, some closely-defined developmentally relevant activities within peacekeeping 
operations are included. 
• Nuclear energy: Reportable as ODA, provided it is for civilian purposes. 
• Cultural programmes:  Eligible as ODA if they build the cultural capacities of recipient countries, but 
one-off tours by donor country artists or sportsmen, and activities to promote the donors’ image, are 
excluded. 
Source: OECD (n.d.). Official development assistance - definition and coverage. Retrieved from 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm#Notes 
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2.1.2 Development 
I have adopted the definition of development offered by Amartya Sen (1999) since it is 
holistic, that is, encompassing all development aspects, not only from an economic, but also from 
political, social, and security perspectives. According to Sen (1999), development is “a process 
of expanding the real freedoms the people enjoy” (p. 3). It is not just about incomes but also 
about the freedom to exercise political and civil rights. There are also other important 
determinants of freedom such as access to health care and education.  
Industrialization, social and technological progress may also contribute to “human 
freedom,” and this is how donor agencies generally view development—as an industrialization 
and socio-economic process. The African Development Bank’s (n.d.) mission is to “spur 
sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), 
thus contributing to poverty reduction.” The World Bank’s (n.d.-a) mission is to end extreme 
poverty and to promote shared prosperity. The Asian Development Bank’s (n.d.) mission is to 
“to help developing member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their 
people.”  
Contrary to the multilateral development banks’ (MDBs) common development objective 
to reduce poverty based on economic advancement, Sen’s definition focuses on human freedom, 
instead of an individual’s poverty level. Sen (1999) equated development with the enhancement 
of human freedom, not only in terms of economic, but also political, social, and security factors. 
According to Sen (1999), development requires the “removal of the major sources of unfreedom: 
poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systemic social deprivation, 
neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance of overactivity of repressive states” (p. 3). This 
definition reflects the principles embedded in SDG 16: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies 
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for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN, n.d.). 
Further, Sen posits that development enables humans to avoid deprivations such as 
“starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as 
freedoms associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and 
uncensored speech” (p. 36). 
If development is equated to human freedom, then Sen’s definition therefore frames 
development as an end and not the means. Development is not the “evil” capitalism, as some 
scholars would argue that could result in socio-economic disparities eventually leading to 
rebellion or civil unrest. The act of providing international aid is not “development” in itself, but 
one of the means toward achieving development—which is defined by Sen as freedom from 
poverty and social deprivation. The provision of development aid is also one of the strategies to 
achieve the sustainable development goals (i.e., end poverty, end hunger). Hence, this study 
treats the concept of development as a result and not as a process, contrary to what economists 
would argue. Two of the definitions of development posited by Crow (2017), for example, are 
the “improvement or creation of something that does not exist but supposedly should” (p. 184) 
and the hierarchical nature of development such as having less developed, developing, and 
developed countries. This study views development neither as an improvement/creation process 
nor as a hierarchical system. However, this study agrees with Crow’s third definition of 
development as the “correct context”—though he does not qualify what this correct context is 
(except mentioning the concept of sustainable development)—which is aligned with Sen’s view 
of development as an end and not the means.  
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2.1.3 Fragile Situations 
Among scholars, a common definition of fragility refers to a condition wherein a country 
is vulnerable to, or has been recovering from conflict and/or natural disaster (Straubhaar, 2012). 
Moreover, viewing vulnerability from the lens of “complex interdependence among nations,” 
Keohane and Nye (2001) define vulnerability as “an actor’s liability to suffer costs by external 
events even after policies have been altered” (p. 11). Fragile situations are also vulnerable to 
external economic shocks and changes in policies by other states, particularly by the more 
powerful ones, as argued by Keohane and Nye (2001).  
Menocal (2011) confirms that there is wide agreement in the international community 
about the definition of a fragile situation, and this constitutes  
a state’s lack of authority or control over the whole of its territory and a lack of monopoly 
over the legitimate use of violence; persistently weak institutions and governance systems 
that often also lack legitimacy in the eyes of the population; and a fundamental lack of 
leadership, state capacity and/ or political will to fulfill essential state functions, 
especially in terms of providing basic services to the poor (p. 1715). 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) uses the term “fragile situations” instead of “fragile 
states” recognizing that some countries may not be fragile as a whole, but have subnational 
situations of fragility (i.e., conflict in Mindanao, Philippines). ADB (2014) defines fragility as 
“the state’s failure to perform its function effectively and provide basic social services, such as 
health, education, and security; incapacity to uphold the rule of law; and failure to provide 
sustainable sources of income for the population to get out of poverty” (p. 3). For the 
Organisation on Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2016), fragility is “a 
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combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system, and/or 
communities to manage, absorb, or mitigate those risks” (p. 21). 
The definitions of fragile situation presented above are not what this study is adopting. 
Fragile situation in this study does not refer to the characteristics of a government, but to the 
condition of a country or territory under a legitimate authority. Fragile situation is not just about 
the lack of state capacity, but also entails circumstances that inhibit the people from experiencing 
what Sen (1999) calls “human freedom,” or “development” as defined by this study. 
The World Bank maintains a list of fragile situations, which it originally called “low-
income countries under stress” in 2006 and defined as “countries with deteriorating governance, 
those in prolonged political crisis, post-conflict transition countries and those in gradual but still 
fragile reform processes” (World Bank, 2006). In 2009, the list was labeled as “fragile states,” 
and in 2010 “fragile situations” (World Bank, 2009/2010). The terminology “fragile state” has 
become a sensitive issue in the international development community, as aid recipient 
governments tend to view it with a negative connotation attached to the incumbent 
administration as being corrupt and ineffective. Another misconception is equating fragility with 
active conflict and post-conflict situations, thus some state leaders of countries not affected by 
conflict refused to label their countries as fragile. The small island states in the Pacific, for 
example, prefers to be labeled as vulnerable to climate change. 
This study uses “fragile situations” instead of “fragile states” to avoid the misconception 
of attributing this concept to governments. The definition of fragile situation in this study is 
drawn from Sen’s (1999) definition of development. If development is “human freedom,” then I 
define a fragile situation as being vulnerable to circumstances of “human unfreedom”—that is 
the lack of not just effective government, but also the lack of social, political, and economic self-
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determination; the lack of access to basic human rights such as education, health and justice; and 
the lack of peace and security.  
2.1.4 State-Society Resilience  
Resilience has been widely known as a concept attached to humanitarian and disaster 
response as well as economic shocks. Generally, it can be defined as one’s ability to cope with, 
adapt to, or rebound from crisis caused by conflict, natural disasters, or economic downturn. 
Over the last decade, applying the concept of resilience to broad-based development has become 
a fad. International development organizations have started to use “resilience” as a form of 
rhetoric in development investment and partnership agendas. But what does “resilience” really 
mean in the context of fragile situations? Resilience and fragility are often viewed as having a 
dichotomous relationship—both are on the opposite sides of the spectrum, in general; the former 
is positive and the latter is negative. Pospisil and Kuhn (2016) explain, “resilience can be 
analysed as the opposite vision to fragility” (p. 4). Similarly, OECD (2008) views fragility as 
residing “at the opposite pole of resilience” (p. 78). OECD (2008) treats resilience as a feature of 
states and social contracts as having “the ability to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness, 
or legitimacy.” Resilience, according to OECD (2008), “derives from a combination of capacity 
and resources, effective institutions and legitimacy, all of which are underpinned by political 
processes that mediate state-society relations and expectations. It is resilience in the social 
contract that creates stability in a state” (p. 78). Five years later, OECD (2013) introduced a new 
definition of resilience which is “the capacity of individuals, communities and states to absorb, 
adapt and transform to the shocks and risks that they should normally be expected to deal with” 
(p. 1).  
Two key questions have surfaced from the definitions above: (1) whose resilience are we 
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building? Are we building the resilience of the state, the civil society, the state opponents, the 
elites, the marginalized, the poor, the youth, and women and children?; and (2) how do we 
measure resilience in such a way that we can measure the aggregate resilience of all these 
stakeholders?  
On the question of whose resilience are we building and assessing, in the context of this 
study, we are building the resilience of states and societies; the state pertains to the government 
and the society refers to the citizens governed by the state—hence the research subject is state-
society resilience. Resilience does not reside in state control alone, but also in individuals, 
families, communities, and societies. Building resilience is the working of every individual and 
institution, from top to bottom, from the state leader to an ordinary citizen, from the executive 
branch to the local government and grassroots institutions. There have been many cases to 
support this aspect of resilience. In the case of Mindanao, Philippines, the signing of the peace 
agreement was not just due to the efforts of the conflicting parties (government and rebel groups) 
and the mediating international community. Without the contributions of grassroots communities 
and local women’s organizations to push for negotiation, the peace agreement could have been 
far from happening (Rico, 2015). At the borders of Thailand and Myanmar, a religious institution 
provides for the basic needs of the refugees, from birth registration to education and health 
services when no government help is available (San Gabriel, 2016). In Nepal, ethnic tensions 
regarding the constitution subsided with the intervention of two ordinary elders respected by the 
communities (San Gabriel, 2016). Everywhere in the world, there are thousands of stories where 
people in their communities help each other in times of disasters and calamities. 
This study therefore defines state-society resilience as the ability of individuals, families, 
communities, societies and the state, as a collective whole, to achieve human freedom (as Sen 
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defines it), so that as a community or a nation, they can withstand, adapt, and rebound in times of 
crisis. In this study, human freedom equates to development and entails effective governance, 
inclusive economic growth, human development, and a peaceful environment.  
On measuring state-society resilience, this study developed a composite resilience index 
with peacebuilding, human development, economic growth, and governance as indicators. These 
four concepts have been extracted from a sample of 694 development projects of AfDB, ADB, 
and WB using the cognitive anthropology approach (See Chapter 4.1). In short, the development 
interventions, which are meant to build state-society resilience in fragile situations, fall under 
these four domains. This study used these four domains to measure state-society resilience, and 
therefore this study defines resilience with the four concepts as the underlying themes.  
2.1.5 Human Development 
UNDP coincides with Sen’s definition of development as a form of freedom. The Human 
Development Report 2016 focuses on the inclusiveness of such freedom, wherein every human 
being should be able to realize his or her full potential. “Human development is the process of 
enlarging people’s choices,” according to UNDP (2016, p. 2). UNDP’s (2016) framework 
involves providing capabilities and opportunities for all individuals to experience good health, 
access to knowledge, human rights, human security, decent standard of living, non-
discrimination, dignity, and self-determination. Based on the cognitive anthropology research 
results of this study, human development interventions cover health, education, child protection, 
social security, and gender equality (see Chapter 4.1.3). 
2.1.6 Governance 
Guy Peters (2012) defines governance as the “capacity of government to steer the 
economy and society toward collective goals.” It involves “setting goals for the society, finding 
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the means to reach those goals, and then assessing the success or failure of those efforts as the 
precursor to a subsequent round of governance activities” (p. 2). Within the context of a fragile 
situation, I define governance as setting up policies and processes to improve a country’s 
economy, raise human development levels, and strengthen state institutions. I have drawn this 
definition from the four criteria used in donors’ country policy and institutional assessment—
economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion/equity, and public sector 
management and institutions. Economic management involves debt policy and management, 
fiscal policy, and monetary and exchange policies. Structural policies pertain to business 
regulatory environment and policies on finance and trade. Policies for social 
inclusion/equity refer to policies and institutions for environmental sustainability, social 
protection and labor, building human resources, equity of public resource use, and gender 
equality. Public sector management and institutions include transparency and accountability, and 
corruption in the public sector; quality of public administration; efficiency of revenue 
mobilization; quality of budgetary and financial management; and property rights and rule-based 
governance (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010). Based on the cognitive anthropology 
research results of this study, governance is fleshed out into private sector development; 
economic and financial management and policy reforms; support to development strategy; 
governance, transparency, and accountability; institutional capacity building; public sector 
reforms; community empowerment; community participation; and support to NGOs (see Chapter 
4.1.3). 
2.1.7 Economic Growth 
Hudson (2015) defines economic growth as “the continuing increase in per capita 
incomes or purchasing power” (p. 1). Economic growth is typically measured by a country’s 
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gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, particularly when economies are compared. GDP is the 
total value of goods and services produced by individuals, groups, and institutions in a country; 
and GDP per capita is the GDP value divided by the country’s total population. An exemption to 
this is the black-market economy or the shadow economy, such as illegal businesses, as well as 
personal services by friends and relatives, that cannot be traced by the government. The 
conventional theory of economic growth posits that the increase of inputs in labor and capital 
and of productivity raises the GDP (Hudson, 2015). Adam Smith and David Ricardo are two of 
the most influential thinkers on economic growth. Adam Smith (2013) believed that the wealth 
of a nation is characterized by its ability to produce useful goods and services (now known as the 
GDP), and not the amount of treasure it possesses. He espouses the importance of division of 
labor, innovation in technology, and capital investments as keys to greater productivity. David 
Ricardo (Hudson, 2015), on the other hand, introduced the theory of comparative advantage. 
Countries gain mutual benefit from trade by concentrating on what they are good at (that which 
they can produce with the most minimum opportunity costs), export that good, and import goods 
from other countries that can produce those goods with less opportunity costs. Based on the 
cognitive anthropology research results of this study (see Chapter 4.1.3), economic growth 
interventions involve infrastructure development, rural infrastructure development, urban 
development and poverty reduction, agriculture, environment sustainability, and climate 
proofing/climate resilience (which refers to making infrastructures resilient to climate change 
effects). 
2.1.8 Peacebuilding 
According to Galtung (1969), like a coin, peace has two sides—the negative peace and 
the positive peace. He defines negative peace as “the absence of personal violence” (or absence 
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of violence and war) and positive peace as the “absence of structural violence” (or the absence of 
social injustice) (p. 183). The sustainable form of peace is now being widely recognized in the 
international community. The UN Peacebuilding Commission (n.d.) defines peacebuilding 
through its mandate of “bringing together various actors, both national and international, to 
ensure that countries affected by conflict do not lapse or relapse into conflict…and building 
effective partnerships for sustaining peace.” While the three other variables (human 
development, good governance, and economic growth) are part of the peacebuilding process 
toward sustainability, this study treats this variable as having the goal of enabling the state to 
recover from conflict and preparing it for the development process. This study therefore 
operationalizes peacebuilding interventions in the form of physical security, recovery from 
conflict, support to the peace process, support to peacebuilding strategy, and crisis response and 
recovery (see results of cognitive anthropology research in Chapter 4.1.3). 
2.2 Traditional Approaches in Development Aid for Fragile Situations 
2.2.1 History of Development Aid 
There is much to learn in the history of development aid, and one can glean various 
insights and draw some conclusions on how national interests play out in international aid and 
how aid has changed the course of history since the end of World War II—from the so-called 
“independence” and “development” of colonies into economic interdependence among nations. 
This section does not cover all the important historical events nor provide an analysis of aid 
history, but the purpose of this section is to set the tone for the rest of the thesis by providing the 
historical account of how development aid was hatched even during the onset of World War II, 
and how aid has evolved since then. As the basis of that history, I am using the Fourteen-Point 
speech of President Woodrow Wilson in 1918 and the book Development of Aid written by 
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Gerard Van Bilzen (2015). The book has some limitations as its main focus is on the US as 
taking the lead role in driving the course of aid history. The UK was also mentioned as a 
significant player in the development of aid. There are yet many other key players in the 
development of aid, such as Japan, Russia, France, and now China entering the development 
game. Nevertheless, I am picking out some important historical accounts written by Bilzen, 
which I find relevant in the discourse of building state-society resilience in fragile situations. 
The Fourteen-Point Speech of President Woodrow Wilson, which he delivered to 
Congress on January 8, 1918 (nearing the end of World War I), shaped many of the subsequent 
US foreign policies, including on development aid. The speech was delivered with the interest to 
end the war and seek the participation of both the Allies and Central Powers to build lasting 
peace. Some of the points carry the principles of self-determination, free trade, and democracy 
(the third, fifth, and fourteenth points quoted below): 
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an 
equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating 
themselves for its maintenance. 
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based 
upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of 
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. 
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity 
to great and small states alike (Link, 1984, p. 536). 
 
President Wilson further stressed the principles behind the fourteen points, which is “the 
principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty 
and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak” (Link, 1984, p. 536)  
Advocacies on peace did not prevent World War II from happening. But even during the 
outbreak of World War II, there had been some efforts to develop the idea of economic 
interdependence that would eventually help restrain or at least mitigate future international wars. 
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The following historical account of development aid is based on the book Development of Aid 
written by Bilzen (2015). 
In 1941, within the auspices of the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace, a 
Commission member and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Eugene Staley, 
developed the theme development assistance, which involves educational and technical 
assistance and capital investments organized through international agencies. In his report World 
Economy in Transition, he discussed a world development program, which involves “an 
international long-term investment bank for financing world utilities” and “international transfer 
of knowledge and its industrial application” (Arndt, 1989 as cited in Bilzen, 2015, p. 90). These 
ideas were picked up by others, and in 1943, this was further supported by the speech of the 
Secretary of the Canadian Economic Advisory Council, Robert Bryce: “no nation can live unto 
itself alone, … we must have substantial loans from the richer states to the poorer states” (Arndt, 
1989 as cited in Bilzen, 2015, p. 90). 
The Commission’s study groups recommended the creation of international economic 
and financial institutions, and proposals were sent directly to President Roosevelt. Dr. Harry 
Dexter White from the Treasury Department and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations 
finally prepared a plan to create a monetary fund and a bank. In Great Britain, similar ideas were 
also being hatched, such as the creation of a World Central Bank and the economic advancement 
of underdeveloped areas. 
Meanwhile, there was growing unrest in the colonies of the United Kingdom. The UK 
officials in charge of the colonies recognized that the riots were due to bad social conditions, 
such as low wages, poor housing and sanitary conditions, and unemployment. In 1940, the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed, wherein “development” was intended to 
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enhance the economies of colonial powers, and “welfare” aimed to reduce social unrest. 
Development primarily involved infrastructure improvement to facilitate extraction of raw 
materials, and welfare was meant to provide basic services to the colonies, such as health, 
education, and housing.  
In 1940, as a response to a perceived security threat (primarily from the Germans), the 
US established the Office for Co-ordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the 
American Republics to stabilize economies, secure and deepen US influence, and combat the 
commercial and cultural penetration of the Axis powers in Latin America. The Office was later 
renamed as the Office of Inter-American Affairs of which primary aim was to develop transport 
networks in Latin America in order to safeguard the transport of defense machineries to Central 
America (related to the Panama Canal). 
In 1942, The American State Department published an official paper, Declaration of 
National Independence for Colonies, urging the old colonial powers to recognize the principle of 
independence (Betts, 1998 as cited in Bilzen, 2015). 
After World War II, the process of decolonization started. To get better access to foreign 
markets, the US supported the decolonization movement in several countries, espousing an 
“open door” policy. Perceiving the newly independent countries as easy prey for the Soviet 
Union, President Truman emphasized the importance of aid in facing the threat of communism. 
The US experienced an economic boom after World War II. The automobile, aviation, 
and electronics industries; the affordable housing mortgages for returning military personnel; and 
the continued military spending linked to the Cold War stimulated US economic growth. Many 
countries in Europe and Asia after World War II experienced quick economic recovery. The US 
played a key role in the economic recovery of postwar Europe through the Marshall Plan, signed 
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by President Truman in 1948 as the Economic Recovery Act. It was named after US Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall who proposed to reconstruct industries and infrastructures of European 
countries heavily damaged by war and to enable trade between those countries and the US 
(Bilzen, 2015). Having the competitive advantage, such as exclusive access to huge capital 
funds, many US-based multinational companies gained access to world markets, including the 
colonies. “The US Government made decolonization and especially free trade a top priority of 
their international economic policy and was keen to spread the free market message to foreign 
shores” (Beder, 2006 as cited in Bilzen, 2015, p. 88).  
President Herbert Hoover conceptualized the idea of humanitarian relief after World War 
II, which led to the creation of the Co-operative for American Remittances to Europe composed 
of representatives from civic, religious, charitable, and farm groups. It was later renamed Co-
operative American Relief Everywhere. Another important NGO created in the 1940s was the 
War Relief Services, which was later renamed Catholic Relief Services. 
In 1943, the US led the international consultations on the establishment of international 
financing institutions proposed by the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace and the 
Council on Foreign Relations. The US was interested in free access to markets while the UK was 
hesitant to open up privileges to its colonies. Both finally agreed on matters of currency 
stabilization, which led to the idea of establishing two entities, temporarily called “International 
Stabilisation Fund” and “International Clearing Union” or “World Central Bank.”  
In 1944, delegations from US, European nations, and developing countries met in a 
conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. There were contentions on what should be the 
priority of the proposed international agencies. The Soviet delegations and the European nations 
were interested in post-war reconstruction, while Mexico proposed that development should be 
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the priority. Eventually, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
now commonly referred to as the World Bank, was established to serve both purposes of 
reconstruction and development. As a result of the conference, the International Monetary Fund 
was also created “to ensure the stability of the international monetary system, avoiding the series 
of competitive devaluations leading to the Great Depression in the 1930’s” (Bilzen, 2015, p. 
104). The IMF and IBRD or World Bank served as a framework for economic cooperation 
intended to avoid repeating the events that led to World War II. 
Against a backdrop of the US being troubled with the spread of Communism, in 1949, 
President Truman delivered an inaugural speech outlining his foreign policy—"(1) Continued 
support to the United Nations; (2) Continued programmes for world economic recovery, first of 
all the European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan), plus a plan to reduce barriers to world 
trade; (3) Introduction of a North Atlantic Security Plan: creation of NATO; and (4) Initiate a 
bold new programme for underdeveloped areas” (Bilzen, 2015, p. 122). The last point led to the 
creation of bilateral aid programs linking economic development and national security. 
 The 1950s marked the beginning of development cooperation, and the process of 
decolonization continued during this period. Majority of development funds from donor 
countries were channeled to their former colonies—ensuring that the “underdeveloped” countries 
functioned efficiently by investing in local administration, security, and infrastructure. The 
investments were also intended to prevent rebellion against the former colonizer and restrain the 
colonies from joining the communist movement (CVCE, 2001 as cited in Bilzen, 2015). 
 In 1959, the US approved the Act of International Development (based on Truman’s 
point IV speech in 1949), which aimed to develop the resources and improve the living 
conditions of underdeveloped areas. The intention behind this, according to a spokesman for the 
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administration, was also to serve the economic and security interests of the US (Ohlin, 1966 as 
cited in Bilzen, 2015). The US provided an estimate of $1,437 million per year on “aid” projects, 
though some infrastructures had to do with military strategy (De Haan, 2009 as cited in Bilzen, 
2015). 
 The World Bank (IBRD) continued to provide loans to both the independent developing 
countries and the colonies. The loans had financed roads, ports, railways, power, industrial 
development, flood control, and irrigation. Infrastructure development was the key program 
supported by the World Bank, and social development such as health and education were not part 
of the development assistance despite demands from the borrowers on those social needs. 
 Several forms of aid modalities or conditionality (“strings attached to aid”) were 
introduced primarily by the US and the UK to the borrowing and/or recipient countries. Some of 
these modalities included:  
• Input conditionality, which “restricts the recipient´s discretion in the spending of inputs” 
(Martens, 2004 as cited in Bilzen, 2015, p. 184). 
• Process conditionality, which “concern[s] decisions on how an activity should be 
implemented (accounting requirements, administrative assurances of fiduciary 
responsibility, transparency, good management, capacity building, involvement of target 
population)” (Esman and Herring, 2001 as cited in Bilzen, 2015, p. 184). 
• Output conditionality, which “allow[s] a specific project to become a success, by 
requiring adequate pricing (energy, water, transport prices)” (Bilzen, 2015, p. 184). 
• Outcome or impact conditionality “relate[s] to a broader context allowing a project to 
become a success: removing specific subsidies on competing products and reforming 
institutions concerned (removing unnecessary bureaucracy)” (Bilzen, 2015, p. 184). 
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• Economic conditionality “may be limited to conditions exclusively at national level, 
requiring the Governments of receiving countries to follow sound economic policies. 
Economic conditions could also relate to more international environment, for example 
lifting import duties, allowing export of profits made on investments in developing 
countries and guaranteeing property rights” (Bilzen, 2015, pp. 184-185).  
• Political conditionality could relate to “the internal political situation of a developing 
country and linked to themes such as the respect of human rights, the introduction of 
democracy or good governance” (Schmitz, 2006 as cited in Bilzen, 2015, p.185).  
There are also “tied aid” wherein grants are tied to loans. These could be in the form of 
technical assistance of which purpose is to improve the knowledge and skills of the local labor or 
build the capacity of local institutions as inputs to larger capital investments such as 
infrastructures. 
In the 1960s, the development paradigm had shifted to agriculture. Recognizing hunger 
as the basic problem in developing countries, investments were concentrated to improving 
agriculture in addition to continued industrialization. In the 1970s, the social sector (e.g., health, 
nutrition, education, housing, social welfare) was added to agriculture and infrastructure sectors 
as areas for development investments. Poverty was recognized as the basic problem. More and 
more grants were given to developing countries, however they were tied to some conditionality, 
as discussed above. Poverty reduction strategies followed the UN resolution to ensure “a higher 
standard of living” and reduce “the gap between developed and developing countries” (Bilzen, 
2015, p. 337). 
 The 1980s saw the attempts of developed countries to resolve structural imbalances 
experienced by developing countries, such as inflation, huge debts, and fiscal deficits. Aid 
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continued to concentrate on the three main sectors: social sector, agriculture, and infrastructure. 
The UN General Assembly gave some guidelines for developed countries to substantially 
increase their official development assistance: “where possible surpassing the agreed 
international target of 0.7% of the gross national product of developed countries…A target of 1% 
should be reached as soon as possible thereafter” (UN, 1980 as cited in Bilzen, 2015, p. 416). 
 Structural adjustments continued in the 1990s. Poverty reduction and addressing 
structural imbalances remained a major target of the international agenda. Debt relief was 
attempted but diminished by the end of the decade for various reasons. For example, in 1985, the 
American Treasury Secretary James Baker hatched a debt relief plan called the “Baker Plan.” 
The plan aimed to identify 15 heavily indebted countries and proposed that the World Bank and 
the private banks provide new funding while these countries were undertaking structural 
adjustment reforms. However, the plan was not implemented because of the lack of consensus 
about which 15 countries should be given the debt relief. Many commercial banks also refused to 
provide new lending. In another instance, the World Bank refused to reschedule the old debts of 
the indebted countries, but instead provided new credits to them so that they could pay their 
commercial debts (Hancock, 1989 as cited in Bilzen, 2015).  Moreover, the social sector became 
the primary goal of development investments, seconded by infrastructures, while support to the 
agriculture sector had been gradually curbed.  
In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals were introduced and agreed upon by 193 
UN member states and 23 international organizations. Eradicating poverty was still at the core of 
the development agenda. Economic growth and debt relief were also part of the agenda. Country 
ownership, good governance, accountability, and human rights were some of the important 
principles embedded in development interventions. The War on Terror was associated with large 
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aid flows, with poverty eradication and income growth as strategy to prevent terrorism. Aid 
continued to concentrate on the social sector, while there was a dip in financing infrastructures, 
which “remained at about 18% of all aid” (Bilzen, 2015, p. 637). 
 There are several other multilateral organizations that followed the footsteps of the World 
Bank. ADB was established in the early 1960s to provide development aid to the Asia-Pacific 
region. It is a Japanese-led institution, with Japan, US, China, India, and Australia as the largest 
shareholders. The AfDB was established in 1964, with UK, US, and Japan as the largest 
shareholders, seeking to promote economic and social development in the African continent. In 
2014, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established, with China as the lead 
country and largest shareholder, of which goal is to finance building of infrastructure in the Asia-
Pacific region. The AIIB was said to be China’s response to slow reforms by IMF, WB, and 
ADB, which are dominated by the Americans, Europeans, and the Japanese. 
 The recent decade (2010-2019) saw some global partnerships in making aid more 
effective and the shift to more sustainable development approaches. The Sustainable 
Development Goals were introduced in 2015 to revise and/or update the Millennium 
Development Goals (See Table 1.1). The next section discusses the recent efforts of the 
international development community in improving development effectiveness, particularly in 
fragile situations.  
2.2.2 Recent Efforts to Improve Delivery of Aid in Fragile Situations 
Addressing fragility has become a major international agenda since 2005 beginning with 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, followed by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States and Situations (2007), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the Dili Declaration (2010), 
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g7+ Statements (2011), the Busan New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011), the Dili 
Consensus (2012), and the Washington Communiqué (2013) (ADB, 2015). 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness aims to “improve the quality of aid and its 
impact on development” ensuring that both donors and recipients are both accountable to their 
commitments (OECD, n.d.-a). Recognizing that fragile situations require a different development 
approach from those of non-fragile contexts (as fragile situations experience political instability, 
insecurities, and limited institutional capacities), donor countries established the OECD Fragile 
States Principles in 2007 (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: The 10 Fragile States Principles 
1. Take context as a starting point. 
2. Ensure all activities do no harm. 
3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective. 
4. Prioritise prevention. 
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. 
6. Promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies. 
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts. 
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors. 
9. Act fast…but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. 
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”). 
 
Source: OECD. (n.d.). Principles for fragile states and situations. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/thefragilestatesprinciplesfsps.htm 
 
 
The Accra Agenda for Action builds on the Paris Declaration and promotes recipient 
country ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering measurable results, and capacity 
development (OECD, n.d.-a) The Dili Declaration is a follow-up to Paris Declaration, the Fragile 
States Principles, and Accra Agenda for Action. Its focus is more on ending and preventing 
conflict by achieving a set of peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals 
 
• Foster inclusive political settlements and processes, and inclusive political dialogue. 
• Establish and strengthen basic safety and security. 
• Achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts and access to justice. 
• Develop effective and accountable government institutions to facilitate service delivery. 
• Create the foundations for inclusive economic development, including sustainable livelihoods, 
employment and effective management of natural resources. 
• Develop social capacities for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. 
• Foster regional stability and co-operation. 
 
Source: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. (n.d.). Dili Declaration: A new vision for 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/45250308.pdf 
 
 
The g7+, established in 2010, is an intergovernmental voluntary organization composed 
of countries facing active conflict or those that just recently experienced conflict. It has 20 
member countries from Asia, Africa, Pacific, and the Caribbean. Its purpose is to provide 
conflict and post-conflict countries an opportunity to share lessons learned and good practices on 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, advocate effective engagement in fragile situations and country-
led peacebuilding and statebuilding, and promote effective institutions (g7+, n.d.). 
The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is an agreement signed by more than 40 
countries and organizations at a high-level forum held in 2011 in Busan, Korea. Donors and 
recipient countries have committed to achieving five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals: 
“legitimate politics, justice, security, revenue and services, and economic foundations” 
(International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, n.d.) 
The Dili Consensus is an agreement made by the g7+ group of fragile states, Pacific 
Island countries, and a group of Portuguese-speaking African countries in 2013 (Republica 
Democratica De Timor-Leste, n.d.). They advocated for inclusive consultative processes to 
define their respective national development priorities, and sustained political commitment as 
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well as for including conflict and fragility issues in the post-2015 development agenda (which is 
now the Sustainable Development Goals). 
The Washington Communique is a response to the g7+ advocacy and a follow-up on the 
New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. It is a joint statement made by the members of The 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, composed of countries affected by 
conflict and fragility, donors, and civil society. The Washington Communique  
urges g7+ governments, bilateral and multilateral development partners, civil society, and 
the broader international community to step up their efforts to translate New Deal 
commitments into concrete changes in behaviour and practice, in support to country-
owned and country-led priorities, and consistent with national law and internationally 
agreed principles. (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2013) 
2.2.3 The Harmonized List of Fragile Situations 
 
In 2006, the World Bank classified 35 of its members as “low-income countries under 
stress,” now referred to by multilateral development banks as “fragile situations.” The World 
Bank (2006) defines “low-income countries under stress” as characterized by “deteriorating 
governance, prolonged political crisis, post-conflict transition countries, and those in gradual but 
still fragile reform processes” (p. 1).  In 2018, the World Bank’s definition of fragile situations is 
those with weak governance (with low harmonized score on country and policy institutional 
assessment by WB, AfDB, and ADB) and those that have the presence of UN peacekeeping 
missions in the past three years.  
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Table 2.4: Comparison of 2006 and 2018 List of Fragile Situations 
2006 Low-Income Countries Under Stress 2018 Fragile Situations 
 
1. Afghanistan  
2. Angola  
3. Burundi  
4. Cambodia  
5. Central African Republic   
6. Chad  
7. Comoros  
8. Congo, Democratic Republic  
9. Congo, Republic  
10. Côte d'Ivoire  
11. Djibouti  
12. Eritrea  
13. Gambia, The  
14. Guinea  
15. Guinea-Bissau  
16. Haiti  
17. Kosovo  
18. Lao, PDR  
19. Liberia  
20. Myanmar  
21. Nigeria 
22. Papua New Guinea 
23. Sao Tome and Principe  
24. Sierra Leone  
25. Solomon Islands 
26. Somalia  
27. Sudan  
28. Tajikistan 
29. Timor-Leste  
30. Togo  
31. Tonga  
32. Uzbekistan  
33. Vanuatu  
34. West Bank and Gaza 
35. Zimbabwe 
 
 
1. Afghanistan  
2. Burundi  
3. Central African Republic   
4. Chad  
5. Comoros  
6. Congo, Democratic Republic  
7. Congo, Republic  
8. Côte d'Ivoire  
9. Djibouti  
10. Eritrea  
11. Gambia, The  
12. Guinea-Bissau  
13. Haiti  
14. Iraq 
15. Kiribati  
16. Kosovo  
17. Lebanon 
18. Liberia  
19. Libya 
20. Mali  
21. Marshall Islands  
22. Micronesia, Federates States 
23. Mozambique 
24. Myanmar  
25. Papua New Guinea 
26. Sierra Leone  
27. Solomon Islands  
28. Somalia  
29. South Sudan  
30. Sudan  
31. Syria 
32. Togo  
33. Tuvalu 
34. West Bank and Gaza 
35. Yemen, Republic 
36. Zimbabwe 
Note: In bold letters are those countries considered fragile in 2006 and still remained in the 2018 list of fragile 
situations. 
 
Source: World Bank (n.d.). Harmonized list of fragile situations. Retrieved from 
www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations 
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In 2018, after channeling resources to help these countries overcome fragility, the number 
of countries in the fragile situations list has not changed. To date, there are 36 countries on the 
list, and 24 from this list were in the 2006 list, which means that 24 countries have not moved 
out of fragility despite 12 years of development interventions (Table 2.4).2 On the other hand, 
eleven countries from the 2006 list have moved out from the 2018 list. However, when countries 
moved out of the list, it does not mean that they are no longer fragile. Some of them might go a 
little above the arbitrary cutoff point of 3.2, but they still show some characteristics of fragility 
(Interview with ADB Director, May 18, 2018). 
2.2.4 How Multilateral Development Banks Make Funding Decisions in Fragile Situations 
The following is a summary of how ADB, WB, and AfDB make funding decisions in 
fragile situations. The information was extracted from semi-structured interviews with policy 
experts from ADB and WB, and from policy briefs from WB and AfDB. 
Asian Development Bank 
ADB’s definition of fragile and conflict-affected states is “countries that are both 
suffering from post-conflict situation and from fragile situation, either economically or 
susceptibility to economic shocks, climate change, and natural disasters.”3   
Differentiating fragility from conflict is important because it clarifies what type of 
financial instruments and measures to undertake to assist these countries. The concepts of 
fragility and conflict may be related but are very distinct from each other. Fragility may refer to 
vulnerability to natural disasters and weak governance while conflict may involve some 
underlying social and ethnic concerns. Fragility and conflict are lumped together for “aggregate 
convenience;” and that some of the Pacific member countries do not want to be labeled as fragile 
 
2 Syria, which had not been in the 2006 list, was listed in 2018 as a fragile situation. 
3 Interview with an ADB vice-president, May 22, 2019, Manila, Philippines. 
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and conflict-affected situations (the terminology used by ADB for its members that are in the 
WB’s fragile situations list), because they can be fragile but not conflict-affected.4 
Each country or region has its own specific issues or challenges. Fragility comes in 
different forms. For example, after the civil war in the Solomon Islands, the immediate 
assistance needed was rehabilitation of damaged infrastructures. Bilateral organizations would 
provide immediate social and humanitarian assistance while MDBs would address the structural 
concerns, such as infrastructure and governance. ADB also works with governments and 
oppositions to address important policies concerning all parties.5 Cofinancing and joint capacity 
building for the government is also done with World Bank, Australia, and New Zealand.6 
Larger fragile states have country partnership strategies that outline the interventions to 
be funded by ADB, and smaller fragile states have a broader regional partnership strategy.7 Each 
year, ADB undertakes programming missions. The country team talks to government officials 
about what the government’s priorities are. The government knows how much money is 
available for them and the type of intervention they choose depends on the size of the funds. The 
development projects are then programmed within a three-year rolling pipeline.8  
ADB determines how much money is available for the country based on two criteria: first 
is if the fragile state is eligible for concessional funds (determined by a set of criteria such as the 
overall size of the funds provided by donors, and the country’s GDP per capita, population, and 
debt level); and second is the performance-based allocation (determined by the country’s 
performance in economic management, structural policies, social inclusion, and public sector 
management). Concessional funds come from the Asian Development Fund or ADF, in which 
 
4 Interview with an ADB senior adviser to the President, May 22, 2019, Manila, Philippines. 
5 Interview with an ADB senior adviser to the President, May 22, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
6 Interview with an ADB director, May 18, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
7 Interview with an ADB vice-president, May 22, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
8 Interview with an ADB director, May 18, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
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donor countries commit money every four years, and are not affected by any international issues 
(though one of the donor countries may stop putting in money into the ADF if it chooses to, for 
economic or political reasons). The funds can be either a loan or a grant. The decision whether 
the funding would be a grant or loan is based on a country’s level of debt stress. The 
International Monetary Fund assesses a country’s debt sustainability. Countries that are high-risk 
will only be given grant funds, those that are medium-risk get a 50% loan, and those that are 
low-risk receive a 100% concessional loan.9   
However, ADB has been providing a minimum allocation of US$6 million per fragile 
Pacific state annually; this allocation is not affected by the country’s performance.10 Donors plan 
to double the base allocation to between US$12 and US$13 million.11 For Afghanistan, there is a 
special set aside from the Asian Development Fund. Though Afghanistan is still subject to a 
performance-based allocation system (PBA), the PBA does not fully determine how much 
money the country should receive. Afghanistan is expected to perform relatively poorly because 
its governance systems and structures are not yet well developed. For countries that are eligible 
to ordinary capital resources, economic indicators and their sustainability are used as a basis for 
how much aid is to be provided. ADB’s fragile states can also avail funds from the Disaster Risk 
Insurance Program when they are struck by a natural disaster. Under the program, ADB supports 
the state in undertaking governance reforms or resilience-oriented reforms to strengthen its 
ability to respond to calamities.12 
Changes in government administration also impact the level of funds, as the priority of 
the country also changes. For example, in the Philippines, former President Benigno Aquino III 
 
9 Interview with an ADB director, May 18, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
10 Interview with an ADB vice-president, May 22, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
11 Interview with an ADB senior adviser to the President, May 22, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
12 Interview with an ADB vice-president, May 22, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
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(2010-2016) focused on public-private partnerships, while the current administration of President 
Rodrigo Duterte (2016-present) is more focused on infrastructure, for which ADB has a lot of 
experience, and this has increased ADB’s level of engagement in the Philippines. Changes in the 
government administration’s priorities also affect ADB’s level of engagement and funding in 
fragile situations. ADB and its member countries however have medium-term development 
plans, which tend to coincide with political cycles.13  
Further, political instability or frequent changes of government may not cause security 
issues, but they may slow down the development process. Even though there are country 
partnership strategies, they are very broad, and the current government can easily determine 
which part of the strategy they would like to focus on, launching their own programs that are 
opposed to the previous government. For example, in Kiribati, former President Anote Tong 
(2003-2016) focused on dealing with the impact of climate change by educating and training the 
people. The current government of President Taneti Maamau (2016-present) has a totally 
different focus, which is building roads in the outer islands. Though education and training are in 
place, sustainability of such programs is weakened with the change of focus by the current 
administration.14  
World Bank 
The World Bank classifies its fragile member states into four categories for financing 
purposes under the International Development Association (IDA): 
• Countries receiving allocations based on IDA’s performance-based allocations 
(PBA) system 
• Countries receiving exceptional post-conflict allocations 
• Countries receiving exceptional allocations upon re-engaging with IDA after a 
prolonged period of inactivity, but which did not qualify for post-conflict assistance 
 
13 Interview with an ADB vice-president, May 22, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
14 Interview with an ADB director, May 18, 2018, Manila, Philippines. 
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• Countries that do not receive any IDA financing because they are in arrears on IDA 
repayments. (World Bank, 2018-a) 
 
IDA funding is not designed solely for fragile states but generally for World Bank’s 
poorest member countries wherein most of them are among the fragile situations list. Aside from 
IDA, fragile states can also avail funding from various sources such as the State- and Peace-
Building Fund (SPF), Korean Trust Fund, Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF), and special 
allocations.  
The SPF supports those countries that are at risk of reverting back into crisis or critical 
debts by funding initiatives on improving governance and institutional performance, as well as 
reconstruction and development. It also supports development of strategies to prevent violence, 
conflict, and fragility at regional, country, and subnational levels.  
The Korean Trust Fund supports the same objective as the SPF—improving governance 
and institutional performance as well as reconstruction and development in fragile and conflict-
affected situations. The MDTF, on the other hand, is a pool of funding from multiple donors that 
is used to support countries in post-conflict or post-disaster environments. MDTF allows other 
countries that are not IDA eligible to avail funding to strengthen their economies and 
governance—helping them address arrears and become eligible for IDA support.  
The World Bank also provides special allocations for countries emerging from severe 
conflict and countries reengaging with IDA after a prolonged disengagement. Additional 
resources are provided in these countries based on their performance as measured by the Post-
Conflict Performance Indicators Framework and/or portfolio rating.   
African Development Bank 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) has a policy for engaging with fragile situations, 
called the “Policy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States.” The policy aims to “assist fragile 
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states move from the condition of fragility to a path of sustainable recovery and development by 
providing them with tailored assistance at critical junctures of their re-engagement and recovery 
process” (AfDB, 2010, p. 1). AfDB has established the Fragile State Facility as a financing 
mechanism covering supplemental support, arrear clearance, and targeted support. 
The supplemental support is allocated for post-crisis and/or transition countries to invest 
on infrastructures, rehabilitate the country, and improve governance. The arrears clearance aims 
to help eligible countries clear their debts that should have been paid earlier. The targeted 
support is allocated for capacity building, service delivery, and knowledge development; it 
focuses on public finance management and administration, private sector and institutional 
development, agriculture and extractive industries, and social sectors. 
Funds from the Fragile State Fragility are allocated using the performance-based 
allocation (PBA) partly. AfDB has another funding facility for fragile situations, which is the 
African Development Fund wherein funding decisions are entirely based on the PBA. According 
to its policy brief, AfDB (2010) recognizes the inadequacy of the PBA system, “which does not 
fully capture the extent of vulnerability and the underlying structural conditions of fragile 
states;” and that the PBA “further penalizes fragility and takes away the opportunity of using aid 
to improve stability and the policy environment” (p. 4).  
This chapter distinguished the study’s definition of key concepts (i.e., development, 
fragile situations, and state-society resilience) from the definitions provided in the literature. The 
history of aid, the recent efforts to improve aid effectiveness, and the MDBs’ funding policies in 
fragile situations clarified how this research is framed within the broader system of international 
development. The next chapter brings the discussion from international policies and practices 
into an academic lens by analyzing the theories linking development aid to peacebuilding and 
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statebuilding and highlighting the study’s knowledge contribution to both academic field and 
development practice.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT AID IN PEACEBUILDING AND 
STATEBUILDING IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS 
 
The international community recognizes the inherent risks of implementing development 
programs in fragile situations compared with non-fragile situations. San Gabriel and Jnawali 
(2018) emphasize that in a fragile post-conflict situation, “the political and social fabric is newly 
woven, and it may be torn with only slight provocation” (p. 84). Building infrastructures in a 
post-conflict situation, for example, may include turning farmlands into roads and power plants, 
which may disrupt the livelihood of the affected communities, or worse may cause land 
grabbing, if there are no effective land administration policies in place. Without appropriate 
social safeguards, development may cause grievances and tensions among the affected people. 
The impact of infrastructure development on the affected and surrounding communities as well 
as on the ecosystem has to be assessed carefully, and measures to mitigate the risks of degrading 
the environment, disrupting wildlife ecosystem, and causing loss of resources and livelihood 
among the locals should be considered. On the issue of land grabbing, in many fragile situations, 
land ownership is communal and land titles are not clear on important details, such as who the 
owners are and what the demarcations are. In many cases, lands are inherited outside of the legal 
processes since the government often lacks efficient land administration systems. If the 
government buys the land from private citizens for the purpose of infrastructure development 
(which is funded by international donors), and one of the landowners sold it without the 
knowledge and consent of other owners, and in connivance with corrupt government officials or 
employees, then conflict among the communities and between the communities and local 
government may arise, and the reputation of the donor is also at stake. 
Moreover, fragile situations are not necessarily those that have active conflict, but also 
those that have been recovering from conflict or those that are vulnerable to natural disasters due 
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to weak state capacity to handle such situations. Peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, 
regardless of whether the context is conflict-affected or not, have been an important aspect of 
development. 
3.1 Development Aid and Peacebuilding 
The UN Peacebuilding Commission (n.d.) defines peacebuilding through its mandate of 
“bringing together various actors, both national and international, to ensure that countries 
affected by conflict do not lapse or relapse into conflict…and building effective partnerships for 
sustaining peace.” Richmond (2013) criticizes international actors’ rhetoric on peacebuilding as a 
form of liberal ideology dictated by Western norms. Peacebuilding, according to Richmond 
(2013), “focuses on external support for liberally oriented, rights-based institutions with a focus 
on norms, civil society and a social contract via representative institutions embedded in a rule of 
law” (p. 383). Richmond (2013) further emphasizes the importance of local actors in 
peacebuilding, whom he characterizes as opposing the neoliberal approach’s “tendency to 
compromise with elite interests” (p. 395). This implies that resilience building is not only 
performed by international actors but also by local actors, which brings us to the question of this 
study on what would be the impact of international processes, such as provision of development 
aid, on the local processes of peacebuilding—does foreign aid help local actors build peace? 
There are conflicting views on whether foreign aid promotes peace. There are several 
studies claiming that development aid can promote peace and reduce the likelihood of conflict 
(Azram & Mesnard, 2003; Collier, 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; 
Fearon, 2004; Franke et al., 2007; and Savun & Tirone, 2011). On the other hand, there are 
studies arguing that aid does not necessarily make a country more peaceful. These studies 
suggest that aid does not lead to peace at all times (Uvin, 1999); can trigger conflict by 
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disrupting the status quo (Miller, 2014); and can only provide temporary absence of violence, but 
does not lead to sustainable peace (Holt, 2005).  
Paul Collier (2007) argues that civil war is more likely in low-income or less developed 
countries, stating that “if the economy is weak, the state is also likely to be weak, and so 
rebellion is not difficult” (p. 21). Collier describes a low-income state as mired with poverty, low 
growth, and hopelessness; and joining a rebel group could give an individual an array of hope to 
get rich. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) claim that neither aid nor policy has a direct effect upon the 
risk of conflict because aid is difficult to capture by rebels during conflict since aid is lessened 
and accrued in the government budget. The indirect effects of aid are on income growth and 
structure, strengthening the economy that allows the government to increase military spending 
and make rebellion difficult to occur. Fearon (2004) supports the idea that aid can catalyze 
economic progress and strengthen state capacity, thereby reducing the probability of conflict. In 
the context of newly democratizing countries, civil war is less likely to happen in countries that 
receive high levels of aid because aid reduces the uncertainties and commitment problems of 
newly established governance that is still weak (Savun & Tirone, 2011).   
Moreover, some scholars claim that development aid focusing on improving governance, 
particularly in states that are rich in natural resources, can decrease the risk of conflict. Franke, 
Hample-Milagrosa, and Schure (2007) conducted a study on the correlation between natural 
resources and violent conflict. The study concludes that “resource abundance as well as resource 
dependence positively correlates with both the risk and the duration of violent conflict;” and that 
“strengthening good governance in general and good resource governance in particular are 
concrete measures the international community must take to reverse the resource curse and build 
sustainable peace and development” (p. 25). This goes back to the argument of Fearon (2004) 
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that aid can strengthen the state’s capacity for good governance particularly in managing the 
country’s natural resources. The state’s capacity for good governance enhances its credibility for 
redistributing economic wealth to excluded groups that are likely to rebel (Azram & Mesnard, 
2003). 
While the theorists and scholars above largely attribute peace to development, there are 
those who recognize that development has the potential to trigger conflict, though not totally 
disregarding aid’s potential to build peace. In 1998, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (Uvin, 1999) conducted four case studies in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda, and 
Sri Lanka to test whether its Official Development Assistance can reduce violent conflict or 
build durable peace. Of these four cases, only Bosnia ended with a peace accord, and in the three 
other countries, violence and civil war continued. Bosnia received large attention from the world 
press and policymakers. Sri Lanka was forgotten, according to the study. The Taliban in 
Afghanistan continues to wage war within the country. In Rwanda, there were international 
contacts, but this did not preclude genocide. A fundamental lesson from these cases is  
All aid, at all times, creates incentives and disincentives, for peace or for war regardless 
of whether these effects are deliberate, recognised or not, before, during or after war. The 
issue is then not whether or not to create (dis)incentives but, rather, how to manage them 
so as to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-violent conflict resolution 
(Uvin, 1999, p. 4).  
Another interesting study is on the Mannar District of Sri Lanka that experienced 
damaged infrastructures, mass displacement, and loss of lives as a result of war between 
government forces and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam. The study highlights that 
development assistance has created a positive impact on war-affected communities by providing 
44 
 
livelihood skills and opportunities and rehabilitation of infrastructures, such as roads, electricity, 
water, and irrigation. However, Holt (2005) questioned the impact of these activities to the peace 
process and concluded that nothing has changed since 2002 in terms of conflict, stating that the 
“issues at the heart of Sri Lanka’s war remain untouched by donor funds” and aid “has bought 
time; it has not bought peace” (p. 192).  
Robert Miller (2014) explored the prospects of aid as a peacemaker and concluded that 
while the prospects for peace can be tied to development, aid can disturb the status quo and the 
balance of power among groups and individuals, which may result in steadily rising levels of 
conflict and violence. The protracted conflict in Afghanistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, and 
Namibia, for example, are characterized by socioeconomic inequalities, oppression of ethnic 
minorities, and widespread violation of human rights; and the process of development can 
intensify historic tensions among different groups in these countries. The case of El Salvador 
illustrates that such conflicts are largely attributed to inequitable sharing of the benefits of 
development. During the 1950s and 1960s, the cotton industry was booming in the country. 
Cotton production does not only need good land but also fertilizers, pesticides, and labor; hence 
the cotton business becomes capital intensive, giving a great advantage to wealthy landowners, 
and disadvantaging the landless proletariat who can only survive as laborers (Close, 2014). Such 
social and economic disparities have led to protracted conflicts in the country between the 
privileged and the less privileged groups. Though El Salvador has received development 
assistance since the 1960s, the internal conflict cannot be solely attributed to aid; and neither 
history show that aid has helped the country resolve socio-economic disparities that have led to 
violent conflict. 
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Those studies that employ deductive approaches arrive at a common conclusion, which is 
the positive effect of development aid on peace. They have all framed the dependent variable as 
“negative peace” (as coined by John Galtung, 1969) or the absence of violence, though they 
articulate this concept in various ways: less likelihood of war (Collier, 2007), rebellion is 
difficult to occur (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002), reduced probability of conflict (Fearon, 2004), civil 
war is less likely to occur (Savun & Tirone, 2011), mitigation of insurgency (Azram & Mesnard, 
2003), risk and duration of conflict (Franke et al., 2007). By contrast, those studies that used 
inductive approaches and focused on specific country cases conclude that aid is not a direct 
cause of conflict; however, it becomes an enabler of inequality that could lead to more conflict. 
These studies have framed the dependent variable as “positive peace,” which provides important 
conditions to achieve “negative peace” or absence of violence. These conditions may include 
social, economic, and political freedoms (as Sen [1999] pointed out). The Institute for 
Economics and Peace (2017) further identifies these conditions as “well-functioning 
government, sound business environment, low levels of corruption, high levels of human capital, 
free flow of information, good relations with neighbors, equitable distribution of resources, and 
acceptance of the rights of others” (p. 133). 
The studies discussed above have conflicting views on whether aid can help states and 
societies become more resilient to conflict or whether aid can help build peace. Peace, as a 
concept, has a complex definition. Fragility may not just be a cause or consequence of war (or 
the absence of peace), but also of the absence of the social, economic, and political conditions 
for sustainable peace. Looking at whether aid for each of these conditions has positive or 
negative impacts on the resilience of states and societies may shed light on the conflicting views 
about whether aid can resolve fragility. This study therefore proposes to flesh out “positive 
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peace,” (or sustainable peace) instead of using the “negative peace” (or the absence of violence) 
as a variable for examining the relationship between development aid and state-society 
resilience. 
Johan Galtung (1969) refers to “positive peace” as the absence of structural violence, and 
to “negative peace” as the absence of physical or personal violence. According to Galtung (1969) 
personal violence can be anatomical, such as crushing, tearing, piercing, burning, poisoning or 
evaporation (nuclear weapon); or physiological, such as denial of air, water, food, and 
movement—and all these can be tools for war. Structural violence, on the other hand, refers to 
social injustice and inequality—a condition where “resources are unevenly distributed” and “the 
power to decide the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed” (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). If 
a person is poor, then he/she has little or no access to health and education, because income, 
health, and education are tied to social structure, where every interaction has some value. Simply 
put, for example, without money, you cannot go to college nor pay your medical bills. Galtung 
(1969) further emphasizes that if the actual falls below the potential (such as health, life 
expectancy, education)—while this should be avoidable—then violence is present. 
Positive peace therefore is fulfilling the potentialities of human beings within the social 
system, as defined by Galtung; and this concept is similar to development as human freedoms as 
posited by Sen (1999). All these concepts are tied to state-society resilience—wherein both the 
state and the society collaborate to build the social system, which allows people to experience 
development and human freedoms. As I have defined earlier, fragile situation is vulnerability to 
circumstances of human unfreedom, while state-society resilience is a collective ability of state 
and society to achieve human freedom so that people can cope, adapt, and rebound to crises, be it 
conflict, natural disasters, or economic crisis. This study has measured state-society resilience—
47 
 
using peacebuilding, governance, human development, and economic growth as indicators—all 
of which are elements of development, which we can either refer to as the process for achieving 
human freedom or the end result in itself as “human freedom.” Analyzing the impact of 
development aid on state-society resilience therefore is critical, because development aid is part 
of the social system, which is under the legitimate authority of the state and where every of its 
element has value; and development aid has a value as a resource but whether it is valuable to 
state-society resilience is in question, and so far it is not clear how impactful such a resource is to 
achieving “human freedom” and “positive peace.” 
3.2 Development Aid and Statebuilding 
 The UN Charter states that, “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other 
peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the 
judgment of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations” (United 
Nations, n.d.) Integrating the fragile states into the international community therefore, not only 
requires peacebuilding but also statebuilding efforts—a country must not only be “peace-loving” 
but is also capable of fulfilling its international obligations. 
OECD (2009) defines statebuilding as a “purposeful action to develop the capacity, 
institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating 
the mutual demands between state and societal groups” (p. 72). Richmond (2013) views 
statebuilding as a parallel to peacebuilding, but often statebuilding is subsumed under 
peacebuilding efforts. Statebuilding, according to Richmond (2013) focuses on “the role of 
external actors, organisations, donors, IFI [international financial institutions], agencies and 
INGOs [international non-government organizations] in building liberal institutions for security, 
democracy and markets, and creating basic infrastructure. They apply international technical 
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expertise and capacity” (p. 382). Richmond (2013) emphasizes that this type of statebuilding is 
“failed by design” (p. 378) as a result of externally formulated frameworks from the Western and 
international actors. In the development realm, this claim is supported by several studies 
suggesting that aid has been ineffective due to unsound performance-based models on aid 
allocation, lack of coordination among donors, donor and recipient governments’ tendency to 
rush on creating partnerships (which leads to aid fractionalization and volatility), corruption as a 
major obstacle in development, a democratic system that increases rent-seeking, and cultural 
differences between international and local actors.  
Paul (2015) argues that performance-based aid models or conditionality do not work for 
recipient countries because the process is misguided and “is grounded in an oversimplified 
incentive model that does not take into account the real functioning of institutions in recipient 
countries” (p. 320). Fuchs, Nunnenkamp, and Ohler (2015) posit that the lack of coordination 
among donors—which is a result of economic and political self-interest—contributes to aid 
ineffectiveness.  
The study by Frot, Olofsgard, and Berlin (2014) finds that the Eastern transition or the 
sudden collapse of communism and establishment of newly democratic countries lead to a rush 
in establishing new partnerships between the donor and the recipient country, which then lead to 
“a surge in aid fractionalization and high levels of aid volatility and unpredictability” (p. 136). 
They explained this rush from two perspectives—the realist, which emphasizes a donor 
country’s desire to compete with others given the first mover advantage in establishing 
relationships with a new regime; and the liberalist, which highlights development in poor 
countries as a public good. According to the authors, “the strategic and commercial interests will 
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dominate the allocation of aid early on, which may have negative consequences on the ability of 
aid to promote development and alleviate poverty” (Frot et al., 2014, p. 136).  
Connor (2012) argues that corruption is a major obstacle in the development of 
Afghanistan, and at the same time, aid is also a resource for corruption. Corruption is perceived 
to be emanating from the government, which causes skepticism and mistrust among the Afghan 
population about the positive outcome of development aid. He further stresses that the impact of 
corruption on development efforts is the same as that of insurgency. On the part of donors, the 
author posits that there is pressure among donor governments to spend large sums of aid quickly 
to see tangible evidence in a short period of time.  
Verkoren and Kamphuis (2013) argue that strengthening state institutions will not work 
as “more aid ownership and strengthening of the Afghan bureaucracy will simply consolidate aid 
rentierism rather than reverse-engineer a market democracy” (p. 501).15 This is because those in 
power will allocate aid to their supporters and not for tax collection and productivity 
enhancement, as intended by donor governments. The authors suggest that economic 
productivity should be the focus of Afghan development and state formation, particularly 
stimulating domestic businesses and collecting taxes. They also recommend that “economic 
development may initially need to be prioritized over democracy” (Verkoren & Kamphuis, 2013, 
p. 517) since a democratic system provides a short period for rulers to be in power which makes 
them more aggressive in committing corruption.  
Minasyan (2015) looks into the cultural differences of development providers and 
recipients as impacting aid effectiveness. Using 66 recipient countries as a sample during the 
 
15 Costello (2016) explains rentierism as coming from the word “rent” which is the “portion of revenue that exists after the costs 
of production are accounted for” (p. 209). Those who have access to rent can use this economic surplus to advance their political 
interests such as buying citizen support or suppressing citizen unrest. 
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period 1961-2010, the study finds that donor-recipient cultural differences have adverse impact 
on aid-growth nexus and suggests for donors to focus on “culturally closer regions and/or engage 
in long-term commitments at the local level” (Minasyan, 2015, p. 320).  
The studies identified above point to the failure of the international community’s 
statebuilding efforts in fragile situations. Critiques focus on the failures and shortcoming of 
donors and international actors. Scholars agree that aid interventions have weak design 
frameworks characterized by unsound performance-based models on aid allocation, lack of 
coordination among donors, donor and recipient governments’ tendency to rush on creating 
partnerships (which leads to aid fractionalization and volatility), and a democratic system that 
increases rent-seeking. The failed design is further aggravated by corruption as a major obstacle 
in development and cultural differences between international and local actors.  
Having weak state systems, fragile situations are left incapable of managing the effects of 
external economic shocks and policy changes by other states (Keohane and Nye, 2001), as well 
as the external and internal risks of conflict and the threats of natural disasters—creating 
spillover effects to their neighboring countries such as influx of refugees and migrants, illegal 
smuggling (of goods, humans, and drugs), as well as the spread of terrorism. The studies view 
international aid as complicating the efforts to build state-society resilience, however, an aspect 
that is overlooked here is—is aid directly complicating fragility? Are we overestimating or 
underestimating the impact of aid?  
Richmond (2013) ties the definition of statebuilding to the international community’s 
involvement in building legitimate and capable institutions. This definition leads us to another 
question, which is—do fragile states need aid to build their own capacity and to strengthen state-
society relations? If so, what kind of capacities should be built and under what circumstances is 
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aid required and not required? Is it when peace is absent, when governance is weak, when people 
have no access to basic needs, and/or when the economy is failing? This study attempts to 
answer these questions by testing the impact of aid for each of the four aspects of capacity 
interventions—peacebuilding, governance, human development, and economic growth—on 
state-society resilience. In addition, this study presents empirical evidence (using regression and 
case analyses) on the behavior of aid flow in each of the four conditions—when peace is absent, 
when governance is weak, when people have no access to basic needs, and/or when the economy 
is failing. 
Based on Sen’s (1999) definition of development as human freedom from economic, 
social, and political oppression, I argue that what makes a situation fragile is the lack of or 
insufficient capacity to promote economic growth, human development, and good governance. In 
a conflict-affected state, peacebuilding (pertaining to recovery from conflict) is a prerequisite to 
achieving economic growth, human development, and good governance. 
While the literature broadly asks whether donors have been successful in peacebuilding 
and statebuilding in fragile situations, this study explores how donors behave toward fragile 
situations in aid allocation, and how aid allocation for economic growth, human development, 
and good governance respectively impact state-society resilience in fragile situations. For the 
purpose of clarification of concepts, I find it useful to reiterate here the meaning of fragility and 
resilience. This study defines fragility as vulnerability to “human unfreedoms,” while resilience 
is the ability to achieve development or “human freedoms” so that states and societies can cope 
with, adapt to, and rebound from crises. Though Pospisil and Kuhn (2016) and OECD (2008) 
argue that fragility and resilience are dichotomous, this study, under fragile contexts, treats these 
concepts as not necessarily binary and not exactly opposite. There are specific circumstances 
52 
 
wherein states and societies can be fragile and there are instances wherein they can be resilient. 
For example, states and societies can be vulnerable to natural disasters, yet they are resilient to 
conflict due to the presence of respected community leaders and elders who act as conflict 
mediators. A fragile situation (or specifically a territory located in remote areas, not accessible 
by government’s basic services) can be labeled as below the poverty line, yet the people have 
longer life expectancies and are healthier than those in non-fragile urban areas, because people in 
remote areas, close to nature (lakes, seas, forests) have access to fresh air and food. Therefore, in 
fragile situations, fragility is not necessarily the absence of resilience, and resilience is not 
necessarily the absence of fragility—the reason for this study having fleshed out the elements of 
state-society resilience into four domains—peacebuilding, governance, human development, and 
economic growth. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 
One of the key messages of the OECD States of Fragility (2018) is to “invest in more and 
smarter aid in fragile contexts.” A key question in this study is that, is it effective to invest more 
in fragile contexts in order to build state-society resilience? Below are the research questions and 
hypotheses of this work. 
Research Questions 
 
1. How impactful is development aid in building the resilience of states and societies in 
fragile situations listed in the harmonized list of World Bank, African Development 
Bank, and Asian Development Bank? 
2. Which areas of development interventions (peacebuilding, governance, economic growth, 
human development) targeted through aid have had the most impact on the resilience of 
states and societies in fragile situations? In what situations does aid tend to increase or 
decrease in fragile contexts? When they are more resilient or more fragile? When they are 
more peaceful or less peaceful? When there is strong or weak government? When the 
economy is growing or failing? When citizens have access to basic services or otherwise? 
3. How do such interventions impact resilience? Do they make states and societies more 
resilient or more fragile? Why and how? 
4. Are fragility levels related (or not) to aid flow?  
Hypotheses 
1.  Development aid helps build state-society resilience in fragile situations.  
Providing development aid is perceived as a major resilience building effort of the 
international community. Former United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (1992) 
links development to peace emphasizing that social and economic development is an 
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important conflict prevention measure. Paul Collier (2007) argues that civil war is more 
likely in low-income or less developed countries, stating that “…if the economy is weak, 
the state is also likely to be weak, and so rebellion is not difficult…” (p. 21). Aid 
interventions that have been designed and implemented appropriately, that is, following 
OECD’s “do-no-harm principles” can help fragile situations become more resilient to 
conflict and natural disasters (See Chapter 3.1).  
2. Aid for governance, human development, and peacebuilding helps states and societies in 
fragile situations become more resilient. 
Good governance, that is, having sound policies and effective institutions, reduces 
the probability of conflict by enabling a more equal distribution of wealth; creates a 
conducive environment for businesses to prosper; and provides citizens a better quality of 
life. The study by Franke, Hample-Milagrosa, and Schure (2007) recommends 
“strengthening good governance in general and good resource governance in particular 
are concrete measures the international community must take to reverse the resource 
curse and build sustainable peace and development” (p. 25) (See Chapters 2.1.6 and 3.1). 
Human development interventions may contribute to less probability for 
grievance, violence, and conflict; and citizens become more productive contributing to 
economic growth (Sen, 1999) (See Chapters 2.1.2 and 2.1.5). 
Aid for peacebuilding, that is, conflict prevention and recovery, can help states 
and societies build resilience to conflict (Savun & Tirone 2011) (See Chapter 3.1). The 
case of Mindanao, Philippines demonstrates that peacebuilding interventions by the 
international community have ushered the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic 
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Liberation Front to resolve their 40-year old conflict through the peace process (See 
Chapter 5.1). 
3.  Aid for economic growth may contribute to fragility, if the benefits are unequal and 
exclusive to a specific population or territory. 
Aid for economic growth, though not directly causing conflict, can create socio-
economic disparities (Miller, 2014). Such inequality takes place when there are a few 
people who benefit from economic surpluses in the absence of check-and-balance 
mechanisms in the state bureaucracy (See Chapter 3.1). A study by Koubi and Bohmelt 
(2013) finds that although a higher GDP per capita can reduce the probability of conflict 
outbreak, the unequal distribution of wealth may result in grievances and ultimately in 
civil conflict.    
4. Aid flow, in general, tends to increase in more fragile or less resilient situations. 
When state fragility increases, aid increases. Afghanistan and Vietnam received 
the largest financial assistance from the European Union during the period 2007-2013 
(Hoang, 2014). Both countries have been labeled as a “donor darling” as they receive 
bigger aid funds compared to other countries that have better governance and economic 
status—Afghanistan is a post-conflict state while Vietnam is a lower-middle income 
country. In his study, Hoang (2014) highlights Vietnam as an aid darling because the EU 
finds it as a potential avenue to advance its trade and political interests; while List (2013) 
posits that donors use aid as a tool to combat terrorism in fragile states, such as 
Afghanistan. Developed countries see fragile states, particularly post-conflict states, as 
new trading partners, particularly those with rich natural resources giving new 
opportunities for market expansion. As Frot, Olofsgard, and Berlin (2014) mention, 
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donors and recipient countries tend to rush partnerships. Connor (2012) supports this by 
saying that donor governments spend large sums of aid quickly to see tangible evidence 
in a short period of time (See Chapter 3.2). 
5. Aid tends to increase when a situation exhibits weak governance, poor economy, and low 
human development levels.  
When governance systems are still weak, aid tends to increase. According to 
Connor (2012), donors tend to spend huge amounts of aid money, particularly for post-
conflict states, such as Afghanistan, which became a “donor darling” after the war 
culminated between the NATO allies and the Taliban in 2002 (See Chapter 3.2). Though 
Afghanistan’s governance system was still weak, the international donor community 
committed $16 billion during the 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan (UNODC, 
2012). 
When prospects for human development are at stake, aid tends to increase. The 
UN has been mainstreaming the importance of human development, such as health and 
education. More than half of the 17 sustainable development goals are geared directly 
toward improving human welfare. UN member countries therefore tend to allocate more 
aid to better the lives of people in fragile situations.  
When a fragile situation has slower economic growth, donors tend to provide 
more aid. Many of the fragile member states of MDBs are aid dependent. OECD (2016) 
records that 10.5% of a fragile state’s gross national income comes from external aid. 
Many of the Pacific fragile states, for example, exhibit such aid dependency. Most of 
them are not conflict-affected but they are vulnerable to natural disasters and they have 
weak governance, such as Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, and Tuvalu. 
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Regardless of their weakening economies, donors have consistently increased aid for the 
Pacific fragile states between 2012 and 2018—from $3 million, to $6 million, and in the 
future $12 million of aid annually (interview with ADB Senior Adviser to the President, 
May 22, 2018). According to OECD (2018), “several countries [fragile states] have high 
levels of aid dependence—in excess of 10% of GDP or half of government spending” (p. 
91), and aid dependence could be attributed to “distorted political accountability” such as 
the government “paying too much attention to donors and too little attention to their 
citizens” (Wood, 2008 as cited in OECD, 2008, p. 91). As to the real reason why these 
fragile member states become aid dependent calls for more research. State leaders decide 
whether they get development assistance, and what influence them or how they are 
influenced, either by donors’ interests or pressure from the constituents (or lack thereof), 
is something that can be further investigated. 
6. Aid tends to decrease when a situation is less peaceful. 
When states are less peaceful, aid decreases. UN Deputy Secretary General Jan 
Eliasson claims that “there is no peace without development, there is no development 
without peace” (Brookings, 2013). In practice, most MDBs refrain from engaging in a 
state with ongoing war. The Asian Development Bank, for example, disengaged with 
Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Nepal at the time of war in these countries. The World Bank 
similarly suspended its missions and operational activities in Syria at the onset of conflict 
in 2011. 
This study involves three research approaches: (1) cognitive anthropology, which 
aims to identify the variables to be used in the regression analyses and the indicators for 
the resilience index, and provide baseline information for the entire study; (2) multiple 
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regression analyses of aid allocation and state-society resilience levels; and (3) case 
analysis of the impact of the Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development 
Project (MTF-RDP) on the resilience of the conflict-affected Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines.16  
4.1 Cognitive Anthropology 
The study uses two major variables: development aid and state-society resilience. Data on 
aid allocations are drawn from the projects implemented by three multilateral development banks 
(MDBs) in 35 fragile situations that received aid from them consistently from 2006 to 2017. To 
quantify development aid, aid allocations for specific sectors need to be determined. However, 
the three MDBs have different categorization of their target sectors, which is relative to their 
respective funding sources and strategic objectives. Table 4.1 shows how each MDB presents 
their focus areas. The engagement areas are mostly similar thematically across the three MDBs, 
but there are areas that are present in one or two MDBs but not present in the other MDB and 
could have been subsumed in another area. For example, both AfDB and ADB have the climate 
change theme, while at the WB, climate change is subsumed under “environment and natural 
resources management.”   
To measure state-society resilience in fragile situations listed in the World Bank’s 
harmonized list (see Table 2.4), indicators are needed in the context of development. This study 
used cognitive anthropology, an approach to investigate human cognition as content, knowledge, 
or process (Bennardo, 2013). Human cognition is a form of tacit knowledge drawn from how 
individuals think which is influenced by their own values and cultures. This seems to be a more 
 
 
 
 
16 The case analysis is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Table 4.1: Engagement Areas of African Development Bank,  
Asian Development Bank, and World Bank 
 
African Development Bank Asian Development Bank World Bank 
Agriculture and agro-industries 
 
Climate change 
 
Economic and financial governance 
 
Education 
 
Energy and power 
 
Environment 
 
Human capital development 
 
Health 
 
Information and communication 
technology 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Gender 
 
Private sector 
 
Transport 
 
Water supply and sanitation 
Agriculture and food security 
 
Climate change and disaster risk 
management 
 
Education 
 
Energy 
 
Environment 
 
Finance sector development 
 
Gender and development 
 
Governance and public 
management 
 
Health 
 
Information and communications 
technology 
 
Public-private partnerships 
 
Regional cooperation and 
integration 
Economic policy 
 
Environment and natural resources 
management  
 
Finance 
 
Human development and gender 
 
Private sector development 
 
Public sector management 
 
Social development and protection 
 
Urban and rural development 
 
 
Sources: Asian Development Bank. About ADB: Focus Areas. Retrieved from https://www.adb.org/about/ (accessed 2 July 
2019); The World Bank. Projects by Theme. Retrieved from https://projects-beta.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-
theme (accessed 2 July 2019); African Development Bank Group. Sectors. Retrieved from https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-
sectors/sectors (accessed 2 July 2019).  
 
objective form of inquiry compared to the MDBs’ classification scheme (how they identify and 
classify their development interventions) that are shaped by international policies serving the 
purpose of donor countries. Gascoigne and Thornton (2014) explain the importance of capturing 
tacit knowledge of experts for the purposes of rational analysis and how such knowledge can be 
“hidden from those who manage them.” 
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One reason for wanting to expose the practical wisdom of experts to “rational analysis” is 
the fear that it otherwise remains hidden from those who manage them and are held to 
account for their activities. Others are the reasonable hope that expert judgement is 
objective, and the widespread assumption that objectivity and codification go hand in 
hand. It is a platitude that if a judgement concerns something about which we can be right 
or wrong then it must answer to some standard of correctness that has nothing to do with 
mere opinion. And it is tempting to infer from this that tacit or implicit forms of 
judgement or of understanding can be “cleansed” of subjective factors and rendered 
objective – and therefore genuine exercises of rationality – only in so far as they are 
codifiable in a principle or set of principles. (p. 2) 
 
Although participants involved in this study are part of an institution, they are not 
constrained by the institution’s policies in identifying the domains of development interventions. 
Instead they draw it from their personal experience with the past and present institutions they 
have worked with, and their thinking is also influenced by their personal values and belief 
systems as well as their role and functions within their respective institutions.  
The cognitive anthropology approach involved creating a taxonomy of aid interventions, 
a pile sort exercise and semi-structured interviews with development experts, multidimensional 
scaling analysis, inter-coder reliability tests, and Cohen’s Kappa tests (see Chapter 4.1.4).  The 
Institutional Review Board approved on November 26, 2018 the conduct of the pile sort 
workshops and semi-structured interviews (Appendix 9). Consent forms on the anonymity of 
participants were also signed, hence this study used the participants’ position in the organization 
instead of their names. 
4.1.1 Taxonomy of Aid Interventions 
Using cluster random sampling, a total of 694 projects were selected from the online 
project database of African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, and World Bank. I 
grouped the projects that were similar in nature and came up with 26 categories (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Taxonomy of Development Projects 
Categories Examples No. of Projects 
1. Agriculture  
 
Development of value rice chains, agriculture market 
infrastructure project 
45 
2. Child protection Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
child ex-combatants; street children project 
5 
3. Climate proofing/climate 
resilience 
Climate resilient transport, catastrophe insurance 5 
4. Community empowerment Microfinance, rural finance expansion, livelihood and 
skills program for the youth, household development 
60 
5. Community participation Participatory rural development 2 
6. Crisis response and recovery Food crisis, financial crisis, avian flu, disaster risk 
management and reconstruction, sanitation and 
supply 
51 
7. Economic and financial 
management and policy reforms 
Debt reduction, improving business climate, 
economic diversification 
63 
8. Education Strengthening higher education, education sector 
reconstruction 
30 
9. Environmental sustainability Coastal resources co-management, forest and nature 
conservation, biodiversity management 
25 
10. Gender equality Protection from gender-based violence, economic 
empowerment for women 
9 
11. Governance, transparency and 
accountability 
Extractive industries transparency initiative, 
strengthening governance, civil service reform and 
accountability 
50 
12. Health Health sector development support, multisectoral 
HIV/AIDS 
32 
13. Infrastructure development Energy, water, transport, ICT 135 
14. Institutional capacity building Customs and trade, results facility, statistics, civil 
registry, mineral sector 
50 
15. Physical security Security plan for project implementation 1 
16. Private sector development Strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial 
sector 
15 
17. Public sector reforms Judicial reform, decentralization, privatization of 
state-owned enterprises 
23 
18. Recovery from conflict Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; 
sexual and reproductive health and rights of war-
affected youth; integration of returning refugees and 
displaced persons 
20 
19. Research Financial competency study, project preparatory 
studies, demographic health survey 
7 
20. Rural infrastructure 
development 
Rural roads rehabilitation, rural electrification 17 
21. Social security Pension, safety nets 2 
22. Support to development strategy National development strategy, poverty reduction 
strategy 
13 
23. Support to NGOs Support to NGO Network 1 
24. Support to peace process National solidarity program 5 
25. Support to peacebuilding 
strategy 
National Framework Peacebuilding, Peacebuilding 
for Development 
2 
26. Urban development and poverty 
reduction 
Urban roads improvement, support for young 
entrepreneurs and urban job creation 
26 
Total  694 
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4.1.2 Pile Sort Method 
 
The 26 aid interventions were further broken down into four themes using the pile sort 
method, a form of cultural domain analysis that aims to determine “how people in a group think 
about [a] list of things that somehow go together” (Bernard, 2011, p. 241). The pile sort method, 
in this study, aims to capture the tacit knowledge of individuals working in a multilateral 
development bank—how they would classify development interventions. Individual workshops 
were held with ADB’s vice president for operations, senior adviser to the President (former 
director general), deputy director general, director, fragile and conflict-affected situations focal  
Table 4.3: Development Themes Identified in the Pile Sort Workshop  
Director Economist Deputy Director 
General 
Senior Adviser 
to the President 
Focal Point for 
Fragile 
Situations 
Vice-President 
Economic/ 
Productive 
sectors (core 
operations) 
  
Research (cuts 
across 
interventions) 
 
Enabler of 
inclusiveness 
 
Enabling 
environment 
 
Basic 
need/foundation 
for development 
 
Good 
governance/ 
Institutions 
(centralized 
responsibility) 
 
Infrastructure 
(hard sector) 
 
Green/rural/ 
Agriculture 
 
Social 
development 
 
Public sector 
development/ 
Governance 
 
Private sector 
development 
 
Fragile and 
conflict-affected 
situations/ 
Recovery 
 
Ex ante 
conflict/natural 
disasters  
 
Community 
 
Priority areas/ 
hard infrastructure 
 
Human capital 
(soft sector) 
 
Strengthening 
resilience 
 
Governance and 
institutions 
 
Long-term 
development 
strategies 
 
Conflict and 
recovery 
 
Environment 
 
Peacebuilding  
 
Immediate 
economic 
activities 
 
Community 
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point, and an economist. All of them have expertise in development policy making in fragile 
situations. These experts were chosen based on the researcher’s existing social network (in effect 
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using snowball sampling). They were asked to categorize the 26 concepts and to label each group 
of concepts with an emergent theme. Table 4.3 shows the themes identified by each participant. 
An evaluation specialist from World Bank was asked to validate the findings of the pile sort 
study. 
4.1.3 Multidimensional Scaling Analysis  
To analyze the clustering made by the six participants (as shown in Table 4.3), 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis was used, also known as the smallest-space analysis. 
MDS is a data analysis method that “builds a mapping of a series of individuals from a proximity 
matrix (similarities or dissimilarities between these individuals)” (XLSTAT, n.d.). The XLSTAT 
software with the MDS component calculated the distances between concepts and plotted within 
a map how close or far each concept is to each other (See representation map in Figure 4.1).  
The representation map was produced following the procedures as described below. 
1. Encode the 26 items in the first column and first row in Excel. 
2. Code each item with either 0 or 1, giving it a 1 if two items intersect or are both found 
in a theme made by the first participant; and 0 if not (see Appendices 2 and 3). In the 
theme Economic/Productive Sectors, for example, the participant categorized 
agriculture (AGR) and climate proofing (CLI) under this theme, and therefore the 
code to be given is 1. On the other hand, agriculture (AGR) and child protection 
(CHI) are not both in this theme, only agriculture is, thus the code is 0. 
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Figure 4.1: Multidimensional Scaling of Aid Interventions  
(Representation Space) 
 
Legend:  
AGR = agriculture 
CEMP = community empowerment 
CHI = child protection 
CLI = climate proofing/climate resilience 
CPAR = community participation 
CRI = crisis response and recovery 
DSTRAT = support to development strategy 
ECON = economic and financial management and 
policy reforms 
EDUC = education 
ENV = environmental sustainability 
GEN = gender 
GOV = governance, transparency, and accountability 
HE = health 
 
INFRA = infrastructure development 
INS = institutional capacity building 
NGO = support to NGO 
PP = support to peace process 
PRIV = private sector development 
PSEC = physical security 
PSTRAT = support to peacebuilding strategy 
PUB = public sector reforms 
REC = recovery from conflict 
RES = research 
RUR = rural infrastructure development 
SSEC = social security 
URB = urban development and poverty reduction 
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 ECONOMIC/PRODUCTIVE SECTORS (core operations) 
 
1. Agriculture (development of value rice chains, agriculture market 
infrastructure project) – 45 
2. Infrastructure development (energy, water, transport, ICT) - 135 
3. Urban development and poverty reduction (urban roads improvement, support 
for young entrepreneurs and urban job creation) 26 
4. Rural infrastructure development (rural roads rehabilitation, rural 
electrification) – 17 
5. Climate proofing/climate resilience (e.g., climate resilient transport, 
catastrophe insurance) – 5 
 
3. Do step 2 for the rest of the participants’ responses, giving it a 2 for the second 
participant, 3 for the third participant, and so on if two items are found together in 
each theme; and 0 if not (see Appendix 4). 
4. Divide the resulting numbers by 6 (the number of participants) to determine the 
percentage of the participants that clustered the concepts similarly (see Appendix 5). 
5. Analyze the data using the multidimensional scaling (MDS) in XLSTAT. The MDS 
yielded a representation space that shows the aggregate clustering or mental map of 
the six participants on how they think the 26 concepts should be grouped (see Figure 
4.1). The MDS also calculated the exact distances of each concept from any other 
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(see Appendix 6). Based on their content and its relation to extant literature (see 
Chapter 3), I labeled the resulting four themes (as shown in Figure 4.1) as follows:17 
Human Development: health, education, child protection, social security, gender 
equality 
Good Governance: private sector development; economic and financial management 
and policy reforms; support to development strategy; governance, transparency, and 
accountability; institutional capacity building; public sector reforms; community 
empowerment; community participation; support to NGOs 
Economic Growth: infrastructure development, rural infrastructure development, 
urban development and poverty reduction, agriculture, environment sustainability, 
climate proofing/climate resilience 
Peacebuilding: physical security, recovery from conflict, support to peace process, 
support to peacebuilding strategy, crisis response and recovery 
4.1.4 Inter-coder Reliability and Cohen’s Kappa Tests 
The inter-coder reliability test aims to check “whether the constructs being investigated 
are shared;” while the Cohen’s Kappa test “measures how much better than chance is the 
agreement between a pair of coders” (Bernard, 2011, p. 448). 
As of February 2019, a total of 2,274 projects (used to quantify aid allocations) were 
found at the websites of the three MDBs. These were the total number of projects implemented 
in 35 fragile member states of ADB, AfDB, and WB from 2006 to 2018.18 These projects were 
then categorized based on the four resulting variables: economic growth, governance, human 
 
17 Research cuts across all aid interventions, according to four of the six participants and was represented spatially within the 
center of the matrix. 
 
18 The 694 projects used in the taxonomy are the 30% sample drawn from the 2,274 projects. 
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development, and peacebuilding. To determine whether my categorization is shared and not just 
based on my own interpretation, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted. A stratified 
sampling method was used to select a sample population from the 2,274 projects—proportionally 
representing each MDB and each of the 35 fragile states—resulting in a sample of 208 projects. I 
and another coder categorized the 208 projects independently. We answered separately a 
questionnaire containing the 208 projects (with descriptions) guided by a code sheet (each theme 
with their respective descriptions and definitions) (See Appendix 7).  
Using the Cohen’s Kappa test, I calculated the percentage of agreement and how much 
better than chance we categorized the projects similarly. The following procedures were applied: 
1. Determine whether each concept (economic growth, governance, human 
development, peacebuilding) is present in each of the 208 projects. For economic 
growth, for example, give it a 1 if the coder indicates that the project belongs to the 
theme on economic growth, and give it a 0 if the coder indicates it belongs to another 
theme. 
2.  For each of the themes across the 208 projects, count the number of times (a) both 
Coder 1 and Coder 2 agreed that the concept is present in a project (e.g., both 
categorized a project as economic growth); (b) both Coder 1 and Coder 2 agreed that 
the concept was not present (e.g., both did not categorize a project as economic 
growth); (c) Coder 1 agreed that the concept was present, but Coder 2 disagreed (e.g., 
Coder 1 categorized a project as economic growth, but Coder 2 categorized it as 
another theme); and (d) Coder 2 agreed that the concept was present, but Coder 1 
disagreed (e.g., Coder 2 categorized a project as economic growth, but Coder 1 
categorized it as something else).  
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3. Use the Cohen Kappa calculator to determine the percentage of agreement and the 
Kappa score.19  
Table 4.4 summarizes the Cohen’s Kappa test results (see Appendix 8 for detailed 
results). Test results indicated an average of 94.35% agreement and a Kappa score of 83%, 
meaning, “the strength of agreement is very good.” The constructs I have been investigating, 
therefore, are shared and not just from my own interpretation. 
Table 4.4: Cohen’s Kappa Results Matrix, N=208 
Variables Definitions Percentage of 
Agreement 
(%) 
Kappa Score 
Economic growth Infrastructure development, rural infrastructure 
development, urban development and poverty 
reduction, agriculture, environment sustainability, 
climate proofing/climate resilience  
 
92.31 0.814 
Good governance Private sector development; economic and financial 
management and policy reforms; support to 
development strategy; governance, transparency, and 
accountability; institutional capacity building; public 
sector reforms; community empowerment; community 
participation; support to NGOs 
92.79 0.854 
Human 
development 
Health, education, child protection, social security, 
gender equality  
 
95.19 0.839 
Peacebuilding Physical security, recovery from conflict, support to 
peace process, support to peacebuilding strategy, crisis 
response and recovery  
 
97.12 0.808 
Average Score  94.35 0.829 
 
4.1.5 Semi-structured Interviews 
During the pile sort workshop, participants were asked to explain why they grouped the 
concepts in the way they did. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with three ADB 
officials and a World Bank evaluation specialist on how MDBs make funding decisions in fragile 
 
19  GraphPad. QuickCalcs. Retrieved from https://www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/kappa1/ 
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states. The following is a summary of the workshop conversations and semi-structured 
interviews (See also Chapter 2.2.4). 
The success of a specific theme (i.e., economic growth) is dependent on how 
development interventions are successful in another theme (i.e., governance). Moreover, specific 
aid interventions complement each other. For example, governance, transparency, and 
accountability play an important role in a country’s recovery from conflict; public sector reforms 
serve as “building blocks or enabling environment for strengthening private sector 
development;” and “having the right plans, policies, and strategies will facilitate responsiveness 
to disasters” (Interview with ADB Pacific Department Deputy Director General, May 22, 2018).  
Policy making should be done from the perspective of the communities—what the people 
care about—and not solely from the perspective of policymakers. In economic growth, for 
example, a typical person cares about whether he or she has a sustainable source of income; in 
human development, a person cares about whether his or her children can go to school and have 
access to medical services (Interview with ADB Senior Adviser to the President, May 22, 2018).  
According to the ADB Director for Urban, Social Development, and Public Management 
Division (interview, May 18, 2018), the themes could be arranged in the form of hierarchical 
needs (Figure 4.2), where peace and security are at the base of the pyramid, next are functioning 
public sector and strong institutions, then healthy educated people and sustainable environment, 
and at the top of the pyramid is the productive sector (agriculture, urban and rural development, 
and infrastructure). Multilateral development banks are aware that all these interventions should 
be done with inclusiveness in mind, but do not know how to do them well. Most of the fragile 
states are young with 30 to 40 years of history as a nation compared with developed countries 
such as United Kingdom, United States, and Japan with hundreds of years of experience as 
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states. Fragile states need to address insurmountable challenges if they are to be at par with the 
“developed countries,” according to the ADB Director.  
 
Figure 4.2: The Hierarchical Approach to Development 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
To determine the relationship between development aid and state-society resilience, this 
study applied multiple regression analysis, a statistical method used to predict a continuous 
dependent variable based on multiple independent variables. On the impact of development aid 
on state-society resilience, this study applied the hierarchical multiple regression analysis to 
identify the contribution to changes in resilience caused by each of the independent variables 
(development aid, natural disasters, violent conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy 
levels). Hierarchical multiple regression analysis determined the relative contribution of each of 
the predictors to the total variance explained, and “how much extra variation in the dependent 
variable can be explained by the addition of one or more independent variables” (LAERD 
Statistics, n.d., p. 1)  
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4.2.1 Sampling 
 
The sampling method used in this study is purposive homogenous sampling. Due to the 
many actors and large, complex aid business in fragile situations, this study focuses on three 
multilateral development banks: World Bank, African Development Bank, and Asian 
Development Bank. The sampling frame is the World Bank’s harmonized list of fragile 
situations from 2006 to 2018 (See Appendix 1).20 Between 2006 and 2018, the World Bank 
records a total of 55 countries in its fragile situations list. Within those years, some countries 
moved on and off the list. From the sampling frame of 55 fragile states, I identified 35 countries 
that consistently received aid from the three MDBs from 2006 to 2018 (see Table 2.4). 
The list of fragile states emerged in 2006 after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
in 2005, wherein the international community, including the multilateral development banks, 
committed to provide greater support to their less developed member countries, now called 
“fragile situations.” 
4.2.2 The Variables and Data Sources 
Development aid is represented by a total of 2,274 project interventions in 35 fragile 
member states funded by the three multilateral development banks from 2006 to 2018. The 
projects were drawn from the online database of the AfDB, ADB, and WB. To determine how 
much aid is allocated for each type of intervention (governance, human development, economic 
growth, and peacebuilding), each of the 2,274 projects was coded based on the aforementioned 
indicators (See Chapter 4.1.4). The data sources are: 
1. World Bank: www.projects.worldbank.org/ 
 
20 The World Bank’s harmonized list of fragile situations is a consolidated list of World Bank, African Development Bank, and 
Asian Development Bank based on the average scores of the three MDBs’ respective country policy and institutional assessments 
(or country performance assessments). A country is considered fragile if it has a score of 3.2 or less, or the presence of a UN 
and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. ADB (2016) emphasizes that “weak 
performance and fragility is part of a spectrum of country performance, and do not disappear when a country moves marginally 
above the cut-off point” (p. 1). 
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2. African Development Bank: https://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-
portfolio/ 
3. Asian Development Bank: https://www.adb.org/projects 
To measure state-society resilience, a composite index was developed, with 
peacebuilding, governance, human development, and economic growth as indicators. Scores of 
the 35 countries in the Global Peace Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Human 
Development Index, and each country’s GDP per capita annual percentage growth were recoded, 
scaled, and averaged to come up with the Resilience Index. The sub-indices are scaled from 0 to 
100 using the following procedure: 
1. Identify the minimum and maximum value of the series of data for each sub-index 
(Global Peace Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Human Development Index, 
GDP per capita). 
2. For each country in a given year, calculate the resilience score of each of the sub-
index, using the following formula. 
= ((X-min) / (max-min)) x 100 
Where X is the original score, min is the minimum value in the series, and 
max is the maximum value in the series. 
3.  For each country in a given year, get the average resilience score of all the sub-
indices. The average score is then used as the State-Society Resilience Index score. 
Since the peace index scoring is in the opposite direction (wherein the “most peaceful” is 
represented by a low value (1) and the “least peaceful” is represented by a high value (4), the 
original scores were recoded so that the “most peaceful” is represented by a high value (4), and 
the least peaceful is represented by the low value (1). The following formula is applied: 
= 4 - x 
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Where 4 is the maximum score in the Global Peace Index and x is the original score. 
The data sources are:  
1. World Bank (n.d.-c) - Worldwide Governance Indicators. This index measures a state’s 
control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability. The aggregate 
scoring is between -2.5 and 2.5, with -2.5 as the weakest and 2.5 as the strongest. 
2. United Nations Development Programme (n.d.-b.) - Human Development Index. This 
index is a composite index that measures the average achievement of the country’s population in 
terms of a long and healthy life, education, and a decent standard of living. The scoring is 
between 0 and 1, with 1 as the highest and 0 as the lowest. 
3. World Bank (n.d.-d) - World Development Indicators. GDP per Capita Annual 
Percentage Growth. It measures the economic growth of a country using the annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. The World Bank defines this 
measure as follows: “Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is 
gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.” 
4. Institute for Economics and Peace (n.d.) - Global Peace Index. This index measures a 
country’s level of peacefulness using three main indicators: (1) ongoing domestic and 
international conflict [number and intensity of civil and international wars]; (2) societal safety 
and security [i.e., perception of criminality, level of political instability, rates of homicides and 
violent crimes; and (3) militarization [i.e., military expenditure, number of armed service 
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personnel, ease of access to small weapons]. Scoring is between 1 and 4, with 1 as the most 
peaceful and 4 as the least peaceful. 
The following control variables were introduced: 
1. Presence or absence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to natural disasters21  
 
The International Displacement Monitoring Centre (n.d.) has a Global Internal 
Displacement Database that presents the number of IDPs resulting from natural disasters. Many 
people are being forcibly displaced from their homes ravaged by natural disasters; they relocate 
to survive and compete with the depleting resources, which aid agencies try to address by 
providing basic needs, such as shelter, food, and water. The mere presence of IDPs indicates the 
severity of a natural disaster, which could impact state-society resilience. This study translated 
this data as a dichotomous (nominal) variable—0 if there are no IDPs and 1 if there are IDPs. 
There is another database on vulnerability to natural disasters (the World Risk Index) that is at a 
continuous level, and can be translated to ordinal scale, however, the data is incomplete for the 
time period covered by the study. The presence or absence of IDPs is a strong indicator of the 
impact of natural disasters on state-society resilience, since having IDPs affect the productivity 
of the citizens and divert resources of the government to helping the IDPs recover from the 
effects of natural disasters.  
The poor communities suffer the most when natural disaster strikes—losing their 
incomes, assets, and health (Dela Fuente & Dercon, 2008 as cited in Dercon, 2014). The OECD 
(2018) reported, in 2015, fragile states were home to 513.6 million people living in extreme 
poverty and by 2030, this number could rise to 620 million people or more. These people in 
 
21 The number of IDPs was tested as a control variable and was scaled to arrive at ordinal level of measurement. However, the 
data is not normally distributed and the kurtosis and skewness levels are high (even when they are scaled and log transformed) 
which are a cause of concern for making accurate predictions. Details are further discussed in the section on Limitations of the 
Study. 
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fragile situations therefore are the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and natural 
disasters. Recent studies suggest that there have been larger declines in GDP per capita (Raddatz, 
2009 as cited in Dercon, 2014) and greater reduction in economic growth rates (Dell, et al. 2008, 
2009 as cited in Dercon 2014) in low-income countries, compared to richer countries, as a result 
of natural disasters. Moreover, Becerra, Cavallo, and Noy (2014) find that the intensity of natural 
disasters, including the country’s characteristics, such as its size, level of development, and stock 
of foreign reserves, are related to the surge of aid flows. Similarly, Robinson. Oliveira, and 
Kayden (2017) find that the UN supplies humanitarian aid based on the severity of natural 
disasters and where aid is needed the most. 
2. Presence or absence of IDPs due to conflict and violence22  
The International Displacement Monitoring Centre (n.d.) has a Global Internal 
Displacement Database that presents the number of IDPs resulting from conflict and violence. 
The data is a continuous variable that can be reconfigured into an ordinal measure; however, 
there is also the problem of missing values for some countries and some time period, thus 
skewing the data to be analyzed. Getting the series mean to replace the missing values, on the 
other hand, resulted into higher standard errors. This study therefore translated the data as a 
dichotomous (nominal) variable—0 if there are no IDPs and 1 if there are IDPs. In this case, the 
missing data whether there have been IDPs as a result of conflict in a specific country for a 
particular year can be searched on the web. Other possible indicators for the impact of conflict 
on resilience are presence or absence of civil war and the number of battle deaths. The presence 
or absence of civil war as well as the number of battle deaths could be somewhat misleading, if 
 
22 The ‘conflict intensity’ (from Heidelberg’s conflict barometer) was tested as a control variable, in place of ‘presence or 
absence of IDPs due to conflict and violence,’ however the ‘conflict intensity’ variable causes autocorrelation (based on the 
Durbin Watson’s statistics test) and higher standard error values, which signifies less accurate predictions. Details are further 
discussed in the section on Limitations of the Study. 
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one is to measure the impact of violence and conflict on state-society resilience. In Mindanao 
Philippines, for example, the rebels and the Philippine armed forces intentionally fight in the 
forests and this does not cause any disruption to normal activities in the populated areas. Also, 
violence has other causes, not only due to armed fighting between the government military 
forces and the rebels, but also due to clan wars, political rivalries, and war on drugs and 
smuggling. The presence or absence of IDPs due to violence and conflict strongly indicates the 
effect of violent conflicts on state-society resilience. The mere presence of IDPs as a result of 
conflict clearly indicates the severity of the impact of violent conflict on state-society resilience. 
Violent conflict presents itself in many forms, such as fighting between government and 
oppositionist groups, international war, terrorism, ethnic wars, and gang violence related to drugs 
and weapons. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2017), violence can impede 
social development, and many countries have experienced the devastating and lasting impact of 
conflict. Lis (2013) further points out that violence results into poor economic growth “associated 
with smaller investment, poorer policies, and higher risks of resource misuse” (p. 15). The studies 
of Lis (2013) and Dreher and Fuchs (2011) posit that violent conflict is related to aid flow. Lis 
(2013) concludes that donors have different responses based on their interests and the recipient’s 
characteristics, such as the donor whether being interested to combatting terrorism or not, and the 
recipient being an oil- or a non-oil exporter. Dreher and Fuchs (2011), on the other hand, find that 
“while countries where terror originates are not more likely to receive aid as a consequence, if they 
are selected, they receive larger aid amounts from the donor hit by the attack” (p. 358). 
3. Ethnic fractionalization 
  Ethnic fractionalization is approximated by a measure of similarity between languages, 
varying from 1 = the population speaks two or more unrelated languages to 0 = the entire 
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population speaks the same language (Fearon, 2003). Conflict may not just be about armed 
violence but it is also fractionalization among ethnicities within a state. Ethnic fractionalization 
may cause social exclusion, marginalization, and political tensions and instability, which can 
affect state-society resilience. 
 Alemu’s study (2016) finds that “in countries with low level of political right and civil 
liberty, ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization significantly increase the probability of 
state fragility” (p. 64). The study also implies that the low levels of political right and civil 
liberty can “exacerbate the negative effects of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization on 
state fragility” (p. 64). Similarly, Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) also studied the determinants of 
fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa using the country policy institutional assessment ratings as a 
variable for fragility level, and some economic, historical, and institutional variables as 
determinants of fragility. They found that “more fractionalization” is “associated with a higher 
probability of extreme fragility” (p. 777). 
4. Democracy level  
Democracy is measured at a continuous level on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 as the highest. 
The database used is the Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2016), which is 
based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of 
government, political participation, and political culture. Based on their scores on a range of 
indicators within these categories, each country is classified as “full democracy,” “flawed 
democracy,” “hybrid regime,” or “authoritarian regime”—each defined below:  
Full democracies: Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties 
are respected, but which also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to 
the flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is satisfactory. Media are 
independent and diverse. There is an effective system of checks and balances. The 
judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced. There are only limited 
problems in the functioning of democracies. 
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Flawed democracies: These countries also have free and fair elections and, even if there 
are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties are 
respected. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, 
including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of 
political participation. 
 
Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from 
being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may 
be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies—in 
political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends 
to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically, there is 
harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent.  
 
Authoritarian regimes: In these states, state political pluralism is absent or heavily 
circumscribed. Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal 
institutions of democracy may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do 
occur, are not free and fair. There is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil 
liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling 
regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. 
There is no independent judiciary. (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016, p. 54) 
 
Modern scholars argue that democratic states are able to exercise transparency and rule of 
law, thereby preventing corruption that perpetuates low-quality infrastructures, and in effect loss 
of human lives are mitigated (Escaleras et al, 2007 as cited in Lin, 2014). A democratic 
government also provides opportunities for civil society to participate in resilience building and 
stimulates social spending hence benefitting disadvantaged citizens (Lin, 2014). Moreover, 
Dietrich and Wright (2015) highlight studies that link aid and democracy, wherein donors attach 
“political reform conditions to aid packages” (p. 217), and these conditions are associated to 
transitions to multi-party politics by the recipient country.   
5. Whether the project is funded by a global MDB (World Bank) or a regional MDB (ADB 
and AfDB) has been introduced as a dummy variable for Models 3 and 4 - A, B, C, D. The 
source of funds is a possible explanatory factor for the variation in aid flows. As a global MDB, 
the World Bank has the greatest number of member countries (both donor and recipient 
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countries) and, as a result, the projects funded by WB are more sizeable than the projects funded 
by ADB and AfDB. 
4.2.3 Time Element 
All the 2,274 projects were used as cases for observation. However, considering the time 
element of the variables, the number of cases varies for each of the hypothesis being tested.23 
Specific time elements were factored in for the following sets of hypotheses: 
Set A: Hypotheses 1-3 
1. Development aid helps build state-society resilience in fragile situations.  
2. Aid for governance, human development, and peacebuilding helps states and societies 
in fragile situation become more resilient. 
3. Aid for economic growth may contribute to fragility, if the benefits are unequal and 
exclusive to a specific population or territory. 
Models: 
 
• Impact of overall aid on state-society resilience 
• Impact of aid for governance on state-society resilience 
• Impact of aid for human development on state-society resilience 
• Impact of aid for peacebuilding on state-society resilience 
• Impact of aid for economic growth on state-society resilience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 The categorization of the projects according to the four themes, the data availability, and the removal of cases with missing 
values and outliers with high leverage and influential points also affected the number of cases being tested for each of the 
hypotheses. 
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Time Element for Set A 
 
The following timing was used:  
 
1. The resilience score (of the country where the project has been implemented) two years 
after the project started (technically when funds are disbursed to hire contractors and 
consultants to implement the project)—after which, it may take two years for the 
impact of the development project to trickle down, according to ADB development 
practitioners (ADB interviews, May 18-25, 2018). The first year is mostly setting the 
stage for implementation (i.e., hiring of contractors and consultants, community 
consultation). The second year is when the project is actually implemented. According 
to interviews with development policy experts (ADB interviews, May 18-25, 2018), 
the impact of the project is already felt when it is implemented. Thus, for example, if 
the project commenced in 2007, the country’s resilience score in 2009 was applied. 
2. The presence of IDPs due to natural disasters, the presence of IDPs due to violent 
conflict, ethnic fractionalization level, and democracy level—a year before the indices 
were released (Global Peace Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Human 
Development Index, and GDP per capita annual percentage growth). The index scores 
are based on the country’s situation a year before the research institution releases the 
report. 
Note: The covered period was adjusted based on the availability of data. For Set A, the 
covered period is 2007-2015 for aid allocation, and 2009-2017 for the resilience scores 
(since there is no available data for the indices for 2008, which is the year before the indices 
were released). 
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Set B: Hypotheses 4-6 
4. Aid flow, in general, tends to increase in more fragile or less resilient situations. 
5. Aid tends to increase when a situation exhibits weak governance, poor economy, and 
low human development levels. 
6. Aid tends to decrease when a situation is less peaceful. 
Models: 
• Impact of state-society resilience on aid allocation  
• Impact of governance levels on aid allocation  
• Impact of economic levels on aid allocation  
• Impact of human development levels on aid allocation 
• Impact of peace levels on aid allocation  
Time Element for Set B 
 
The following timing was used:  
 
1. The starting date of development projects (the dependent variable) three years after 
indices’ scores were released (state-society resilience as the independent variable). 
This timing is based on the funding cycle of three years adopted by the development 
agencies.   
2. The presence of IDPs due to natural disasters, the presence of IDPs due to violent 
conflict, ethnic fractionalization level, and democracy level—a year before the 
development project started. Although the funding cycle is three years, the decision 
whether to release the funds are affected by situations of conflict and adverse natural 
calamities that may have taken place from a year to a month before the project started. 
Ethnic fractionalization is constant across the years and the timing is not an influential 
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factor. The data used for democracy level and CPIA are three years before the project 
started. 
4.2.4 Reliability Tests 
Eight assumptions were considered in running the multiple regression analysis: 
1. One dependent variable is measured at the continuous level (interval or ratio level). 
2. Two or more independent variables are measured either at a continuous or nominal 
level. 
3. There should be independence of errors (residuals), which means that observations 
should not be correlated. 
4. There should be a linear relationship between the predictor variables and the 
dependent variables. 
5. There should be homoscedasticity of residuals. 
6. There should be no multicollinearity. 
7. There should be no significant outliers, high leverage points or highly influential 
points. 
8. The errors (residuals) should be normally distributed. 
All of the above assumptions have been met for the hypotheses being tested except for 
assumptions 3, 6, and 7. Cases that are significant outliers and have high leverage points and 
highly influential points have been removed from the analysis. Since there were large degrees of 
freedom, removal of such cases did not affect the analyses. After removal of these cases, 
assumption 7 has been met. The following variables are correlated to each other: 
1. The levels of peace and the presence or absence of IDPs due to violent conflict  
2. Levels of governance and democracy  
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The presence or absence of IDPs due to conflict, and democracy levels were removed 
from the models being affected (Model 3 and Model 4 – A, B, C, D), in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. After removal of these variables from the affected models, assumptions 3 and 6 
were met. 
4.3 Limitations of the Study 
 This study does not include other aid providers such as the bilateral organizations (e.g., 
United States Agency for International Development, United Kingdom Department for 
International Development, German Technical Cooperation Agency) and other multilateral and 
intergovernmental agencies (e.g., United Nations organizations, Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank). Donor countries provide different types of aid—from humanitarian, military, to 
development. In general, donor countries that provide humanitarian and military aid channel 
their financing through bilateral agencies, while donor countries that provide development aid 
channel their money through multilateral development banks.  This study only focuses on 
development aid provided by the three prominent multilateral development banks, which have a 
harmonized process for identifying fragile situations. The World Bank represents the global 
development banks, while the AfDB and ADB represent the regional development banks in 
Africa and Asia (Engen and Prizzon, 2018). The three MDBs are purposively selected due to 
their harmonized scoring of the country policy and institutional assessment of their fragile 
member states. It is also limited to fragile situations that received aid from 2006 to 2018. Other 
fragile situations, such as Syria and Iraq, came into the fragile situations list between those years. 
They are not included in the sample because they did not receive aid consistently from the 
MDBs. Selecting fragile situations that consistently received aid from 2006 to 2018, and that 
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belong to a harmonized list by the MDBs, allowed for a homogenous sample size—which 
presents a low margin of error, preventing outliers and skewed data.  
 There are several other indices that can be used in the regression model, such as the 
conflict intensity found in the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict, the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, the World Risk Index, 
country policy and institutional assessments (CPIA), and number of battle deaths. However, 
including them in the model poses some concerns such as high correlation between residuals, 
multicollinearity, abnormal distribution, and missing values. Including the conflict intensity and 
corruption levels, for example, yields a Durbin-Watson statistical value of .098. The ideal range 
should be between 1.5 and 2.5 to conclude that there is independence of errors or residuals. The 
World Risk Index, a measure of a country’s vulnerability to natural disaster, has only data for 
years 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2016, which led to missing values. The number of battle deaths has 
abnormal distribution (log transformation does not help), while the CPIA is highly correlated 
with governance and resilience variables causing multicollinearity issues. 
 The number of IDPs due to conflict and natural disasters was used in place of conflict 
intensity and World Risk Index, respectively. However, they are also abnormally distributed, 
even if they are log transformed and scaled to come up with an ordinal level of measurement. 
Thus, a binary nominal level of measurement was used—the presence or absence of IDPs due to 
violent conflict and natural disasters—which has more normal frequencies of distribution than 
the ordinal level of measurement that is based on the number of IDPs. 
 The participants in the pile sort activity have no representation from the AfDB due to 
geographical limitation, wherein I would have needed to fly to the AfDB headquarters in Cote 
d’Ivoire to conduct the pile sort workshop; whereas the World Bank located in Washington DC 
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and the ADB headquartered in Manila, Philippines (which is my home country), were not 
difficult to reach. Six policy experts from the Asian Development Bank and one evaluation 
expert from the World Bank participated in the pile sort activity. The projects in both the 
taxonomy and pile sort, however, included projects from all three MDBs. 
 The four variables (aid for governance, peacebuilding, economic growth, and human 
development) could only be analyzed individually with the control variables (i.e., aid for 
governance and the control variables in one multiple regression analysis; aid for peacebuilding 
and the control variables in another multiple regression analysis, and so on), because the 
observation cases across the four themes are not proportionate. There is a total of 625 projects 
leaning toward governance objectives, 506 projects related to economic improvement, 334 
human development projects, and 180 peacebuilding projects. Each project was regressed against 
the resilience score of the country where the project was implemented and two years after the 
project commenced. The unequal number of projects across the four themes made it impossible 
to run the four variables in a multiple regression analysis, since each project has to match a 
corresponding resilience score. They have to be proportionate in terms of the sample size and the 
years the projects have been implemented have to match, in order to run the multiple or 
hierarchical regression analyses. It is possible to run the four variables using country-level cases 
but analyzing them at country level only gives 35 cases for observation. A small sample size did 
not yield statistically significant results; thus, a database was developed to have the analysis at 
the project level resulting in a total of 2,274 cases.  
 There are projects that cannot be boxed in one theme, and some of them cut across two or 
three themes. Water supply and sanitation projects for example can both serve the purpose of 
human development and economic improvement. In clustering such projects, project descriptions 
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were reviewed and checked whether the main objective is leaning toward human development or 
economic improvement. In some instances, there are pie charts provided in the project 
description, which indicate, for example, what percentage of the funds go to a specific theme or 
sector (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4). The four variables however are run in a regression analysis 
separately. Each was run under a hierarchical multiple regression analysis with the control 
variables, thus preventing some possible auto-correlation of residuals.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: World Bank Project Sectors and Themes 
Source: The World Bank. Projects in Angola. Retrieved from https://projects-beta.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-
summary?countrycode_exact=AO 
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Figure 4.4: Water Sector Institutional Development Project in Angola:  
Covered Sectors and Themes 
 
Source: The World Bank. Project and Operations. Angola Water Sector Institutional Development AF (PDISA-AF). Retrieved 
from https://projects-beta.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P124511 
 
 
This chapter presented the research questions and hypotheses, and discussed in detail the 
first two methodologies used—cognitive anthropology and hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis. The findings in the cognitive anthropology research were presented, providing the sub-
variables of development aid and the indicators of state-society resilience. The next chapter 
delves on the case analysis of Mindanao, Philippines, explaining the impact of a World Bank 
program on state-society resilience of the conflict-affected Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao, and how resilience levels throughout the peace process have influenced the WB 
funding. 
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CHAPTER 5: CASE ANALYSIS 
 
This case analysis aims to explain the causal link between development aid and resilience 
in a real-life situation—the impact of the 10-year Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and 
Development Project (MTF-RDP) on the resilience of the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM), a region in the Philippines that has experienced protracted conflict for more 
than 40 years. It should be noted that the Philippines as a country is not considered a fragile 
situation by MDBs, but it has a subnational fragile situation in Mindanao, hence the use of the 
term “fragile situation” in this study, instead of “fragile state.” This case analysis has attempted 
to answer the research questions in the context of the MTF-RDP intervention in ARMM: 
1. Does the MTF-RDP have impact on the resilience of ARMM? 
2. How has each component of the MTF-RDP affected the resilience of ARMM? The 
components are capacity building of the Bangsamoro Development Agency and the 
people’s organizations (governance), development of new enterprises (economic 
growth), and establishment of community infrastructures, such as learning centers and 
water systems (human development). 
3. Have any of these components made ARMM more resilient or more fragile? How and 
why? 
4. Are the fragility levels of ARMM related to the MTF-RDP funding? How has the 
peace process affected the World Bank aid allocation for ARMM? 
Although the Philippines is not included in the list of fragile situations, the ARMM case 
was chosen to reveal the hidden subnational fragility in non-fragile situations such as the 
Philippines. The Asian Development Bank—which is headquartered in Manila and has more 
presence and network in the country than any other donor agencies—provides development aid 
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to more stable and peaceful areas in the Philippines, but not to the conflict-affected areas in 
Mindanao. The World Bank, on the other hand, has demonstrated its flexibility by engaging in 
ARMM while there was ongoing armed conflict. The World Bank used civil society 
organizations to implement the projects instead of adopting the traditional approach of engaging 
the local government institutions as executing agencies. 
 
Figure 5.1: The Six MILF Camps where MTF-RDP was Implemented 
Source: Espesor, Jovanie. (2017). Waltzing with the powerful: Understanding NGOs in a game of power in conflict-ridden 
Mindanao. ChristChurch, New Zealand: University of Canterbury. (p. 75). Retrieved from 
https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/13644 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, map recreated by Omer San 
Gabriel). 
 
The study compared the predetermined control and treatment groups using the existing 
statistical data from the Philippine government. ARMM has five provinces. Two of them 
received the MTF-RDP interventions, while three did not. The World Bank implemented the 
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project in six rebel camps located in the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao (the 
treatment groups) (see Figure 5.1). Camps from the other three provinces were originally 
included as project beneficiaries, however, due to political reasons and/or security risks, the sub-
projects were cancelled; thus, this study used these three provinces as the control group—
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi. This study also used the project’s logical framework and the WB’s 
reported program results and impact on the target groups in comparison to the statistical data of 
the entire population of a given province under the treatment group. 
5.1 Background of the ARMM Conflict 
Mindanao is one of the three major islands of the Philippines located in the southern part 
of the country, the other two are Luzon and Visayas. Mindanao has 26 provinces, and five of its 
provinces have been mired in violent conflict for many decades, namely Maguindanao 
(excluding Cotabato City), Lanao del Sur, Basilan (excluding Isabela City), Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi—all of which comprise the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Conflict 
in Mindanao is multi-layered, characterized by separatism, communist insurgency, banditry, and 
rido or clan wars. The conflict between government and opposition groups is aggravated by the 
escalation of rido cases. They could be either a major or minor war among fellow Muslims and 
feuding families that started over a property dispute, a dishonor inflicted on a family, or a crime 
committed against a member of another family (Torres, 2007). In rido, justice is served by 
committing another crime (blood for blood and teeth for teeth). In addition to independent 
bandits present in Mindanao, the separatist groups and communist insurgents are allegedly linked 
to acts of terrorism and banditry.  
Three centuries before the Philippine government was established in 1898, a governance 
structure was already in place in Mindanao in the form of a sultanate system. Mindanao’s 
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population is comprised of the Bangsamoro population or the Moros, the majority of which are 
Muslims. In the 1800s, the Spanish colonizers were not able to penetrate Mindanao due to fierce 
resistance from the Moros. During the American occupation in the early 1900s, the US 
government encouraged Filipino Christians to migrate to Mindanao and establish businesses. 
Land grabbing became prevalent wherein many of the Moros, unaware of the new government 
policies, lost their lands to the elite Christian-Filipino settlers (Vellema et al., 2011). 
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) are the two leading separatist movements in the Philippines. The MNLF started the 
armed struggle for independence from the Philippine government in 1972. In 1996, the MNLF 
and the government signed a peace agreement, which granted autonomy to provinces in Southern 
Mindanao with a Muslim majority population. Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Tawi-
Tawi, and Sulu form the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or ARMM, which has a 
population of roughly 3.8 million (as of 2015)—89% of which are Muslims.  
MNLF demobilized as a result of the establishment of ARMM; however, a group of 
MNLF members who did not agree with autonomy instead demanded a complete independence 
and mobilized a splinter group called the MILF. The MILF continued the armed struggle for 
independence until they reached a negotiated solution that led to a bilateral ceasefire in 1997 and 
the start of formal peace negotiations in 1999.  
The peace negotiations between the government and the MILF lasted from 1997 to 2014. 
Alongside the peace negotiations, sporadic clashes between government forces and the rebel 
groups continued (Herbolzheimer, 2015). In 2014, the Aquino administration and the MILF 
signed a peace agreement leading to the preparation of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which 
aimed to establish a political identity for the Bangsamoro people. Legislation of the BBL was 
92 
 
stalled, however, because of the alleged killing of 44 policemen by the MILF in early 2015 
(which created distrust among legislators and prompted them to postpone the signing of the 
BBL); and due to the Congress’ stance about the unconstitutionality of the BBL. While the peace 
process was ongoing, the MNLF (the rival of MILF) and the newly formed Bangsamoro Islamic 
Freedom Fighters waged violent attacks on civilians and soldiers to express their opposition to 
the peace process and their grievance of being excluded from the BBL discussions. The MNLF 
leader Nur Misuari became a fugitive after leading a violent attack in Zamboanga City and was 
later given an amnesty by President Rodrigo Duterte. The MNLF leader met with the President 
in November 2016, and this gave hope on the willingness of the rival separatist groups (MNLF 
and MILF) to work together to achieve peace in Mindanao. However, isolated conflict incidents 
between members/supporters of the two factions still occur as of the writing of this thesis. 
On July 26, 2018, President Duterte finally signed the BBL, calling it the Bangsamoro 
Organic Law (BOL). The BOL provides for self-determination by the Bangsamoro people within 
the framework of the Philippine Constitution and norms and standards of international law. The 
former ARMM will be replaced by the BARMM (Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao), which will be empowered to enact its own laws. The BARMM will automatically 
receive an annual block grant (5% of the net tax revenue of the Philippine government); 75% 
share from the government’s revenue taxes, charges, fees, and taxes imposed on natural 
resources; and PhP5 billion annually for ten years, which will be used to rehabilitate the conflict-
affected areas (Republic of the Philippines, 2018). 
Similar to the former ARMM, the BARMM also covers the provinces of Basilan, Lanao 
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. On January 2019, a plebiscite held to ratify the 
BOL resulted in the majority of ARMM voters approving the BOL or the Republic Act 11054. 
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As a result of the plebiscite, the BARMM became one city larger than the ARMM, now 
including Cotabato City, part of the Maguindanao province (Ranada, 2019). 
5.2 The Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development Project 
The Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) is a multi-donor facility that seeks to promote peace 
and security through community development projects in conflict-affected areas and build the 
capacity of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), a development arm of the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front. The MTF is a pool of funds from development partners including 
European Union, Sweden, Australia, Canada, World Bank, United States, and New Zealand. The 
MTF Steering Committee was composed of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace 
Process (OPAPP), the BDA, and the World Bank. The World Bank also serves as the MTF 
Secretariat. The World Bank worked with trust fund recipients (Mindanao Land Foundation, 
Community and Family Services International, and International Labour Organization), which in 
turn worked closely with the BDA on the ground. Since 2006, the MTF has been financing 
projects that seek to empower communities and help them recover from conflict. The MTF also 
aims to promote participatory and effective governance wherein community members are given 
the opportunity to contribute to carrying out projects that will help them improve their 
conditions. It has the following components (World Bank, 2017):  
Component 1: A total of US$14.12 million was given as block grants for conflict-
affected municipalities, barangays (villages), and internally displaced people. The grants were 
used to establish and/or improve public goods such as community centers, water systems, 
concrete pathways, public markets, and concrete bridges. The component also includes the 
Program for Local Economic Development through Enhanced Governance and Grassroots 
Empowerment (PLEDGE) to provide sustainable livelihood opportunities in conflict-affected 
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areas. It aimed to increase knowledge and skills of the BDA beyond community-driven 
development to cover market-linked enterprise development. 
Component 2: The amount of US$13.01 million financed all project management 
activities related to block grants for communities, and to capacity building of the BDA and other 
MILF-affiliated institutions. It supported management, planning, and implementation of program 
activities. After the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement was signed on October 2012, new 
activities were added under this component to (i) prepare the Bangsamoro Development Plan 
(socio-economic plan) and (ii) operationalize support for “Sajahatra Bangsamoro,” the first joint 
development initiative between the government and the MILF. The Sajahatra Bangsamoro 
included health insurance coverage, updating health facilities, college scholarships, support to 
Madrasas and private schools, technical and vocational training, and “cash for work” programs. 
The additional scope of work also included needs assessments for affected communities. 
Component 3: The World Bank provided US$1.24 million to support information 
dissemination and social mobilization/preparation for communities, municipalities, and 
stakeholders to achieve governance goals. Key stakeholders were trained in regard to planning, 
implementation, and maintenance of grant investments. Operational support was also provided to 
the program management office. This component also supported monitoring and evaluation, 
external implementation reviews, related impact studies, and audit of trust fund activities. It also 
covered administrative costs to establish the Mindanao Trust Fund Secretariat and its 
coordinating functions. 
5.3 How and Why the MTF-RDP Contributed to ARMM’s Resilience 
In the context of the MTF-RDP in six rebel camps primarily located in the provinces of 
Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur, this section answers the three impact evaluation questions 
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which are part of the OECD/DAC Criteria for International Development Evaluations: “What 
has happened as the result of the program or project? What real difference has the activity made 
to the beneficiaries? How many people have been affected?” (OECD, n.d.-b). A couple of 
questions were posed upon the responses to the three questions above: (1) In comparison with 
Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and Basilan (which did not receive the intervention), what changes happened in 
Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur in terms of poverty, human development, peace, and 
governance levels? (2) Can we attribute these changes to the project results? Why or why not? 
The project has three main target outcomes, each of them enhancing state-society 
resilience: (1) conflict-affected communities have recovered economically, (2) conflict-affected 
communities have recovered socially, and (3) local peacebuilding initiatives have been 
strengthened. Table 5.1 shows how the World Bank reported the project accomplishments vis-à-
vis the target outcomes: 
Subprojects such as water and sanitation systems, learning centers, livelihood training 
skills, farm-to-market roads, solar dryers, and post-harvest facilities were implemented in the six 
MILF camps (four in Maguindanao, one in Lanao del Sur, and one in Lanao del Norte). As 
reported by World Bank (2018-b, p. 50), “more than 40,000 people have access to sanitation, 
130,000 to safe water, and 100,000 have better access to markets through roads and bridges.”  
 Farm-to-market roads have facilitated the transportation of agricultural produce to the 
markets and helped the government provide basic services in remote areas. The storage facilities 
and solar dryers have also reduced post-harvest wastage and added market value to dried fruits 
and vegetables—since agricultural products are no longer spoiled easily (food spoilage is 
common in a tropical climate such as in the Philippines), and are protected from dust, birds, and 
insects. The learning centers are used for community meetings, social functions, day-care, and 
96 
 
government services such as immunizations, and as venue for conflict resolution. 
 
Table 5.1: Multi-Donor Trust Fund:  
Reconstruction and Development Project Accomplishments 
 
(1) Conflict-affected communities have recovered economically 
• 300 people’s organizations have been formed. 
• 614 community subprojects were completed in 332 villages. 
• 638,000 people have benefitted from the project, against a target of 550,000. Of this number, 51% 
are women. 
• More than 40,000 people have access to sanitation; 130,000 to safe water; and 100,000 have better 
access to markets through roads and bridges.  
• 1,500 people completed literacy and elementary and secondary school equivalency courses 
provided through the Alternative Learning System. 
• BDA trained 1,178 individuals on small business development, and out of this, 91% formed an 
enterprise.  
• 42 enterprises have been established and all were operational at the time of the project closing.  
• 21 houses provided to IDPs in 36 barangays.  
• Economic rate of return for subprojects was 12.9%, exceeding the target of 12%. 
• BDA set up a new Economic Enterprise Development Unit.  
 
(2) Conflict-affected communities have recovered socially 
• 300 people’s organizations have been formed. 
• 2,444 training sessions provided to POs (including BDA’s values transformation training). 
• 5,717 PO members have been trained on organizational management and project management. 
• BDA received capacity building assistance to be able to deliver 572 subprojects in 332 barangays 
in 114 municipalities in 19 provinces in Mindanao.  
 
(3) Strengthened local peacebuilding initiatives. 
• Sajahatra Bangsamoro program delivered by BDA in partnership with GPH (Government of the 
Philippines), providing 50,000 people with health, education, and livelihood assistance.  
• 378 people trained and supported in the MILF’s project management team for Sajahatra 
Bangsamoro. 
• BDA received capacity building assistance to be able to deliver 572 sub-projects in 332 barangays 
in 114 municipalities in 19 provinces in Mindanao.  
• Bangsamoro Development Plan prepared and delivered by the BDA in 2015.  
• A 2012 capacity assessment of the BDA, which was used to prepare a structured program of 
capacity building for the agency.  
• Partial contribution to a 2016 Skills, Needs and Aspirations Assessment for MILF ex-combatants, 
which informed the design of assistance in the MILF camps and base camps.  
• MDTF annual reports and communication campaign which kept everyone informed about peace 
dividends realized through the program. 
 
Source: World Bank. (2018, March 7). Multi-Donor Facility: Reconstruction and development. Implementation 
completion and results report. Retrieved from https://projects-beta.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/document-
detail/P095173 
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 Social cohesion has been an intangible result of the project, according to World Bank 
(2018-b). In some villages, Muslims and Christians used to be segregated—Muslims could not 
go to the territories of Christians and vice-versa. With the introduction of people’s organizations, 
composed of both Muslims and Christians, who are in charge of project maintenance (such as 
collecting users’ fee to maintain water systems, cleaning and maintaining the learning centers), 
the two religious factions have no recourse but to meet and work together. In the process, they 
have formed social trust and are now free to come to one another’s territory (World Bank, 2018-
b). 
 The World Bank (2018-b) also emphasized that confidence between the local government 
and the local communities was also harnessed. The project required the local government to 
produce counterpart resources, such as construction equipment and financial and technical 
support for maintaining the subprojects. The communities have seen this support from the local 
government especially when the people’s organizations are not able to afford the repair of water 
system facilities—in these instances, the local government comes to the rescue.  
 The project has also helped build the capacity of a local entity, the Bangsamoro 
Development Agency (BDA). However, since the peace negotiation was still ongoing when the 
project had been implemented, the BDA, which is composed of MILF members and/or 
supporters, is somewhat illegitimate. The local government units in ARMM, who are composed 
of MNLF members and/or supporters (the rival of MILF), have the legitimacy over the ARMM 
constituents. The ARMM local government units are a legacy of the peace agreement in 1996 
between the government and the MNLF. The BDA is a legacy of the 2014 peace agreement 
between the government and the MILF. However, the Bangsamoro Organic Law was not yet 
ratified when the project was implemented—making the BDA a paralegal institution. The local 
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government units and the BDA were hesitant at first to work together, but with the intervention 
of the central government (the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process), the two 
factions were encouraged to cooperate with the purpose of benefitting the larger Moro-Muslim 
population. 
 The project was said to have a positive influence toward good governance, according to 
World Bank (2018-b). The use of a non-state trust fund recipient allows for transparency and 
accountability. This has been a unique approach in the administration of development funds, as 
the funds are managed by a non-government organization instead of the traditional approach of 
having a government agency manage the funds. Therefore, there is no state procurement law in 
effect, and the procurement is administered by an NGO on its own terms.24 The NGO trained the 
BDA and the people’s organizations in project management processes including procurement. 
According to World Bank (2018-b), “the BDA was able to set up a participatory and transparent 
development approaches when engaging with communities, and was able to deliver concrete 
services in a timely manner” p. 14). In the process, trust and confidence between the 
government, the BDA, and the communities was harnessed, as the Moro-Muslims began to see 
and experience the tangible benefits of development. 
 One of the project’s major objectives is to build the capacity of the BDA, which is being 
groomed as a development arm of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(BARMM). The BARMM (a product of the 2014 peace agreement between the government and 
MILF), once ratified, would replace the ARMM (a product of the 1996 peace agreement between 
the government and MNLF). The World Bank (2018-b, p. 19) reported that:  
 
24 The Community and Family Services International and the Mindanao Land Foundation were the NGOs that worked with the 
BDA. 
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The project has significantly contributed to the institutional growth and development of 
the BDA. The BDA grew from an organization run by a few MILF volunteers in 2001, to 
an agency with over 300 staff, capable of delivering 572 subprojects across 332 
Barangays in 114 municipalities over 11 years. It is now an organization with 
professional systems and manuals for administration, financial management and human 
resource management.  
5.4 How and Why the MTF-RDP Did Not Contribute to ARMM’s Resilience 
Social cohesion is one of the indirect impacts of the project as attested by the World Bank 
(2018-b). In 2015, the ARMM had a total population of 3,781,387; the project benefitted 
638,000 Moro-Muslims—17% of the ARMM’s entire population—concentrated in two 
provinces: Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. 
While the previous section discusses the effects of the project on the direct beneficiaries, 
this section looks into the resilience level of the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, 
respectively—where the six rebel camps (the aid beneficiaries) are located, and compares it to 
the resilience level of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi—the ARMM provinces which did not 
receive the intervention. 
Despite the data limitations due to the remoteness of the areas, this study attempted to 
collect the scant data available at the Philippine Statistics Office that are relevant in explaining 
the resilience level of a particular province covering the period before and after the intervention 
(2005-2017). The percentage change per indicator before and after the intervention was 
calculated for the five provinces (see Figures 5.2 to 5.13). Davao del Sur, a peaceful area in 
Mindanao, is also included in the figures presented as a point of comparison between the 
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peaceful and non-peaceful areas. (This section discusses the facts. The findings are discussed in 
Chapter 5.6: Case Analysis Findings.) 
Economic Growth 
Although ARMM is rich in natural resources, it has only posted 1% share in the 
Philippine GDP between 2006 and 2010 (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2: Average Regional Share in National GDP, 2010-2016 
 
REGION GDP SHARE (%) 
ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 1 
CAR Cordillera Administrative Region 2 
NCR National Capital Region 36 
Region 1 Ilocos Region 3 
Region 2 Cagayan Valley 2 
Region 3 Central Luzon 9 
Region 4A CALABARZON 17 
Region 4B MIMAROPA 2 
Region 5 Bicol Region 2 
Region 6 Western Visayas 4 
Region 7 Central Visayas 6 
Region 8 Eastern Visayas 2 
Region 9  Zamboanga Peninsula 2 
Region 10 Northern Mindanao 4 
Region 11 Davao Region 4 
Region 12 SOCCSKSARGEN 3 
Region 13 Caraga Region 1 
 
Source: Pernia, E.M. (2018, February). The role of Mindanao in national development. Paper presented at the General 
Membership Luncheon Meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc.-Mindanao (Ernesto M. 
Pernia, Socioeconomic Planning Secretary, National Economic Development Authority). 
 
The Philippines is a major exporter of rice grain, which plays a big role in the country’s 
economy and the livelihood of many Filipinos. According to an ARMM Agriculture Secretary, 
ARMM in 2015, ranked 18th in rice production in the country (Manila Times, 2015).  By 
province, the production of rice grains in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur during the project 
period increased, greater than that of the peaceful province of Davao del Sur. Rice production 
significantly decreased in the three provinces where the project had not been implemented 
(Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Palay (rice grains) Produced (metric tons) 
Percentage Change Between 2007 and 2015 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics Authority. 
Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
 
Fishing is a major source of food and incomes for many Filipinos, as the 
Philippines is surrounded by seas and lakes. Majority of the fishing grounds in the 
Philippines are found in the waters surrounding the provinces of ARMM. Between 2005 
and 2017, Maguindanao experienced a huge increase in the volume of its fish production. 
The peaceful Davao del Sur and the conflict-affected Sulu and Tawi-Tawi also recorded 
an increase while Basilan’s and Lanao del Sur’s fish production decreased (Figure 5.3). 
Fish are either consumed by fishermen’s families and clans or sold as a commodity in the 
local and international market, thus the value of production is also an important indicator 
of economic productivity. The conflict-affected and World Bank aid recipient 
Maguindanao saw an immense rise of the value of its fish production between 2005 and 
2017, followed by the peaceful Davao del Sur, then by the conflict-affected, non-aid 
recipients Basilan and Sulu. Lanao del Sur, which is both conflict-affected and aid 
recipient recorded a shortfall in the value of its fish production (Figure 5.4). Both the 
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volume and value of fish production did not show patterns differentiating the aid and 
non-aid recipients and the non-conflict and conflict-affected provinces (Figures 5.3 and 
5.4). 
 
Figure 5.3: Fisheries - Volume of Production (in metric tons) 
Percentage Change Between 2005 and 2017 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics Authority. 
Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Fisheries - Value of Production (in '000 Peso) 
Percentage Change Between 2005 and 2017 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics Authority. 
Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
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In a fragile situation, such as ARMM, bank deposits could be a contentious indicator for 
economic development, as one cannot tell how much money comes from the elites, the middle 
class, and the poor. Figure 5.5 demonstrates that Maguindanao and Lanao Del Sur have the 
largest increase in bank deposit during 2005-2015, and yet the two provinces did not show a 
significant increase in the number of banks (Figure 5.6) and are recorded by the Philippine 
Statistics Authority as one of the poorest provinces in the country. 
 
Figure 5.5: Total Banks Deposit (in million peso) 
Percentage Change Between 2005 and 2015 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics 
Authority. Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July15, 2019). 
 
This study also used the magnitude of poor population and poverty incidence 
among families as indicators of economic growth in Mindanao. The magnitude of poor 
population refers to the size of the population—individuals and families whose incomes 
fall below the poverty threshold of $1.9 per day, and the poverty incidence among 
families is the proportion of families living below the poverty line to the total population 
(Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016). 
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Figure 5.6: Total Number of Banks 
Percentage Change Between 2005 and 2015 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics 
Authority. Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019) 
 
The magnitude of poor population is high in Sulu and Lanao del Sur. Maguindanao also 
posted an increase of its poor population. The magnitude of poor population in Tawi-tawi and 
Basilan has decreased over the years. Lanao del Sur posted a high increase in poverty incidence 
while Tawi-tawi showed a large decrease in poverty incidence (Figures 5.7 and 5.8). 
 
Figure 5.7: Poverty Incidence Among Families 
Percentage Change Between 2006 and 2015 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics Authority. Quickstat. 
Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
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Figure 5.8: Magnitude of Poor Population 
Percentage Change Between 2006 and 2015 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics Authority. 
Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
 
Human Development 
In general, life expectancy requires a longer-term comparison. In a conflict-affected 
situation where the lives and welfare of people are always at risk, however, life expectancy could 
pose a significant difference compared with the non-conflict areas. Ironically, the peaceful 
Davao del Sur has significantly lower rates of life expectancy than those of the conflict-affected 
areas (Figures 5.9 and 5.10); and this case provides an evidence for the argument made earlier in 
Chapter 3.2: 
A fragile situation (or specifically a territory located in remote areas, not accessible by 
government’s basic services) can be labeled as below the poverty line, yet the people 
have longer life expectancies and are healthier than those in non-fragile urban areas, 
because people in remote areas, close to nature (lakes, seas, forests) have access to fresh 
air and food (p. 52). 
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Davao del Sur is not as highly urbanized as Manila, but it is not as pristine as the conflict-
affected areas. The industries and commercialism creeping into Davao del Sur could be 
correlated to the lower rates of life expectancy in the peaceful province—and this is a 
phenomenon that should be investigated—how economic growth brought about by 
industrialization affects human development levels. Among the conflict-affected areas, there is 
no significant difference between the treatment and control groups, except for a lower rate of life 
expectancy for Basilan. 
 
Figure 5.9: Life Expectancy at Birth - Male 
Percentage Change Between 2006 and 2018 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics 
Authority. Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
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Figure 5.10: Life Expectancy at Birth - Female 
Percentage Change Between 2006 and 2018 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics 
Authority. Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
 
Sulu, which is conflict-affected and not part of the project intervention, posted the most 
significant improvement in literacy rate, followed by Maguindanao, which received project 
intervention. There is no significant difference in literacy rates between the peaceful Davao Del 
Sur and the non-peaceful provinces Tawi-tawi, Basilan, and Lanao del Sur (Figure 5.11).  
 
Figure 5.11: Literacy Rate 
Percentage Change Between 2005 and 2015 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics 
Authority. Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
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The Philippines has its own human development index (by province) that is different 
from that of the UNDP. The Philippine HDI measures the “average achievement in a country in 
three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, the acquisition of 
knowledge, and access to resources to obtain good standard of living.” (Philippine Statistics 
Authority, 2016). The treatment groups posted a significant decline in HDI compared to the 
control groups. The peaceful province Davao del Sur posted the highest percentage change in 
HDI (Figure 5.12). 
 
Figure 5.12: Human Development Index 
Percentage Change Between 2000 and 2012 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics 
Authority. Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
 
Governance 
The Philippines’ Good Governance Index measures “(a) sustainable management of 
resources through generation of adequate financial resources and responsiveness to/alleviation of 
poverty; (b) rule of law through improvement of internal and external security, law enforcement, 
and administration of justice; (c) efficiency of the delivery of services on health, education, and 
power supply; and (d) people’s empowerment and participation” (Philippine Statistics Authority, 
n.d.). 
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There is no significant difference between the treatment and control groups in governance 
performance. The peaceful province Davao shows a huge increase in its good governance rating 
(Figure 5.13). 
 
Figure 5.13: Good Governance Index 
Percentage Change Between 2005 and 2008 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics 
Authority. Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
 
Peacefulness 
Conflict deaths have significantly increased in Lanao del Sur between 2016 and 2017 
compared to other provinces. The provinces that did not receive project intervention posted a 
decrease in conflict deaths while the provinces that received project intervention showed an 
increase in conflict deaths (Figure 5.14). Conflict incidents in treatment groups are also higher 
than those of the control groups, except for Basilan (Figure 5.15). According to International 
Alert (2018), a major cause of conflict incidents are shadow economy issues, which may include 
informal businesses, buying and selling of illegal drugs and weapons, and human trafficking. The 
main causes of conflict death are identity conflicts and political issues (Figure 5.16). 
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Figure 5.14: Conflict Deaths per 100,000 Persons 
Source: International Alert, Philippines. (2018). Conflict alert 2018: War and identity (p. 15). Retrieved from 
https://www.international-alert.org/publications/war-and-identity-conflict-alert  
 
 
Figure 5.15: Conflict Incidents per 1,000 Persons 
Source: International Alert, Philippines. (2018). Conflict alert 2018: War and identity (p. 10). Retrieved from 
https://www.international-alert.org/publications/war-and-identity-conflict-alert  
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Figure 5.16: Conflict Incidents and Deaths by Main Cause 
Source: International Alert, Philippines. (2018). Conflict alert 2018: War and identity (p. 29). Retrieved from 
https://www.international-alert.org/publications/war-and-identity-conflict-alert  
 
Looking at the data presented above, there are no significant differences between the 
provinces that received the project intervention and those that did not. If there is any difference, 
it is ironic, such as the treatment groups posting a lower human development index rating, higher 
poverty incidence, and higher conflict deaths and incidents than those of the control groups.  
5.5 Is ARMM a Donor Darling? 
Figure 5.17 shows the World Bank’s aid allocation, which is mainly for the rehabilitation 
and recovery programs in ARMM.25 Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the timeline of the peace process 
and mass displacements due to conflict to provide the context for the years the aid was given. By 
 
25 Though the World Bank provided assistance at the country level in the form of concessional loans and grants (which may or 
may not include ARMM), it was not captured in Figure 5.17. This has been one of the monitoring issues for country-level 
assistance wherein aid is not monitored and reported at the subnational level. 
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the end of 2002, aid started to flow for the conflict-affected situation in ARMM. Aid allocation 
in ARMM was highest in 2005. These were the years (2003-2007) that the Philippine president 
was brokering peace with the MILF. Aid started to drop in 2010, after clashes between MILF 
and government forces, and also the year when mass displacements began to take place as a 
result of clashes between MILF and MNLF. Aid flow significantly dropped in 2012 during the 
conclusion of the Bangsamoro framework—a step forward in the peace agreement between the 
government and MILF. From that time (2012) forward 2018, aid has never risen to a significant 
level. 
 Is ARMM then a donor darling? Data shows that it is not. ADB, headquartered in the 
Philippines, has not provided aid for ARMM; only the World Bank has. Though there are 
bilateral organizations assisting ARMM, their support was consolidated through the Mindanao 
Trust Fund administered by the World Bank. 
 Does resilience of ARMM affect aid allocation? Depending on the context, aid flows in 
ARMM may increase or decrease. In the first decade of World Bank assistance, a pattern can be 
gleaned on aid allocation in ARMM—more aid is allocated when there is a promise of peace, 
and aid decreases when there is the risk of war. However, when the peace agreement was 
solidified due to a tangible action plan (the Bangsamoro Development Framework) to bring a 
more sustainable peace, aid started to decrease. This disconfirms the hypothesis that less aid is 
given for less peaceful situations, but confirms the study’s findings that less aid flows in more 
peaceful situations. There could be several factors why aid started to decrease when peace is in 
the horizon in the subnational fragile situation in ARMM. One reason is the changes of 
administration throughout the history of the peace process. State leaders decide whether to access 
development assistance from donors, and the current administration of President Rodrigo Duterte 
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(who pushed for the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law) is less interested in getting 
foreign aid, compared to the previous administrations. Another reason is, the Philippines is a 
middle-income country, and has the capacity to finance the socio-economic development 
programs in ARMM, and when the time came that the conflict between the MILF and the 
government has been resolved, the government became willing to use its own fund reserves for 
the development of the Bangsamoro region. Moreover, the cancellation of the MTF-RDP sub-
projects in MNLF territories (due to lack of political support by the MNLF and therefore 
presence of security risks) confirms the hypothesis that donors are hesitant to invest in areas that 
pose risks related to conflict. It should be noted that the MILF territories pose similar security 
risks, however, the MILF leadership supports the MTF-RDP as they know that many MILF 
members/supporters would benefit from the project, and therefore the MILF leadership was able 
to maintain peace and order while the project was ongoing. 
 
Figure 5.17: World Bank Aid Allocation for ARMM (2002-2018) 
Source: Graph created by Cyrel San Gabriel using data from World Bank. Project in the Philippines. Retrieved from  
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-summary?countrycode_exact=PH 
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Table 5.3: Timeline of Conflict Between Philippine Government  
  and Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
 
▪ 1970 - MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF - Fight for Independence) is founded. 
▪ 1972 - President Ferdinand Marcos declares Martial Law to contain the growing Muslim and communist 
insurgencies. 
▪ 1976 - Signing of the Tripoli Agreement which provides a framework for autonomy. 
▪ 1984 - MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Breakaway Group of the MNLF) is established. 
▪ 1990 - Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created, based on an agreement with 
MNLF. 
▪ 2000 - All-out war between the AFP and MILF under President Joseph Estrada. 
▪ 2003 - Pres. Gloria Arroyo brokers peace talks with MILF. 
▪ 2008 - Conflict intensifies as peace talks are declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
▪ 2011 - President Aquino resumes Peace Negotiations with the MILF in Narita, Japan. 
▪ 2012 - Negotiations for Bangsamoro Framework concludes. 
▪ 2014 – Signing of Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) leading to the Bangsamoro Basic 
Law (BBL) submitted to Congress. 
▪ 2015 - Mamasapano Incident (ambush and killing of 44 national police, 18 MILF people and 4 citizens); 
passage of the BBL is stalled. 
▪ 2016 - Newly elected President Rodrigo Duterte pushes to pass the BBL. 
▪ 2017 - Congress begins reading the BBL in the Parliament. 
▪ 2018 - President Duterte signs off the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), a new name for the BBL 
▪ 2019 - Plebiscites in Southern Mindanao to ratify the BOL and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) to replace ARMM (January & February). 
 
Source: World Bank. 2015. Philippines violence-conflict Mindanao case study. Washington DC. (Updated to cover 
2016-2019) 
 
Table 5.4: Conflict and Mass Displacements 
 
Date and Place of Conflict Description of Conflict Affected 
October 2010, North Cotabato Clashes between MNLF and 
MILF factions 
6 barangays (villages); 5,726 
persons or 1,042 families 
displaced 
February 2012, North Cotabato Two MILF commanders clashed 
over a long-running land dispute 
105 families displaced 
March 2013, Barangay Anticala, 
Butuan City 
Encounter between the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines and the 
New People’s Army (communist 
insurgents) 
150 families or 750 persons 
displaced 
September 2013, Zamboanga City 
(Zamboanga del Sur) 
The MNLF destroyed 10,000 
homes 
327,000 persons displaced 
 
63,000 people unable to return to 
their homes because parts of the 
city were declared “no return 
area” 
 
209 IDPs died in 2014 due to 
pneumonia and gastroenteritis 
(half of them were children under 
5 years old) 
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Date and Place of Conflict Description of Conflict Affected 
March 2015, Maguindanao and 
Cotabato 
Military offensive vs. BIFF 8,149 families or 40,745 
individuals were displaced  
 
March 2015, North Cotabato Clash between MILF and BIFF 
due to “contending controls over 
the areas” 
6,383 families or 34,925 
individuals displaced  
 
March 2016, Marawi City, Lanao 
del Sur 
Government troops clash against 
Maute Group 
7,800 persons displaced 
January 2016-February 2017; 
Sulu and Basilan 
 
Military operations vs. Abu 
Sayaff (terrorist group) 
68,400 persons displaced 
 
May 2017 – present, Marawi 
City, Lanao del Sur 
Marawi siege 400,000 persons displaced 
 
Source: Rappler. (2017, July 11). Forced to flee: How many have been displaced due to conflict? Retrieved from 
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/175236-fast-facts-world-population-internally-displaced-persons-conflict 
 
5.6 Case Analysis Findings 
The MTF-RDP has benefitted 17% of the ARMM population by providing them public 
goods that enhance their quality of living. Households got access to water systems, which have 
freed women and children from fetching water from the wells; and as a result, they have more 
time for other productive activities. Tire paths facilitated the transportation of agricultural 
products from the farms to the markets, while the post-harvest facilities allowed the preservation 
and better quality of agricultural crops. The learning centers became a hub for social gatherings, 
public services, and conflict mediation. People from the MILF camps have been trained on 
livelihood skills such as sewing clothes and producing banana chips. The Bangsamoro 
Development Agency (BDA) and the peoples’ organizations were not only trained to plan and 
implement local development projects, but they were also immersed in values formation 
programs particularly on transparency and accountability. 
Comparing the provinces where the rebel camps are located and that received aid, with 
the provinces where there are also rebel camps but did not receive aid, there have been no 
significant trends in terms of differences in economic and poverty, human development, 
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governance, and peace levels. In many instances, resilience of non-aid recipients appeared to be 
better than that of the aid recipients. For example, the poverty incidence and the magnitude of 
poor populations in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao (the aid recipients) have spiked during the 
project period while those of Tawi-tawi and Basilan (the non-aid recipients) have been curbed. 
The human development index shows that the scores of aid recipients are much lower than those 
of the non-aid recipients. Sulu and Tawi-tawi (the non-aid recipients) recorded less conflict 
deaths and incidents than Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao (the aid recipients.) On one hand, the 
volume and value of fish production in ARMM did not show any patterns differentiating the aid 
and non-aid recipient provinces and the non-conflict and conflict-affected provinces. 
The MTF-RDP therefore has not contributed to the resilience of ARMM overall, but only 
contributed to the resilience of individuals and groups of people from a small percentage of the 
population in the conflict-affected areas. Confidence and trust building have taken place in 
project intervention areas, which contributed to harmonious relationships between Christian and 
Muslim communities and between MNLF and MILF supporters/members.  
The benefits brought about by the project to the rebel camps are unquestionable, but it 
has not trickled down to the entire population; and their sustainability, such as the maintenance 
of water systems and learning centers and the marketing of clothes and agricultural crops, rely on 
a larger social, political, and economic system internal to the new BARMM government for 
which the Philippine government has given the autonomy to have its own governance and 
economic policies and systems, which is beyond the influence and control of donors. On one 
hand, the MILF-driven BDA is a paralegal entity and exercises its authority under the shadow of 
the World Bank, and could only be legitimate on its own once the BARMM government has 
been constituted.  
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  Resilience levels are somewhat associated to aid allocation by the World Bank in 
ARMM. With the promise of peace, whereby the government initiates peace talks with MILF, 
aid for ARMM increased by 33%, but at the height of conflict, aid flows start to decline by 
34.86%. However, when there has been concrete evidence of conflict resolution, such as the 
creation of the Bangsamoro Development Framework and the drafting of the Bangsamoro Basic 
Law (now called the Bangsamoro Organic Law), aid flows have significantly decreased by 83%. 
From 2012, the time that the Bangsamoro Development Framework was created, to 2018 when 
the Bangsamoro Organic Law was approved in Congress, aid flow has been constant. Although 
aid allocation and resilience levels are related, it is not 100%, as there could be many other 
factors affecting aid allocation. The decline of aid flows in ARMM in 2010 could also be 
attributed to the lack of trust by the national government to the Moro-Muslims, due to many 
cases of plunder and corruption committed by Moro-Muslim leaders seated in the regional 
government. The national government has the jurisdiction where to use the aid money, which 
could be diverted to Philippine regions where there are stronger transparency and accountability 
mechanisms; and this case needs further investigation. There have been claims on the lack of 
trust of the national government to the MNLF-led ARMM,26 and at this time the current 
President has been trying to rebuild the trust with the Moro-Muslims as a whole, starting with the 
MILF-led BARMM. More research should be done on the determinants of aid allocation, 
particularly on the influence of the religious and political dynamics between the government and 
the autonomous region. Christian faith (predominantly Catholic) is embodied in the capital of the 
Philippines where the national government is seated; and there has been a history of distrust 
between Christians and Muslims in the Philippines and this is also reflected among Christian and 
 
26 Conversations with Philippine government officials (April 2015, Manila, Philippines) 
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Muslim politicians. Development aid, which is considered as “sovereign operations” by donor 
agencies, has to go through the Christian-dominated national government before it is distributed 
to the local governments in ARMM with predominantly Muslim population. Religious and 
ethnic fractionalization could have either correlation or causation with aid allocation in the 
subnational fragile situation in ARMM, and this is something that should be explored. 
The future political context where aid would operate is uncertain, particularly how the 
new MILF-led BARMM, composed of former revolutionaries used to war and guerilla tactics, 
would now run a bureaucracy on their own, independent from the national government. Here, the 
absorptive capacity to handle huge amounts of aid (if there’s any) and/or large share of tax 
revenue and Internal Revenue Allocation from the national government is in question. It is also 
uncertain how the dissolution of MNLF-led ARMM (to be replaced by BARMM) would play 
out—whether this would lead to more conflict or whether there is hope to consolidate peace for 
the benefit of the greater Moro-Muslim population and indigenous people in the natural-resource 
rich region of the Philippines. A study by Franke, Milagrosa, and Schure (2007) posits that 
abundance of natural resources is correlated with conflict. If development aid intends to extract 
the natural resources shared by a highly fractionalized society, such as ARMM, state-society 
resilience could further deteriorate. Results of the regression analysis show ethnic 
fractionalization as a major cause of deteriorating state-society resilience, and aid causes only a 
slight decrease in resilience (See Chapter 6 and Table 6.1). Here, development has the potential 
to be either an instrument for social cohesion or for further conflict; but the question is not 
whether aid should be provided or not, but how aid can be delivered effectively as an instrument 
of social cohesion in a highly fractionalized society sharing a territory rich in natural resources.    
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This chapter discussed how a World Bank program has and has not helped built the 
resilience of ARMM, and how the peace process and resilience level in the Moro-Muslim region 
influenced the WB aid allocation. The findings revealed in this chapter provided empirical 
evidence from a real-life context that would help explain the results of the regression analyses 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
6.1 Impact of Development Aid on State-Society Resilience 
 
Hypothesis: Development aid helps build state-society resilience in fragile situations. 
Findings: A total of 1,625 development projects were analyzed on how they could impact 
resilience two years after the start of project implementation (See Chapter 4.2.3 and footnote 23). 
These are the projects implemented by AfDB, ADB, and WB in 35 fragile member states that 
received aid from 2007 to 2015. The analysis incorporated other factors that might affect state-
society resilience: presence of internally displaced persons due to natural disasters and conflict, 
ethnic fractionalization, and democracy levels. 
Model 1, presented in Table 6.1, shows that for every unit of increase in aid allocation, 
resilience decreases by .842. Results imply that aid interventions do not help the state and the 
society to collectively withstand, adapt to, and rebound from crisis. Providing more development 
aid weakens (by .842) the collective resilience of the state and society to crisis. The p-value 
suggests that there is a strong causal connection between aid allocation and state-society resilience; 
development aid causes a change in resilience. The F value shows that the findings are statistically 
significant, wherein the null hypothesis (aid has nothing to do with state-society resilience) is 
rejected. Overall, aid allocation, presence of internally displaced persons due to natural disasters 
and conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy levels account for 43.4% of the variation in 
the resilience of states and societies. This means that 43.4% of the changes taking place in the 
resilience levels of the state and society is caused by all of these five factors: aid allocation, natural 
disasters, violent conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy levels. It should be noted that 
the impact of democracy levels on state-society resilience is positive—contrary to the negative 
impact of all the other variables—which means that the more democratic a country is, 
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Table 6.1: Model 1 - Impact of Development Aid on State-Society Resilience 
 
Variables 
Focus: Development Aid 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Adjusted R2 R2 Change 
 
Constant 
 
67.158 
*** 
(1.957) 
  
Development aid 
 
-.842 
*** 
(.261) 
.045 .046 
Presence of IDPs due to 
natural disasters 
 
-3.129 
*** 
(.481) 
.104 .060 
Presence of IDPs due to violent 
conflict 
-9.732 
*** 
(.519) 
.290 .186 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
-11.837 
*** 
(.766) 
.403 .113 
 
Democracy level 
1.581 
*** 
(.168) 
.434 .031 
N 1625   
F 249.891   
Dependent Variable = State-Society Resilience 
*** p ≤ .001 
the more resilient the state and society are to crisis. When the impact of aid allocation is isolated 
from all the other determinant variables, it only accounts for 4.5% of the variation in state-society 
resilience (as shown by its adjusted R2 in Table 6.1.) Consequently, the impact of aid allocation 
combined with IDPs due to natural disasters accounts for 10.4% of the variation in state-society 
resilience; the impact of aid allocation, IDPs due to natural disasters and conflict accounts for 29% 
of the variation in state-society resilience; and the impact of aid allocation, IDPs due to natural 
disasters and conflict, and ethnic fractionalization accounts for 40.3% of the variation in state-
society resilience. The results imply that 4.5% of the weakening resilience levels of the state and 
society are attributed to development aid, and 35.8% is attributed to natural disasters, violent 
conflict, and ethnic fractionalization. Democracy levels, however, cause a positive change in state-
society resilience, and its contribution to that change is 3.1%. 
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The negative effect of aid (-.842) on state-society resilience is contrary to what was 
hypothesized (aid increases resilience); however data in Table 6.1 shows that development aid has 
little impact on resilience, which is 4.5% compared to the impact of all the other variables, which 
is 38.9% (natural disasters, conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy levels combined). 
Having the impact magnitude of 4.5%, the negative effect of aid (-.842) is not as impactful as those 
of the other variables. Looking at the values of R square change from Tables 6.1 to 6.6, conflict 
and ethnic fractionalization have consistently shown that they have the greatest contribution on 
weakening state-society resilience. The blame for weakening state-society resilience should 
therefore be more upon conflict and ethnic fractionalization, than on development aid; and 
democratic reforms, including political empowerment of civil society organizations, should be 
adopted, as a democratic state, as shown by this study, strengthens state-society resilience. 
Thus, the debates on whether aid is an incentive or disincentive to peace, whether aid is a 
failure or success in statebuilding, and whether aid can make states and societies fragile or resilient 
should not be a major concern, but how impactful aid is on fragile situations should be looked at. 
And the results of this study show that, overall, development aid is not as impactful as other 
determinants of fragility, such as conflict, natural disasters, ethnic fractionalization, and 
democracy.  
The case of Mindanao also shows that the MTF-RDP has little impact on the overall 
resilience of ARMM. Though the project has benefitted 638,000 Moro-Muslims, it is only 17% 
of the ARMM’s population and concentrated in two provinces only. Lanao del Sur and 
Maguindanao, the two beneficiary provinces, are still among the poorest in the Philippines 
(Table 6.2) and have higher conflict deaths compared to the ARMM provinces that did not 
receive aid. 
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Table 6.2: Poverty Incidence Among Families 
 
Province Region Poverty Incidence 
(%) 
1. Lanao del Sur  ARMM 70.2 
2. Sulu  ARMM 61.8 
3. Sarangani  Region 12 54.5 
4. Bukidnon  Region 10 53.6 
5. Siquijor  Region 7 53.0 
6. Northern Samar  Region 8 52.4 
7. Maguindanao  ARMM 50.4 
8. Sultan Kudarat  Region 12 47.4 
9. Zamboanga del Norte  Region 9 45.8 
10. Agusan del Sur  Caraga 44.7 
11. Negros Oriental  Region 7 41.9 
12/13. Western Samar  Region 8 41.8 
12/13. North Cotabato  Region 12 41.8 
14.Lanao del Norte  Region 10 41.4 
15. Mt. Province  CAR 40.7 
16. Eastern Samar  Region 8 40.1 
17. Camiguin Region 10 40.0 
18. Catanduanes  Region 5 39.7 
19. Leyte  Region 8 39.1 
20. Apayao CAR 37.5 
 
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority. Poverty incidence among Filipinos registered at 26.3%, as of first semester of 2015 – 
PSA. (2015 First Semester Official Poverty Statistics – Table 11). https://psa.gov.ph/content/poverty-incidence-among-filipinos-
registered-263-first-semester-2015-psa (Accessed 25 December 2018). 
 
 
6.2 Impact of Aid for Governance, Human Development, Economic Growth, and 
Peacebuilding on State-Society Resilience 
 
Hypotheses:  
Aid for governance, human development, and peacebuilding helps states and societies in 
fragile situations become more resilient. Aid for economic growth may contribute to fragility, if 
the benefits are unequal and exclusive to a specific population or territory. 
Findings: The study analyzed how aid for governance, human development, economic growth, 
and peacebuilding can affect state-society resilience, respectively. A total of 616 governance 
projects, 331 human development projects, 502 economic improvement projects, and 176 
peacebuilding projects were tested. These are the projects implemented by AfDB, ADB, and WB 
in 35 fragile member states that received aid from 2007 to 2015. Each theme (aid for governance, 
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aid for human development, aid for economic growth, and aid for peacebuilding) was analyzed 
separately incorporating other factors that can affect state-society resilience. These other predictors 
are presence of IDPs due to natural disasters and conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy 
level. 
Table 6.3 shows that the relationship between aid for governance and state-society 
resilience is statistically significant, or aid for governance has a causal relationship with the 
resilience levels of state and society. For every increase of aid for governance, resilience decreases 
by 1.678. In other words, increasing aid for governance does not build the resilience of state and 
society to crisis, but weakens it by 1.678. Aid for governance and the other predictors included in 
the analysis account for 45.3% of the variation in state-society resilience.27 The impact of aid for 
governance, without including the control variables, accounts for 8% of the variation in resilience. 
The Adjusted R square in Table 6.3 implies that 34.1% of the weakening state-society resilience 
is explained by natural disasters, violent conflict, and ethnic fractionalization; 8% of the 
deteriorating resilience can be attributed to aid for governance alone; while democracy accounts 
for 3.2% of improved state-society resilience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 The control variables’ relationship with development aid and state-society resilience is fully discussed in Chapter 6.5. 
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Table 6.3: Model 2A - Impact of Aid for Governance on State-Society Resilience 
 
Variables 
Focus: Aid for governance 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Adjusted R2 R2 Change 
 
Constant 
 
69.970 
*** 
(2.787) 
  
Aid for governance 
 
-1.678 
*** 
(.392) 
.080 .082 
Presence of IDPs due to 
natural disasters 
 
-.978 
(.741) 
.112 .033 
Presence of IDPs due to violent 
conflict 
-9.293 
*** 
(.792) 
.306 .195 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
-10.166 
*** 
(1.157) 
.421 .115 
 
Democracy level 
1.603 
*** 
(.263) 
.453 .033 
N 616   
F 102.812   
Dependent Variable = State-Society Resilience 
*** p ≤ .001 
 
The relationship between aid for human development and state-society resilience is also 
statistically significant, or aid for human development causes a change in the resilience levels of 
state and society to crisis. The study’s results show that for every unit of increase in human 
development aid, resilience weakens by 1.469 (Table 6.4). Like aid for governance, aid for human 
development causes a deterioration of the resilience levels of state and society. Aid for human 
development, including the other predictors, explains 37.8% of the variation in state-society 
resilience. Isolating the impact of aid for human development from the control variables, it only 
accounts for 4.1% of the variation in resilience. The Adjusted R square in Table 6.4 implies that 
32.5% of the declining resilience levels is caused by natural disasters, violent conflict, and ethnic 
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fractionalization. Democracy accounts for 1.2% in explaining the increase in state-society 
resilience. 
Table 6.4: Model 2B - Impact of Aid for Human Development on State-Society Resilience 
 
Variables 
Focus: Aid for human 
development 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Adjusted R2 R2 Change 
 
Constant 
 
73.701 
*** 
(4.738) 
  
Aid for human development 
 
-1.469 
* 
(.611) 
.041 .044 
Presence of IDPs due to 
violent conflict 
 
-8.912 
*** 
(1.037) 
.247 .208 
Presence of IDPs due to natural 
disasters 
-3.821 
*** 
(.979) 
267 .023 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
-10.230 
*** 
(1.657) 
.366 .099 
 
Democracy level 
.958 
** 
(.355) 
.378 .014 
N 331   
F 41.031   
Dependent Variable = State-Society Resilience 
*** = p < .001;  ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 
 
Both aid for governance and human development weakens state-society resilience. 
Intuitively, one might think that aid for improving governance should make states and societies 
more resilient, for when there are capable public institutions and governance systems in place, it 
is assumed that this will harness economic opportunities, build capacities, increase the quality of 
life, and sustain peace. Similarly, aid for human development is expected to increase state-society 
resilience, for when citizens have access to health, education, and gender equality, they can 
productively contribute to economic growth, strong governance systems, and better quality of life. 
However, in a fragile society, where there is armed violence, high ethnic fractionalization, and that 
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which is challenged by the risks of natural disasters, the story could be different. Although the 
majority of the ARMM’s population is Moro-Muslim, the ethnicity within that population is highly 
diverse, and the territories are segregated according to clans. The MTF-RDP has only benefitted 
the clans supporting the MILF, since the project was implemented in the MILF rebel territories 
and not in the MNLF enclaves, and this has caused further jealousy and strife between the two 
rebel groups and between the MNLF and the government—thus undermining state-society 
resilience. Many individual Moro-Muslims have also benefitted from the human development 
interventions brought about by international aid. They gained some skills training (and also 
benefitted from the cash-transfer programs from the government) and migrated to more peaceful 
parts of the Philippines or abroad, and this can be gleaned from the large decrease in the Moro-
Muslim population between 2007 and 2015 (see Figure 5.18); and thus a brain drain occurs in 
ARMM, weakening the labor force that should drive socio-economic development in the region. 
The MTF-RDP has some positive impact on local governance, particularly on building the 
capacity of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). The BDA received training from the 
project, and the agency was able to deliver what was expected of it by planning and implementing 
development projects with some transparency and accountability. However, it is not a legitimate 
institution, and it represents the MILF, from which the next political leaders of the new BARMM 
would come from. The BARMM would replace the ARMM that is composed of MNLF members 
who still have the legitimate power—holding positions as provincial governors, mayors, and local 
government officials. Once the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BoL) has been ratified, the BARMM 
would be established, and the institutions under it, including the BDA, would have the legitimate 
power, and the ARMM would then be dissolved. While the ratification of the BoL has not yet 
taken place, having the BDA attached to the MTF-RDP, which is funded by international aid 
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agencies and administered by World Bank, makes the BDA ‘legitimate’ in the eyes of the Moro-
Muslims in Mindanao, as the people’s organizations (POs) willingly worked with BDA with trust 
and confidence. A week before the plebiscite (that is to ratify the BoL), several bombings have 
taken place in ARMM. Though it cannot be definitely concluded that the bombings are attributed 
to the MTF-RDP, we can infer that having aid in such a complex fragile situation, where there is 
high ethnic fractionalization, can undermine state-society resilience if the development benefits 
are not evenly distributed among the ARMM population.  
On the aspect of aid for human development negatively affecting resilience, though it is 
counter intuitive, it is not entirely a dubious assumption. A fragile situation is far more complicated 
than a non-fragile situation. The decrease in resilience caused by international aid for human 
development is played out, for example, in the marginalized women in Nepal who have been 
educated and trained with the support of international aid agencies. The marginalized women in 
Nepal played a significant role in the Maoist revolution. Lauren Leve (2007) attributed the 
educational programs provided by international aid as a contributing factor to women’s motivation 
in supporting the revolution. Leve (2007) argues, “women’s politization may be the unexpected 
result of successful development programs that aimed to ‘empower’ women by raising their 
consciousness of gender-and class-based oppression” (p. 127). 
The MTF-RDP has some tangible positive impact on the lives of the few populations in 
the Moro-Muslim region (ARMM). If the project has some negative impact, as this study’s results 
have shown, such impact is covert and would require further research. Having said this, we can 
draw from the experience of the marginalized women in Nepal, that when the oppressed people 
are empowered, they can either ‘fight’ or ‘flee’ (both of which would appear in the data as less 
resilience). So far there is no evidence that beneficiaries of development aid in ARMM have 
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supported any other rebel group (aside from the MILF and MNLF, there are many other rebel 
groups in ARMM, including different communist parties and Islamic groups), and this would 
require further investigation. The decreasing population in ARMM between 2007 and 2015 (as 
shown in Figure 5.18), however, may mean that a large portion of the healthy, educated population 
has gone to the Philippine capital or abroad to flee from conflict and fragility in ARMM and find 
better-paying jobs—and this assumption should be further investigated. 
 
Figure 5.18: Total Population in ARMM 
Percentage Change Between 2007 and 2015 
 
Source: Percentage change calculated by Cyrel San Gabriel using raw data from Philippine Statistics 
Authority. Quickstat. Retrieved from psa.gov.ph (accessed July 15, 2019). 
 
It should be noted, however, that although aid for governance and human development has 
negative impact (-1.678 and -1.469 respectively) on ARMM’s resilience, the magnitude of their 
impact is small (8% and 4.1% respectively), compared to the negative impact of the control 
variables violent conflict, natural disasters, and ethnic fractionalization (34.1% for the control 
variables analyzed with aid for governance and 32.5% for the control variables analyzed with aid 
for human development). Thus, we cannot conclude that aid for governance and human 
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development is the main culprit for the fragility in ARMM, but there are many other factors that 
can cause such fragility.  
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show that, when economic growth and peacebuilding are regressed 
against state-society resilience, the analysis yields statistically insignificant results. This means 
that aid for economic growth and peacebuilding has no causal relationship with state-society 
resilience. Peacebuilding programs mostly involve recovery and rehabilitation and may not have 
that significant impact on building state-society resilience, but more on helping the fragile situation 
get back on its feet, rather than helping it withstand potential fragility and conflict risks. Aid for 
economic growth is the largest amount among those of the other three themes,28 and it is not easy 
to accept the finding that it has neither positive nor negative impact on state-society resilience. The 
MTF-RDP, for example, provided US$14.12 million to establish and/or improve public goods (i.e., 
community centers, water systems, concrete pathways, public markets, and concrete bridges) and 
provide sustainable livelihood opportunities in conflict-affected areas in ARMM; however, only 
17% of the population benefitted from the project. Infrastructure projects have given income 
opportunities for the locals, such as construction work, but it is only for a short term. Livelihood 
projects in ARMM have not been sustainable as there are no available markets for the local 
products, which cannot compete with big businesses in terms of production, quality, and prices. 
There is also the notion that infrastructure projects actually benefit international contractors and 
consultants, and not really the local people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 From 2009 to 2017, aid for economic growth amounted to $81 million, aid for governance $32.4 million, aid for human 
development $54 million, and aid for peacebuilding $30 million. 
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Table 6.5: Model 2C - Impact of Aid for Economic Growth on State-Society Resilience 
 
Variables 
Focus: Aid for economic 
growth 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Adjusted R2 R2 Change 
 
Constant 
 
67.539 
*** 
(3.659) 
  
Aid for economic growth 
 
-.515 
(.485) 
.036 .038 
Presence of IDPs due to 
natural disasters 
 
-3.487 
*** 
(.921) 
.101 .067 
Presence of IDPs due to violent 
conflict 
-10.598 
*** 
(1.043) 
.307 .207 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
-14.293 
*** 
(1.546) 
.399 .093 
 
Democracy level 
1.821 
*** 
(.302) 
.439 .041 
N 502   
F 79.511   
Dependent Variable = State-Society Resilience   *** p ≤ .001 
 
Table 6.6: Model 2D - Impact of Aid for Peacebuilding on State-Society Resilience 
 
Variables 
Focus: Aid for peacebuilding 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Adjusted R2 R2 Change 
 
Constant 
 
53.311 
*** 
(7.115) 
  
Aid for peacebuilding 
 
-.280 
(.933) 
.033 .038 
Presence of IDPs due to 
violent conflict 
 
-7.872 
*** 
(1.386) 
.248 .218 
Presence of IDPs due to natural 
disasters 
-7.128 
*** 
(1.308) 
.320 .075 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
-11.256 
*** 
(2.044) 
.521 .200 
 
Democracy level 
3.580 
*** 
(.606) 
.600 .080 
N 176   
F 53.545   
Dependent Variable = State-Society Resilience     *** p ≤ .001 
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6.3 Impact of State-Society Resilience on Aid Allocation 
 
Hypothesis: Aid flow, in general, tends to increase in less resilient situations. 
 
Findings: A total of 1,755 development projects were analyzed to determine how state-society 
resilience could affect aid allocation. The predictor is the resilience score of the country, wherein 
the project was implemented three years before the start of project implementation. Donor agencies 
usually have a funding cycle of three years. Prior to the disbursement of funds during the start of 
the project, reconnaissance and due diligence missions (which may include feasibility studies, risk 
assessments, stakeholder consultation), project design, and proposal review and approval 
processes are conducted, and this may take an average of three years for a fragile state (interviews 
with ADB staff, May 18-25, 2018). Other predictors that could influence aid allocation are also 
included in the analysis. These are the presence of IDPs due to natural disasters and conflict, ethnic 
fractionalization, and democracy levels. Dummy variables are also introduced—whether the 
project is funded by a global MDB (World Bank) or a regional MDB (ADB and AfDB). With 
World Bank, as a global MDB and having the greater number of member countries (both donor 
and recipient countries), compared to the regional MDBs, results of the analysis show that aid 
increases by .365 if the projects are funded by the WB, compared to .267 when the projects are 
funded by regional MDBs (See Table 6.7). 
 Results of the analysis disconfirm the hypothesis that more aid is given if a situation is less 
resilient. Model 3, presented in Table 6.7, shows that states and societies with higher levels of 
resilience receive higher levels of aid allocation. However, state-society resilience has a small 
effect on aid allocation. For every unit increase in resilience, aid allocation grows by only .007; in 
other words, when the state and society are resilient to crisis, aid flows increase, but not at a very 
significant amount. The F value of 23.376 shows that the findings are significant and the null 
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hypothesis (no relationship between state-society resilience and aid allocation) is rejected. Table 
6.7 also shows that aid allocation increases when a fragile situation experiences natural disasters, 
violent conflict, and ethnic fractionalization; but aid flows decrease when democracy levels are 
higher (The implications of these findings are further discussed in Chapter 6.5). The variables 
state-society resilience, violent conflict, natural disasters, ethnic fractionalization, democracy, and 
whether the project is funded by a global or regional MDB only account for 8.2% of the variation 
in aid allocation. About 91.8% is explained by other unknown factors. This suggests that the 
behavior of donors in aid allocation is not completely dependent on the resilience of the recipients, 
but it could also be attributed to the donors’ interests, including their financing policies. Another 
implication is that it is neither the increase nor the decrease of aid allocation that matters, but how 
aid is delivered in fragile situations. 
In a separate regression model, the country performance and institutional assessment 
(CPIA), the basis for the performance-based allocation adopted by the development agencies, was 
included to test its contribution to the variation of aid allocation. Fragile situations are identified 
based on the results of the annual CPIA under four dimensions—economic management, structural 
policies, policies for social inclusion/equity, and public sector management and institutions. If a 
country’s overall score is 3.2 or below (wherein a 1 rating corresponds to a very weak performance, 
and a 6 rating to a very strong performance),29 and/or the country has the presence of UN or 
regional peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions during the past three years, then it is categorized 
as a fragile situation (World Bank, n.d.-b). 
 
29 The 3.2 cut-off score is an arbitrary choice made by the first team of the World Bank working on low-income countries under 
stress (LICUS). Conflict-affected countries had very low values in the country policy and institutional assessment and the team 
assessed the LICUS mean scores to allow for the identification of fragile situations (called the LICUS way back in 2006). The 
African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank have also adopted the 3.2 cut-off score in identifying their fragile 
member states, and that led to the harmonized list of fragile situations by the three MDBs (Interview with Dr. Patrick Safran, 
former ADB focal point for fragile situations, September 18, 2018). 
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Table 6.7: Model 3 - Impact of Overall State-Society Resilience on Aid Allocation 
 
Variables 
Focus: State-Society Resilience 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Constant 
 
6.156 
*** 
(.152) 
State-Society Resilience 
 
.007 
*** 
(.002) 
Presence of IDPs due to natural 
disasters 
 
.096 
* 
(.044) 
Presence of IDPs due to violent 
conflict 
.169 
*** 
(.049) 
 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
.489 
*** 
(.074) 
 
Democracy level 
-.039 
** 
(.015) 
World Bank (funding from a global 
MDB) 
.365 
*** 
(.048) 
Asian Development Bank, African 
Development Bank (funding from 
regional MDBs) 
.267 
*** 
(.071) 
Adjusted R2 .082 
N 1755 
F 23.376 
Dependent Variable = Aid Allocation 
*** = p < .001;  ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 
 
CPIA was not included in Models 3 and 4 because it causes multicollinearity issues as it is 
highly correlated with state-society resilience and governance variables. But for the purpose of 
showing its role on aid allocation, the results of the test are provided in Table 6.8. Results imply 
that when a state performs its functions better, aid allocation increases by 0.329. However, the 
CPIA explains only 0.8% of the changes in aid allocation, which is a low contribution to the 91.8% 
‘other unknown factors’ affecting aid allocation. The 91.8% that causes the variation in aid 
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allocation may include changes in government administrations and preferences of influential 
leaders in fragile states (interview with an ADB vice president, May 22, 2018); colonial past and 
political alliances (Alesina & Dollar, 2000 as cited in Ellison, 2016); absorptive capacity (Hoang, 
2014); good governance, economic reform, and potential impacts of aid (Hoang, 2014); and 
historical ties and geopolitical considerations (Swiss & Brown, 2015). There have been also 
empirical research studies on the determinants of aid allocation using a different set of variables. 
Carment, Samy, and Prest (2008) used authority, legitimacy, and capacity as explanatory variables 
for aid allocation in fragile situations. They concluded that, “An improvement in capacity is 
associated with less aid, while an improvement in authority is associated with more aid” (p. 365) 
and that legitimacy has no impact on aid allocation. They defined authority as “ the ability of the 
state to enact binding legislation over its population and to provide the latter with a stable and safe 
environment;” legitimacy as “the extent to which the governing regime enjoys public loyalty and 
support for government legislation and policies along with international recognition of that 
support;” and capacity as “the power of a state to mobilize public resources for productive uses” 
(p. 350). To explain aid allocation, Clist (2011) used the 4-P framework (poverty, population, 
policy, and proximity). Poverty is measured using GDP per capita; population is the country’s 
population per se; policy is measured using the Freedom Index (focusing on political rights and 
civil liberties) and the Political Terror Scale (describing the level of terror and absence of the rule 
of law); and proximity is measured using religion, language, and [former] colony variables. Results 
show that aid allocation is not sensitive to any particular variable such as poverty or policy, but 
there is a “substantial and entrenched donor heterogeneity” (Clist, 2011, p. 41). For example, 
Sweden, Netherlands, and the UK, compared to other donors, focus more on poverty as a basis for 
aid allocation. Clist (2011) explains that such differences among donors are due to their competing 
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priorities and donor fragmentation, which can lead to higher transaction costs and greater aid 
ineffectiveness. 
Table 6.8: Impact of Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)  
On Aid Allocation 
 
Variables 
Focus: State-Society Resilience 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Adjusted R2 R2 Change  
Constant 
 
6.245 
*** 
(.209) 
  
State-Society Resilience 
 
-.007 
* 
(.003) 
.027 .027 
Presence of IDPs due to natural 
disasters 
.045 
(.046) 
.047 .000 
Presence of IDPs due to violent 
conflict 
.213 
*** 
(.057) 
.048 .022 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
.419 
*** 
(.083) 
.068 .021 
 
Democracy level 
-.039 
* 
(.016) 
.070 .003 
CPIA .329 
*** 
(.089) 
.078 .008 
N 1571   
F 22.985   
Dependent Variable = Aid Allocation 
*** = p < .001;  ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 
 
The variables determining aid allocation mentioned above overlap and need to be classified 
in a more systematic way. Due to the differences in the conceptualization of variables, it is difficult 
to conclude whether the findings of this study (more state-society resilience means more aid 
allocation) conforms or contradicts the findings of Carment, Samy, and Prest (2008)—more 
capacity means less aid, and more authority means more aid. As to their definition of capacity, it 
is subsumed in the governance variable, and authority (based on their definition as having the 
element of safe and secure environment), under the peacebuilding variable of this study. In Model 
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4 (Table 6.9), the determining variable in this study, state-society resilience, has been broken down 
into four elements, which could further shed light on the differences of explanatory variables 
posited by various scholars.    
 
6.4 Impact of the Levels of Governance, Human Development, Economic Growth, and 
Peace on Aid Allocation 
 
Hypotheses: Aid tends to increase when a situation exhibits weak government, poor economy, and 
low human development levels. Aid tends to decrease when a situation is less peaceful. 
Findings:  
The following model subsets were tested separately to determine how the levels of 
governance, human development, economic growth, and peacefulness affect aid allocation, 
respectively. (It should be noted that the number of observation cases varies for each model 
because for every model, a specific number of cases were taken out as these cases are either 
significant outliers, high leverage points, and/or highly influential points). 
a) 1,755 development projects were analyzed to determine whether aid allocations for 
these projects are affected by a fragile situation’s level of governance;  
b) 1,648 projects were tested to know whether aid allocations for these projects are 
influenced by the situation’s level of human development;  
c) 1,687 projects were analyzed to determine how the level of economic growth affects 
aid allocation for these projects; and  
d) 1,203 projects were tested to know how the level of peacefulness affects aid allocation 
for these projects. 
Resilience index scores of the states where the projects were implemented, three years 
before the project started serve as the predictor (or independent variable)—the year when the funds 
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have been disbursed as indicated in the agencies’ websites. It is assumed that decisions to allocate 
the funds are made three years before they are disbursed, since the last three years before funds 
disbursement would involve reconnaissance and due diligence missions, feasibility studies and 
risk assessments, project design, and review and approval processes (Interview with ADB staff, 
May 18-25, 2018). 
Model 4 (see Table 6.9) shows statistically significant results—the levels of governance, 
human development, and peacefulness have strong causal relationship with aid allocation levels. 
The analysis presents human development as the most significant determining factor for aid flows, 
followed by peace levels, and then governance levels. Though the relationships are statistically 
significant, the changes in aid allocation are small: if the state’s governance system is strong, aid 
tends to decrease by .004; if the state’s human development levels are higher, aid allocations 
increase by .007; and if the state is more peaceful, aid decreases by .003. The three indicators 
(levels of governance, human development, and peacefulness), including all the other predictors, 
account for only 7% to 10% of the variation in aid allocation. The explanatory variables posited 
by other scholars may largely account for the unknown 90%-93%: changes in government 
administrations and preferences of influential leaders in fragile states (interview with ADB vice 
president, May 22, 2018); colonial past and political alliances (Alesina & Dollar, 2000 as cited in 
Ellison, 2016); absorptive capacity (Hoang, 2014); good governance, economic reform, and 
potential impacts of aid (Hoang, 2014); historical ties and geopolitical considerations (Swiss & 
Brown, 2015); authority, legitimacy, and capacity (Carment et al., 2008); and poverty, population, 
policy, and proximity (Clist, 2011).  
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Table 6.9: Models 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D: Impact of the Levels of Governance, Human 
Development, Economic Growth, and Peace on Aid Allocation 
 
Variables Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Focus: Governance, 
human development, 
economic, and peace 
levels  
Model 4A Model 4B Model 4C Model 4D 
Constant 6.686 
*** 
(.113) 
6.011 
*** 
(.127) 
6.531 
*** 
(.196) 
6.947 
*** 
(.145) 
Governance Levels -.004 
* 
(.002) 
   
Human Development 
Levels 
 .007 
*** 
(.001) 
  
Economic Levels   .001 
(.003) 
 
Peace Levels    -.003 
** 
(.001) 
Presence of IDPs due 
to natural disasters 
.057 
(.043) 
.090 
* 
(.044) 
.059 
(.044) 
.012 
(.058) 
Presence of IDPs due 
to violent conflict 
.084 
(.050) 
.184 
*** 
(.051) 
.137 
** 
(.047) 
-- 
Ethnic fractionalization .385 
*** 
(.074) 
.561 
*** 
(.085) 
.434 
*** 
(.071) 
 
.225 
* 
(.110) 
Democracy level -- -.008 
(.016) 
-.032 
* 
(.015) 
-.016 
(.019) 
World Bank (funding 
from a global MDB) 
.323 
*** 
(.046) 
.456 
*** 
(.052) 
.347 
*** 
(.047) 
.403 
*** 
(.060) 
Asian Development 
Bank, African 
Development Bank 
(funding from regional 
MDBs) 
.226 
*** 
(.070) 
.378 
*** 
(.074) 
.225 
** 
(.072) 
.235 
** 
(.083) 
Adjusted R2 .077 .101 .085 .068 
N 1755 1648 1687 1203 
F 25.465 27.351 23.448 15.582 
Dependent Variable = Aid Allocation 
*** = p < .001;  ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 
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The results of this study agree with the findings of Carment, Samy, and Prest (2008)—
when capacity is strong, less aid is given. This study results suggest that stronger governance 
means less aid. The case in ARMM also confirms the findings “stronger governance and more 
peacefulness means less aid”—when the capacity for implementing the peace agreement is greater, 
wherein the Bangsamoro Organic Law was ratified and the Philippine government is financially 
and institutionally equipped to execute the law, the World Bank’s level of financing support started 
to decline. On the other hand, the aid increase when human development levels are higher implies 
that donors consider people as an important input to driving socio-economic growth of a fragile 
situation, so that as a country, it is prepared to become part of the economic interdependence of 
nations (See history of development aid in Chapter 2.2.1).  
 Further, the p-value in the Model indicates that there is weak evidence on the impact of 
economic growth on aid allocation; in other words, regardless of whether the economy is strong 
or weak, aid would continue to flow in fragile situations. 
 
6.5 The Control Variables 
 
Although ethnic fractionalization and democracy levels are control variables, and not really 
the “main characters in the story,” how they affect resilience and aid allocation is quite interesting. 
As the degree of ethnic fractionalization increases, resilience decreases by 11.8; Alemu (2016) 
confirms this in a study on The Impacts of Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Fractionalization on 
State Fragility in Africa, using a data set of 43 African countries covering the period 1995-2014. 
The study finds that “in countries with low level of political right and civil liberty, ethnic, linguistic 
and religious fractionalization significantly increase the probability of state fragility” (Alemu, 
2016, p. 64). The study also implies that the low levels of political right and civil liberty can 
“exacerbate the negative effects of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization on state 
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fragility” (Alemu, 2016, p. 64). Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) also studied the determinants of 
fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa using the country policy institutional assessment ratings as a 
variable for fragility level and some economic, historical, and institutional variables as 
determinants of fragility. They found that “more fractionalization” is “associated with a higher 
probability of extreme fragility” (p. 777). 
The analysis also shows that a more democratic state is more resilient (as democracy levels 
get higher, state-society resilience increases by 1.6); and this provides empirical evidence 
supporting Immanuel Kant’s idea of “perpetual peace,” theorized three centuries ago (in the 
1700s). Kant posited that if the form of government “is to be in accordance with the concept of 
right, the form of government must include a representative system, the only kind of system in 
which a republican form of government is possible, and without which, the government will be 
despotic and violent” (Kleingeld et al., 2006, pp. 77-78). To achieve global peace, Kant 
propositioned international cooperation and universal democracy among states. Two centuries 
later, Doyle (1986) used Kant’s idea to explain the US behavior toward other countries as liberal 
internationalism— “liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among 
them. This separate peace provides a solid foundation for the United States’ crucial alliances with 
the liberal powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and our Japanese alliance” (p. 19). 
Kant’s “perpetual peace” has spawned the democratic peace theory— “democratic states do not 
fight with each other (but do fight with non-democracies) because of their distinctive political 
institutions and propensity to externalize democratic norms” and his concept of “hospitality” and 
“cosmopolitan right” has further blossomed into economic interdependence (Simpson, 2018, pp. 
109, 125). The history of aid (Chapter 2.2.1) shows how development aid has ushered the colonial 
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era to economic interdependence, and how aid has been used as an instrument to protect national 
security and at a later period, national economic interests. 
Modern scholars argue that democratic states are able to exercise transparency and rule of 
law, thereby preventing corruption that perpetuates low-quality infrastructures, and in effect loss 
of human lives are mitigated (Escaleras et al., 2007 as cited in Lin, 2014). A democratic 
government also provides opportunities for civil society to participate in resilience building and 
stimulates social spending hence benefitting disadvantaged citizens (Lin, 2014).  
Results of the study also show that violent conflict and natural disasters are significant 
determinants of resilience. Resilience weakens by 9.73 as a result of violent conflict, and by 3.13 
as a result of natural disasters (See Table 6.1). Natural disasters can cause mass displacements, 
destroy infrastructures, disrupt productivity resulting in loss of livelihood, and less access to basic 
services in fragile situations where the government is incapable of coping with such crisis. Violent 
conflicts have similar effects, and it also results into poor economic growth “associated with 
smaller investment, poorer policies, and higher risks of resource misuse” (Lis, 2013, p. 15).   
The effects of violent conflict, natural disasters, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy 
levels on aid flows are all significant. Results show that aid increases when the levels of natural 
disasters, violent conflict, and ethnic fractionalization rise; while aid decreases when democracy 
levels are higher. There have been studies that looked into the causal relationship between violent 
conflict and aid flows (Lis, 2013; Dreher & Fuchs, 2011), between natural disasters and aid flows 
(Becerra et al., 2014; Robinson et al. 2017), between ethnic fractionalization and aid flows 
(Nunnenkamp et al., 2017), and between democracy levels and aid flows (Dietrich & Wright 2015; 
Nunnenkamp et al., 2017). 
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Results of this study are consistent with the findings of Becerra, Cavello, and Noy (2014) 
in their examination of the Official Development Assistance in the aftermath of large natural 
disasters. They find that the “damages caused by the disaster are positively related to subsequent 
aid inflows, but that higher incomes and higher incomes per capita, ceteris paribus, are associated 
with lower post-disaster aid flows” (p. 458). Robinson, Oliveira, and Kayden (2017) also find that 
the UN funding is based on the severity of the impact of natural disaster and where it is needed the 
most. 
On providing aid to conflict-affected situations, Lis (2013) posits that donors have different 
responses based on their interests and the recipient’s characteristics. Lis disaggregated his research 
subjects into multilateral and bilateral donors as aid providers, and oil-exporters and non-oil 
exporters as aid recipients. He found that bilateral aid agencies tend to allocate more aid to non-
oil exporters if they experience increasing transnational terrorism; while the multilaterals are not 
affected by transnational terrorism taking place in non-oil exporting states, but multilateral aid 
flows “are very strongly affected by armed conflict, with a conflict-affected country likely to see 
a reduction of around 80 percent in received aid” (p. 14). For oil-exporting aid recipients, “bilateral 
donors appear to be neutral to terrorism and armed conflict,” while multilateral donors, “free of 
strategic interests,” are “consistent in their aversion of armed conflict, reducing multilateral aid to 
an oil exporter by approximately 75 percent; but there is no evidence that they react to terrorism,” 
according to Lis (2013, p. 15). Dreher and Fuchs (2011), on the other hand, in their research on 
how the donors of the Development Assistance Committee respond to transnational terrorist 
incidents, find that “while countries where terror originates are not more likely to receive aid as a 
consequence, if they are selected, they receive larger aid amounts from the donor hit by the attack” 
(p. 358). 
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While results of this study suggests that aid allocation and ethnic fractionalization are 
significantly related, Nunnenkamp, Ohler, and Andres (2017), in their study on the determinants 
of aid allocation by the World Bank in selected districts in India, found no evidence that aid 
allocation is “affected by political patronage at the state or district level” (p. 126). Political 
patronage is common in societies mired in ethnic fractionalization. In the case of Mindanao, the 
political compositions of ARMM are either members or supporters of MNLF, who are seated in 
local government posts. The incoming BARMM (to replace the ARMM) is composed of 
members and supporters of MILF (the rival group of MNLF), and the MTF-RDP capacity 
building programs are implicitly aimed at benefitting the MILF group by training their leaders in 
governance as a preparation for the upcoming BARMM government. While it is not intentional 
for the MTF-RDP to favor MILF over MNLF, the donors are trapped in that position to help the 
MILF because of the country partnership strategy agreed by the World Bank and the Philippine 
government to work together on the peace process with MILF. This implies that the World Bank 
did not provide aid to favor a political group, but it is only conforming to the larger interests of 
the state, wherein the state leader drives the peace process.  
Dietrich and Wright (2015) highlight studies that link aid and democracy, wherein donors 
attach “political reform conditions to aid packages” (p. 217), and these conditions are associated 
with transition to multi-party politics by the recipient country. The merit system or the 
performance-based allocation also indicates that aid favors the better performers in terms of 
economic management, social inclusion, governance, and structural policies. Nunnenkamp, 
Ohler, and Andres (2017) on the other hand, in their study on the World Bank’s aid allocation at 
the district level in India, find that the evidence on the merit-based allocation is weak. 
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This study finds that democracy levels are significantly related to aid allocation (with aid 
allocation decreasing if democracy level is higher). As defined by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2016), countries with high democracy level or “full democracy” have “not only basic 
political freedoms and civil liberties [that] are respected, but which also tend to be underpinned 
by a political culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy” (p. 54). In a more democratic 
environment, decisions whether to get a concessional loan or “aid” from donors are decided by 
the majority and not only by the state leader. Providing a political space for the civil society to 
participate in development processes should be a major feature of democracy, and the state 
should work in collaboration with civil society to achieve national development goals. 
This chapter presented the detailed findings on how development aid impacts state-
society resilience and how resilience levels affect aid flows in fragile situations. The inter-
linkages of the intervening and focus variables were also discussed—how ethnic 
fractionalization, violent conflict, natural disasters, and democracy levels influence state-society 
resilience and aid flows—supported by the case of the subnational fragile situation in Mindanao, 
Philippines. The concluding chapter delves deeper into those inter-linkages, particularly how 
exclusive aid can exacerbate ethnic fractionalization and, on a positive note, how a more 
democratic state (particularly empowering the civil society) can reverse the negative impact of 
aid. Based on this study’s findings that democracy levels can strengthen state-society resilience, 
the next chapter highlights the importance of tapping into the potential of civil society 
organizations. With aid for governance and human development strongly linked to resilience, the 
final chapter also emphasizes the need to move from a hierarchical to concentric approach to 
development, that is, from a step-by-step process to a targeted approach of aid delivery, where 
governance and human development are at the heart of resilience building. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This study has explored the causality between development aid and state-society resilience 
in the fragile situations listed in the harmonized list of World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and 
African Development Bank. Development aid has been categorized into four themes—aid for 
governance, aid for economic growth, aid for human development, and aid for peacebuilding. To 
determine the impact of development aid on state-society resilience, aid for each theme was 
regressed against overall state-society resilience. A composite resilience index was developed, 
drawn from the scaled and averaged fragile states’ scores in Worldwide Governance Index, Human 
Development Index, Global Peace Index, and GDP per capita. To identify the impact of resilience 
on aid flows, the resilience scores for each theme were regressed against aid allocations by project. 
Violent conflict, natural disasters, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy levels were used as 
control variables. The elements of development and state-society resilience—governance, human 
development, economic growth, and peacebuilding—were determined using a cognitive 
anthropology approach (See Chapter 4.1). Regression analyses were complemented by a case 
analysis of the link between a ten-year World Bank project (Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction 
and Development Project or MTF-RDP) and the resilience of the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM), a region in the Philippines affected by conflict for more than four decades. 
The study finds that the relationship between development aid and state-society resilience 
are statistically significant; however, the variation in resilience caused by aid is small, compared 
to the changes caused by natural disasters, violent conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and 
democracy. Similarly, the variation in aid allocation caused by resilience levels, including the 
control variables, is also small, and around 90% is caused by some unknown factors. Performance-
based allocation was also not a significant contributing factor in aid allocation.  
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In general, aid can hurt a fragile situation, but not too painfully; and aid flows are associated 
with resilience, but not always, and not entirely. Factors that significantly weaken resilience are 
violent conflict, natural disasters, and ethnic fractionalization. Democracy levels prove to be an 
asset to strengthening resilience. The fragile situation in Mindanao shows that the ten-year MTF-
RDP has little impact on the resilience of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The 
development intervention benefitted 17% of the region’s population, and concentrated in two out 
of five provinces in ARMM due to political and security reasons. Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, 
the two beneficiary provinces, have the highest poverty rates in the country and higher violence 
levels compared to the similarly fragile ARMM provinces that did not receive aid.  
The Impact of Development Aid on State-Society Resilience 
Overall, development aid causes a decrease in resilience. When development aid is 
disaggregated, aid levels for governance and human development are significant determinants of 
state-society resilience, while aid for peacebuilding and economic growth are not related to the 
resilience levels in fragile situations. Both aid for governance and human development causes a 
decrease in resilience, though the magnitude of their impact is low. The MTF-RDP built the 
capacity of the Bangsamoro Development Agency primarily led by the MILF and peoples’ 
organizations located in MILF camps. Communities in the MILF camps and the indigenous groups 
in the nearby areas also benefitted from water systems and learning centers, helping them improve 
their quality of life. However, a major political opponent of MILF, the MNLF, has its own turf and 
supporters located in other territories not reached by the project. Though there have been some 
attempts by the World Bank to include the MNLF territories, attempts faced political challenges 
(such as an MNLF community leader not wanting to be dictated by the MILF-led BDA) and 
security risks (bombings and abductions), thus the subprojects in MNLF areas were cancelled. 
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Within the MILF camps, harmonious relationships were built between Muslim and Christian 
communities; but within ARMM as a whole, hostilities between MNLF and MILF continue, as 
evidenced by several bombings before the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law intended 
to legitimize the MILF-led BARMM, replacing the MNLF-led ARMM. Thus, when aid goes to 
improving governance—where the MTF-RDP unintentionally creates a situation where MNLF 
would perceive MILF being politically favored (by the government and the World Bank)—
political power (which involves access to international and local funds) becomes a coveted 
commodity. The quest for political power draws the rival ethnic groups to engage in violent 
conflict or rido (See Chapter 5.1), especially during elections and plebiscites. Governance 
interventions and trust and confidence between the government and the Moro-Muslim 
communities (highly influenced by either MNLF or MILF) are undermined, leading to a further 
decline in state-society resilience. 
A study by International Alert (2018) finds that it is not only political factors that greatly 
contribute to violent conflict in ARMM but equally the shadow economy issues (illegal businesses) 
and identity issues (See Chapter 5.4 and Figure 5.16). Violent clan wars revolve around political, 
shadow economy, and identity issues (Torres, 2007). Thus, the MTF-RDP case in ARMM shows 
that aid can hurt the already fragile situation, but not to the extent as ethnic fractionalization (see 
Table 6.3).  
High democracy levels also contribute to resilience (see Tables 6.1, 6.3-6.6); however, low 
levels of democracy may not be directly affecting fragility, but a less democratic environment 
provides opportunities for corruption due to lack of transparency and weak rule of law. The direct 
causes of fragility in ARMM—shadow economy issues, identity issues, common crimes, political 
issues, resource issues, and governance issues (International Alert (2018), and rido (Torres, 
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2007)—are perpetuated by the weak rule of law, inadequate exercise of civil liberties to hold the 
government accountable, and less or lack of welfare fund allocation for vulnerable citizens. 
Moreover, a more democratic state provides opportunity for civil society to participate in resilience 
building (Lin, 2014). Anheier, Lang, and Toepler (2019) highlight the importance of civil society 
as “the arena of self-organizations of citizens and established interests seeking voice and 
influence,” and it has the potential to peacefully settle diverse private and public interests (p. 2). 
The civil society has played an important role in the Mindanao peace process whereby women’s 
organizations influenced both the government and MILF to restore peace negotiations, and the 
local grassroots helped monitor ceasefire mechanisms, provide relief services to internally 
displaced people, and seek justice for the victims of war crimes.  
This study shows that there is no causal relationship between state-society resilience and 
aid for economic growth and peacebuilding. Peacebuilding programs mostly involve recovery and 
rehabilitation and may not have that significant impact on building resilience, but more on helping 
the state and society get back on their feet, rather than helping them withstand potential fragility 
and conflict risks. The MTF-RDP has provided the largest funds for economic growth purposes 
such as livelihood skills and farm-to-market roads. However, only 17% of the ARMM population 
benefitted from the project, and within that population, the local market economy is limited and 
not connected to larger national and international markets. The goods produced by small local 
farmers are not able to compete with those from bigger entrepreneurs due to low quality products, 
insufficient production capacity, and lack of access to a market already saturated by more powerful 
and more resource-capable industry players. 
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The Impact of State-Society Resilience Levels on Aid Flows  
This study finds that greater state-society resilience is indicative of more aid flows into 
fragile situations. However, when resilience is disaggregated, aid decreases with higher 
governance and peace levels, but aid increases when human development levels are high; and 
economic growth is not causally linked with aid flows.   
The history of the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF shows 
that when there is a promise of peace (that was when the Philippine president brokered peace with 
MILF), aid increases; but when violent conflict heightens, aid flows start to curb—and this is also 
demonstrated by the cancellation of the MTF-RDP subprojects in the conflict-affected provinces 
in ARMM; and when peace is solidified, when there is concrete evidence of conflict resolution 
(such as the passing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law), aid significantly decreases. The Philippines, 
as a middle-income country, has funds for the socio-economic development of the subnational 
fragile situation in Mindanao. However, due to the history of plunder and corruption committed 
by MNLF leaders seated as governors and mayors in ARMM, the government hesitates to release 
its national budget, and chooses to rely from international aid (which is in the form of grants). 
With a new set of political entities (the MILF) to seat in the new ARMM (now BARMM), and 
with the enactment of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, which provides for a huge fund from the 
national budget (5% annual block grant, 75% share from taxes, and PhP5 billion annually for ten 
years) (see Chapter 5.1), international aid is obviously no longer needed.  
Moreover, when the population has a healthy and educated workforce—as results of this 
study suggests—donors tend to provide more aid, with the underlying interest to invest in people 
who can provide goods and services in the process of natural resources/raw materials extraction, 
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which in turn fuels the international market economy and the further industrialization of donor 
countries. 
The magnitude of the impact of state-society resilience levels on aid flows is weak, and 
study results show that there are other factors that can influence aid flows, such as violent conflict, 
natural disasters, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy levels. There are other studies suggesting 
that violent conflict, natural disasters, and democracy levels are related to aid flow. Donors allocate 
aid based on the severity of natural disasters (Robinson et al., 2017); aid flows on conflict-affected 
situations are based on the donors’ interests and the recipients’ characteristics (i.e., whether the 
donor seeks to combat terrorism and whether the recipient is an oil or non-oil exporter) (Lis, 2013); 
Dietrich and Wright (2015) posits that democratic reforms are sometimes attached to aid packages, 
while Nunnenkamp, Ohler, and Andres (2017) find that the evidence for a merit-based allocation 
is weak. Moreover, Nunnenkamp, Ohler, and Andres (2017) conclude that there is no evidence 
that aid flow is attached to political patronage, which is common in societies mired in ethnic 
fractionalization. The differences of views from these studies suggest that there are various 
conditions (and that each of these conditions is unique) that dictate aid flows in fragile situations, 
not only on the part of recipients but also of donors—and this is shown by the World Bank project 
in ARMM that has provided aid interventions in MILF territories, and not in MNLF territories. 
The World Bank, the one administering the pool of funds from various donor countries, is trapped 
with the country partnership strategy signed with the Philippine government, which aims to build 
confidence and trust with the MILF by providing socio-economic development programs in Moro-
Muslim communities in ARMM (regardless of whether they are MILF or MNLF territories). 
However, the local political situation made it difficult for the project to reach the MNLF territories 
as the project is identified with MILF with whom the MNLF is hostile. 
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The Concentric Model of Development: A Proposed Development Framework to Build 
State-Society Resilience 
 
This study has so far discussed how aid has affected state-society resilience in a fragile 
situation and how resilience levels impacted aid flows. Though aid for governance and human 
development, and aid as whole, causes a slight decrease in state-society resilience, this study does 
not imply that aid support for fragile situations should stop. The hierarchical regression analysis 
findings show greater attribution of weak state-society resilience to violent conflict, ethnic 
fractionalization, and natural disasters combined, than to development aid; and that aid exacerbates 
ethnic fractionalization due to lack of inclusiveness, as demonstrated by the Mindanao case. This 
scenario implies that aid is not the root cause of fragility, and it is possible to reverse the slight 
negative impact of aid on resilience if the aid system is enhanced. This study therefore proposes a 
new framework for building state-society resilience in fragile situations—the concentric model of 
development.  
The current approach in aid delivery is hierarchical (See Chapter 4.1.5 and Figure 4.2), 
whereby peace and security is at the bottom of the pyramid, followed by good governance 
(functioning public sector and strong institutions), then by human development (healthy, educated 
people and sustainable environment), and at the top is economic growth (infrastructures, banking 
and trade). It is also widely recognized by donors that peace should be a prerequisite to 
development, and development is also required to achieve peace—as pointed out by UN Deputy 
Secretary General Jan Eliasson in one of his speeches— “there is no peace without development, 
there is no development without peace” (Brookings, 2013). Peace and security at the bottom of the 
pyramid means that it is the foundation for all other development interventions. Even if conflict 
remains unresolved, there has to be at least an ongoing peace process, which may include 
negotiations between warring parties, ceasefire mechanisms, and UN peacekeeping forces. 
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Discussions and agreements among donors and recipients over the last decade have highlighted 
the importance of statebuilding in the development agenda, which include strengthening of public 
institutions and country ownership (See Chapter 2.2.2). Hence governance improvement, 
following the establishment of peace and security, is recognized recently as an important catalyst 
to human development, and finally to economic growth. 
Results of this study show that aid for governance and human development have causal 
relationship with state-society resilience while aid for peacebuilding and aid for economic growth 
are not causally connected to resilience. These findings imply the importance of focusing on 
governance and human development, as aid for these types of interventions (as evidenced by this 
study) can influence state-society resilience. Though the influence of aid for governance and 
human development is a slight decrease in resilience, this does not mean that aid for such type of 
interventions should be eliminated; instead how aid is delivered should be revisited and the system 
for aid delivery should be reconstructed. 
This study therefore proposes a new development framework, which is not hierarchical in 
nature, but a ‘ripple-effect’ model whereby aid for governance to strengthen the state and aid for 
human development to strengthen the society are at the core of the concentric model of 
development. Since aid for peace and economic growth has no influence on state-society 
resilience, peace and economic growth should be outside of the core. Unlike the hierarchical 
model, which is linear in nature, where each development intervention progresses from one stage 
to another, the concentric model allows for feedback and interaction between development 
interventions. With governance and human development at the core of the development model, 
both interventions complement each other to achieve peace and economic growth. With peace and 
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economic growth at the outer layers of the circle, they foster better governance and enhance human 
development.  
In practical terms, the hierarchical approach creates aid modalities, conditionality or strings 
attached to aid (see Chapter 2.2.1). For example, a state is required by donors to adopt democratic 
reforms before aid is given; and in another instance, there has to be a peace process in place before 
the provision of development aid. This scenario reflects the findings of this study that more 
resilient situations receive more aid. The concentric model, on the other hand, implies that 
regardless of whether the situation is peaceful or not, or whether there are strong institutions in 
place or none, development interventions are possible by first targeting governance and human 
development.  
This study posits that the main target of aid should be governance and human development, 
for these interventions have influence on state-society resilience—which then could create a 
ripple-effect to peace and security and economic growth, and eventually to sustainable peace and 
sustainable economic growth (Figure 7.1). In this model, both good governance and human 
development should be targeted at the same time. This also bears the concept of state-society 
relations whereby development aid should create an environment for the two actors to be 
accountable to each other. The Department for International Development (DFID) defines state-
society relations as  
“Interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public 
authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people. They are focused on issues 
such as defining the mutual rights and obligations of state and society, negotiating how 
public resources should be allocated and establishing different modes of representation and 
accountability” (DFID, 2010 as cited in Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016, p. 3). 
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To achieve the goals of sustainable development, the state and the society are not to act 
individually, but in synergy. Synergy involves collaboration between the state and society, whose 
combined effects are greater than the sum of their individual effects. The state performs its 
functions of providing basic services and ensuring that citizens’ political and civil rights are 
exercised; while the society adheres to the laws and participate in political and development 
processes. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The Concentric Model - The Proposed Development Framework 
The use of aid for governance and human development as catalyst to peace and economic 
growth is demonstrated by the experience of Singapore, a small island in East Asia. Through 
governance improvement and people empowerment, Singapore, leaped from extreme poverty to 
an unprecedented economic growth, even in the absence of natural resources. In the 1960s, 
Singapore was seen as a hopeless case by the global community, because of the presence of 
communist movement that controlled the trade unions; endemic corruption; high unemployment 
rates; and poor infrastructures, water supply, and sanitation. Under the leadership of Lee Kuan 
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Yew, Singapore transformed into a global economic power. Ever since, Singapore has maintained 
its high economic status and peacefulness. In 2019, Singapore ranked the 7th most peaceful country 
(IEP, 2019), and was projected by IMF (2018) to gain the fourth highest GDP per capita in the 
world for the period 2019-2023. During its fragile times, Singapore borrowed soft loans from the 
World Bank and used them to curb corruption and establish strong institutions to provide the basic 
services for the citizens, equip workers with technical and management skills, and attract foreign 
investors. In their book Fixing Failed States, Ghani and Lockhart (2008) note, “Lee Kuan Yew 
and his colleagues explicitly rejected this seductive model of sliding into addiction to foreign help. 
The goal from the beginning was the short-term use of aid, which moved toward an eventual break 
with the need for such assistance” (Kindle edition). Singapore’s strategy was channeling aid to 
strengthen the state and its people, so that the country could attract foreign investors, until it 
became self-sufficient without having to borrow money from the richer countries to achieve its 
development goals. 
Empowering the Civil Society Organizations 
Not all states with fragile situations, however, have a leader like Lee Kuan Yew who has a 
clear vision and effective leadership. In the absence of such type of leadership, the synergy 
between the state and the society should be tapped. In fragile situations, where governance capacity 
and public institutions are weak, and the state may have not gained the trust and confidence of the 
citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs) play a pivotal role in getting the state and citizens to 
work together (Anheier et al., 2019). CSOs are seen as gaining more trust from the citizens than 
public agencies, and they are “central to building, maintaining, and rebuilding social cohesion” 
(Anheier et al., 2019, p. 2). CSOs also tend to be more innovative than government agencies due 
to their small-scale operations compared to the government’s bureaucratic system. Because of their 
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proximity to the communities affected, they are able to apply creative solutions (Anheier et al., 
2019). 
 Given that CSOs are agents for social cohesion (Anheier et al., 2019), and in view of this 
study’s findings that conflict and ethnic fractionalization have the greatest impact on deteriorating 
state-society resilience, CSOs should be utilized in aid design and delivery in fragile situations. 
Moreover, the study’s findings that democracy has a positive effect on state-society resilience 
reflect the effectiveness of engaging the society, represented by CSOs, toward achieving 
development goals. The state should provide a legitimate opportunity for CSOs to represent 
different societal groups and citizens in development processes. This is not to undermine the 
legitimacy of the state, but to establish a partnership between the state and society in development 
efforts. Donor agencies should not only provide capacity building for government institutions but 
also for the CSOs, which are apolitical and have considerable experience with the local 
communities. Many local CSOs in fragile situations do not have the capacity required by 
international aid agencies to get them engaged in development work. International aid agencies, 
such as WB and ADB, require proven technical, managerial, administrative, and financial capacity 
of CSOs to design and implement development projects. Thus, the institutional capacities of local 
CSOs have to be built so that they can design, implement, and evaluate development projects.  
Donor agencies use international non-government organizations (INGOs) in implementing 
development projects related to research, community consultation, capacity building, and 
monitoring and evaluation. INGOs are engaged either through consulting/contracting mechanisms 
or through partnerships where the INGOs provide counterpart funding. INGOs are also required 
to work with relevant local CSOs. There have been capacity building programs for local CSOs, 
but they are quite limited compared to the capacity building programs given for public institutions. 
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Local CSOs receive sporadic training through their involvement with the INGO projects 
contracted with the donor agencies. In some instances, they participate in a one-time event of 
planning the national development strategy with donors and governments. This study therefore 
recommends for donor agencies to create a mechanism whereby the CSOs can be actively engaged 
in development processes—from country-level strategic planning, to program design, 
implementation and evaluation. For the CSOs to work with the state in delivering aid for 
governance and human development, the following actions are proposed: 
1. Map out the civil society organizations, including faith-based organizations 
(FBOs), working in fragile situations. Research should be carried out on the 
existing CSOs, their affiliations, sources of funds, purpose, ideologies and 
motivations, values, approaches, and capabilities.   
2. Establish a regulatory body for CSOs whose functions will be to facilitate the 
registration, capacity building, mobilization, and monitoring of CSOs. In the 
case of the Philippines, after martial law, the Constitution has provided 
participatory mechanisms for people to raise their voices, and as a result, many 
CSOs have sprouted. A collaboration between the Philippine government and 
some large NGOs in the country led to the establishment of the Philippine 
Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) that certify the legitimacy, 
accountability, and transparency of NGOs (PCNC, n.d.). However, the PCNC’s 
role is limited to certification of NGOs that receive donations and distribute 
these to the underprivileged Filipinos. The same type of institution can be 
established in fragile situations, but with the expanded role of building the 
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capacity of the local CSOs in collaboration with donor agencies and the 
government.  
3. Explore mechanisms to channel aid funds directly to CSOs. Under the MTF-
RDP, the World Bank piloted a financing mechanism whereby an INGO and a 
local NGO manage the development funds, as opposed to the traditional 
approach of channeling funds through national and local government bodies 
(World Bank, 2018-b). As the case analysis found, this approach has been 
effective in promoting transparency and accountability in the procurement of 
goods and services, in enabling the communities to actively participate and gain 
ownership in the implementation of local development programs, and in 
creating trust and confidence between the local government and the local 
communities in ARMM. This case is a subnational fragile situation and can be 
tested and/or replicated at the national-level fragile situation. 
4. Pilot development programs in selected countries, whereby state institutions 
and CSOs work in partnership in designing and implementing governance and 
human development related initiatives, such as public sector reforms, policy 
reforms, health, education, child protection, and social security. The programs 
should adopt a special financing mechanism for CSOs as discussed in Item 3.  
5. Replicate the successful programs in other fragile situations. Best practices and 
lessons learned should be captured in the course of implementing the pilot 
programs. 
As to the type of development programs on governance and human development, it will 
depend on the needs of a fragile situation. The local CSOs have greater knowledge and deeper 
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understanding of the local context, and they can significantly contribute to political economy 
analyses, fragility and risk assessments, and participatory consultations that should be conducted 
prior to designing and implementing development programs. Moreover, academe has a role to 
play in educating development policymakers and practitioners by providing knowledge based on 
anthropological approaches, exploring the detailed dynamics among ethnic groups, between the 
central and local governments, and between donors and recipient governments. Mechanisms 
should be in place to link academic recommendations with development policy making and 
operations. For example, instead of PhD students producing dissertation research that is rarely or 
never used for policy making, the MDBs, the bilateral agencies, and the UN organizations could 
link up with universities to sponsor development research, particularly on the local political 
economy contexts of the fragile situations the MDBs are engaging with. 
For Future Research 
The fragile situation in Mindanao, Philippines is just one of the many unique contexts 
that calls for a deeper knowledge and understanding when designing and implementing 
development interventions. Further research should be done on the different types of fragile 
situations, what type of intervention is needed and how that type of intervention should be 
implemented in a particular social and political context. Interventions should be customized 
based on the social context, which may include cultures, religions, and traditions; and the 
political context, which may involve local laws, policies, and ideologies. Both the social and 
political contexts also define how individuals and groups of people interact with each other, and 
how they interact with the legitimate and non-legitimate institutions surrounding them. 
Moreover, the MTF-RDP has some tangible positive impact on the lives of the few populations 
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in the Moro-Muslim region (ARMM). If the project has some negative impact, as this study’s 
results have shown, such impact is covert and would require further research.  
Another interesting area to study is the relationship between development aid and ethnic 
fractionalization—does aid worsen a highly fractionalized society or does it help build social 
cohesion? The implementation of MTF-RDP in ARMM has shown some evidences that aid can 
help build social cohesion within a territory with similar ethnicities, but not in the entire region 
affected by conflict. Whether such a phenomenon is true for other fragile situations should be 
explored. On the other hand, given the history of distrust between the Christian-dominated 
national government (that has legitimate authority over aid distribution) and the Muslim-
dominated ARMM, religious and ethnic fractionalization could have either correlation or 
causation with aid allocation in the subnational fragile situation in ARMM, and this is something 
that should be explored. 
This study has also investigated how donors behave in fragile situations in terms of aid 
allocation. Results indicate that state-society resilience in general, and governance, human 
development, and peace levels in particular, account for around 10% variation in aid flows; and 
unknown factors account for around 90%. This study also tested the influence of the performance-
based allocation and found that this only contributes a small variation in aid flows. The 90% 
unknown factors should be further investigated and this may include changes in government 
administrations and preferences of influential leaders in fragile states (interview with ADB vice 
president, May 22, 2018); colonial past and political alliances (Alesina & Dollar, 2000 as cited in 
Ellison 2016); absorptive capacity (Hoang, 2014); good governance, economic reform, and 
potential impacts of aid (Hoang, 2014); historical ties and geopolitical considerations (Swiss & 
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Brown, 2015); authority, legitimacy, and capacity (Carment et al. 2008); and poverty, population, 
policy, and proximity (Clist, 2011). 
As to the reason why fragile states become aid dependent and remain in the list of fragile 
situations also calls for more research. The protracted fragility and aid dependence could be 
correlated, and both could be attributed to the following factors: (1) frequent changes in 
government administrations as a result of political instability, wherein development priority 
changes along with the administration changes; (2) development program designs that did not 
take into account the social and political context, which may result to exclusiveness of aid 
benefits and pose conflict risks to the already fragile situation; and (3) aid modalities and 
conditionality (i.e., repayment of loan within a short time period) that put pressure to both the 
recipient governments and donors to rush the approval, design, and implementation of 
development interventions—which may result in inefficient and ineffective delivery of aid. 
These are not an exhaustive list; each fragile situation should be investigated inductively, why 
they are aid dependent and why they have not moved out of the fragile situations list despite a 
consistent flow of aid in their countries. Further, state leaders decide whether they get 
development assistance, and what influences them or how they are influenced, either by donors’ 
interests or pressure from the constituents (or lack thereof), is something that can be further 
investigated. Donor countries’ trade and financing policies should also be investigated whether 
they affect aid dependence.  
Lastly, if the goal is development and resilience, there has to be a consensus on these 
concepts, how do we flesh them out, and what are the dynamics and relationships among the 
disaggregated elements of development and resilience. This study has started the typology of 
resilience and development using a cognitive anthropology approach and it calls for a more 
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rigorous exploration of the elements of governance, economic growth, human development, and 
peace and how they can build state-society resilience. What makes up good governance, 
economic growth, human development, and peace should be defined based on the perspective of 
the citizens experiencing fragility; and as emphasized earlier, fragile situations have their own 
unique characteristics, therefore citizens from each fragile situation may have varying concepts 
and definitions of these themes. It is possible that citizens in fragile situations may have a 
different view of what it means to experience good governance, economic growth, human 
development, and peace compared to the citizens living in non-fragile situations, especially those 
from wealthy nations. Conducting quantitative and qualitative research in each fragile situation 
to define these elements of development and identify how each of these elements can build 
resilience consequently would give a voice to the citizens in fragile situations, and tapping the 
knowledge of these citizens who experience fragility themselves may create new approaches and 
strategies to build state-society resilience. 
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Appendix 1: World Bank’s Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (2006-2018) 
Note: Those with asterisks (*) are the states that received funding from the MDBs during 2006-
2018—the study’s sample population. Harmonized list means the country policy and institutional 
assessment scores given by World Bank, African Development Bank, and Asian Development 
Bank are averaged to identify the fragile situations. A country is identified as fragile if it has a 
score of 3.2 or less in the country policy and institutional assessment, or the presence of a UN 
and/or regional peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission during the past three years. 
 
IDA Eligible 
 
1. Afghanistan * 
2. Angola * 
3. Burundi * 
4. Cambodia * 
5. Cameroon  
6. Central African Republic *  
7. Chad * 
8. Comoros *  
9. Congo, Democratic Republic * 
10. Congo, Republic * 
11. Côte d'Ivoire * 
12. Djibouti * 
13. Eritrea * 
14. Gambia, The * 
15. Guinea * 
16. Guinea Bissau * 
17. Haiti * 
18. Kiribati  
19. Kosovo * 
20. Lao, PDR * 
21. Liberia * 
22. Madagascar   
23. Malawi  
24. Mali  
25. Marshall Islands  
26. Mauritania  
27. Micronesia, Federates States 
28. Mozambique 
29. Myanmar * 
30. Nepal  
31. Nigeria * 
32. Papua New Guinea * 
33. Sao Tome and Principe * 
34. Sierra Leone * 
35. Solomon Islands * 
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36. Somalia * 
37. South Sudan  
38. Sudan * 
39. Syria 
40. Tajikistan * 
41. Togo * 
42. Tonga * 
43. Tuvalu  
44. Vanuatu * 
45. Yemen, Republic 
46. Uzbekistan * 
 
Territories 
 
47. West Bank and Gaza * 
48. Western Sahara  
 
Blend 
 
49. Georgia  
50. Timor-Leste * 
51. Zimbabwe * 
 
IBRD Only 
 
52. Bosnia and Herzegovina  
53. Iraq 
54. Lebanon 
55. Libya 
 
IDA = International Development Association 
IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
 
Source: World Bank (2017). Harmonized list of fragile situations. Retrieved from 
www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations 
(The researcher consolidated the 2006-2018 lists of fragile situations from this site) 
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Appendix 2: Summary of Pile Sort Workshop with Six Policy Experts 
In lieu of the Institutional Review Board policy, the names of the participants were not 
indicated below to observe anonymity and confidentiality. The following are how each of the six 
participants categorized the 26 concepts presented in Table 4.2. 
Participant 1: Director 
 
ECONOMIC/PRODUCTIVE SECTORS (core operations) 
 
1. Agriculture (development of value rice chains, agriculture market infrastructure project) 
– 45 
2. Infrastructure development (energy, water, transport, ICT) - 135 
3. Urban development and poverty reduction (urban roads improvement, support for young 
entrepreneurs and urban job creation) 26 
4. Rural infrastructure development (rural roads rehabilitation, rural electrification) - 17 
5. Climate proofing/climate resilience (e.g., climate resilient transport, catastrophe 
insurance) – 5 
 
RESEARCH (cuts across interventions) 
 
ENABLER OF INCLUSIVENESS 
 
1. Gender equality (e.g., protection from gender-based violence, economic empowerment 
for women) – 9 
2. Support to NGOs (Support to NGO Network) - 1 
3. Private sector development (strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial sector) - 
15 
4. Social security (pension, safety nets) - 2 
5. Child protection (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child ex-combatants; 
street children project) - 5 
6. Community participation (participatory rural development) - 2 
7. Community empowerment (microfinance, rural finance expansion, livelihood and skills 
program for the youth, household development) – 60 
 
ENABLING ENVIRONMENT 
 
1. Education (strengthening higher education, education sector reconstruction) – 30 
2. Health (health sector development support, multisectoral HIV/AIDS) - 32 
3. Environmental sustainability (coastal resources co-management, forest and nature 
conservation, biodiversity management) - 25 
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BASIC NEED/FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
1. Physical security (security plan for project implementation) – 1 
2. Recovery from conflict (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; sexual and 
reproductive health and rights of war-affected youth; integration of returning refugees 
and displaced persons) - 20 
3. Support to peace process (national solidarity program) - 5 
4. Support to peacebuilding strategy (National Framework Peacebuilding, Peacebuilding for 
Development) – 2 
 
GOOD GOVERNANCE/INSTITUTIONS (centralized responsibility) 
 
1. Support to development strategy (national development strategy, poverty reduction 
strategy) – 13 
2. Economic and financial policy management and reforms (e.g., debt reduction, improving 
business climate, economic diversification) - 63 
3. Institutional capacity building (customs and trade, results facility, statistics, civil registry, 
mineral sector - 50 
4. Public sector reforms (judicial reform, decentralization, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises) - 23 
5. Governance, transparency and accountability (Extractive industries transparency 
initiative, strengthening governance [civil service reform and accountability])- 50 
6. Crisis response and recovery (food crisis, financial crisis, avian flu, disaster risk 
management and reconstruction, sanitation and supply) - 51 
 
Participant 2: Economist 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE (hard sector) 
1. Climate proofing/climate resilience (e.g., climate resilient transport, catastrophe 
insurance) – 5 
2. Infrastructure development (energy, water, transport, ICT) – 135 
3. Urban development and poverty reduction (urban roads improvement, support for young 
entrepreneurs and urban job creation) 26 
 
GREEN/RURAL/AGRICULTURE 
 
1. Agriculture (development of value rice chains, agriculture market infrastructure project) 
– 45 
2. Rural infrastructure development (rural roads rehabilitation, rural electrification) - 17 
3. Environmental sustainability (coastal resources co-management, forest and nature 
conservation, biodiversity management) - 25 
 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
1. Health (health sector development support, multisectoral HIV/AIDS) – 32 
2. Education (strengthening higher education, education sector reconstruction) - 30 
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3. Community participation (participatory rural development) - 2 
4. Research (financial competency study, project preparatory studies, demographic health 
survey) - 7 
5. Social security (pension, safety nets) - 2 
6. Community empowerment (microfinance, rural finance expansion, livelihood and skills 
program for the youth, household development) - 60 
7. Child protection (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child ex-combatants; 
street children project) - 5 
8. Gender equality (e.g., protection from gender-based violence, economic empowerment 
for women) - 9 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR DEVELOPMENT/GOVERNANCE 
 
1. Institutional capacity building (customs and trade, results facility, statistics, civil registry, 
mineral sector – 50 
2. Public sector reforms (judicial reform, decentralization, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises) – 23 
3. Governance, transparency and accountability (Extractive industries transparency 
initiative, strengthening governance [civil service reform and accountability])- 50 
4. Support to NGOs (Support to NGO Network) – 1 
5. Support to development strategy (national development strategy, poverty reduction 
strategy) – 13 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
1. Private sector development (strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial sector) – 
15 
2. Economic and financial policy management and reforms (e.g., debt reduction, improving 
business climate, economic diversification) – 63 
 
FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS RECOVERY 
 
1. Support to peacebuilding strategy (National Framework Peacebuilding, Peacebuilding for 
Development) – 2 
2. Physical security (security plan for project implementation) - 1 
3. Crisis response and recovery (food crisis, financial crisis, avian flu, disaster risk 
management and reconstruction, sanitation and supply) - 51 
4. Support to peace process (national solidarity program) - 5 
5. Recovery from conflict (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; sexual and 
reproductive health and rights of war-affected youth; integration of returning refugees 
and displaced persons) - 20 
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Participant 3: Deputy Director General 
 
EXANTE CONFLICT/NATURAL DISASTERS (It includes preparedness, responsiveness, 
measures within a national development strategy, research to support that effort) 
 
1. Climate proofing/climate resilience (e.g., climate resilient transport, catastrophe 
insurance) – 5 
2. Crisis response and recovery (food crisis, financial crisis, avian flu, disaster risk 
management and reconstruction, sanitation and supply) - 51 
3. Recovery from conflict (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; sexual and 
reproductive health and rights of war-affected youth; integration of returning refugees 
and displaced persons) - 20 
4. Research (financial competency study, project preparatory studies, demographic health 
survey) - 7 
 
COMMUNITY 
 
1. Community empowerment (microfinance, rural finance expansion, livelihood and skills 
program for the youth, household development) - 60 
2. Community participation (participatory rural development) – 2 
3. Support to NGOs (Support to NGO Network) - 1 
 
PRIORITY AREAS/ HARD INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
1. Rural infrastructure development (rural roads rehabilitation, rural electrification) – 17 
2. Infrastructure development (energy, water, transport, ICT) - 135 
3. Environmental sustainability (coastal resources co-management, forest and nature 
conservation, biodiversity management) - 25 
4. Agriculture (development of value rice chains, agriculture market infrastructure project) - 
45 
5. Physical security (security plan for project implementation) - 1 
6. Urban development and poverty reduction (urban roads improvement, support for young 
entrepreneurs and urban job creation) - 26 
7. Private sector development (strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial sector) - 
15 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL (soft sector) 
 
1. Education (strengthening higher education, education sector reconstruction) – 30 
2. Gender equality (e.g., protection from gender-based violence, economic empowerment 
for women) - 9 
3. Health (health sector development support, multisectoral HIV/AIDS) – 32 
4. Child protection (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child ex-combatants; 
street children project) - 5 
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STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE 
 
1. Economic and financial policy management and reforms (e.g., debt reduction, improving 
business climate, economic diversification) - 63 
2. Governance, transparency and accountability (Extractive industries transparency 
initiative, strengthening governance [civil service reform and accountability])- 50 
3. Social security (pension, safety nets) - 2 
4. Support to development strategy (national development strategy, poverty reduction 
strategy) - 13 
5. Support to peace process (national solidarity program) - 5 
6. Support to peacebuilding strategy (National Framework Peacebuilding, Peacebuilding for 
Development) – 2 
7. Institutional capacity building (customs and trade, results facility, statistics, civil registry, 
mineral sector - 50 
8. Public sector reforms (judicial reform, decentralization, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises) - 23 
 
Participant 4: Senior Adviser to the President 
 
GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
1. Institutional capacity building (customs and trade, results facility, statistics, civil registry, 
mineral sector – 50 
2. Research (financial competency study, project preparatory studies, demographic health 
survey) - 7  
3. Governance, transparency and accountability (Extractive industries transparency 
initiative, strengthening governance [civil service reform and accountability])- 50 
4. Public sector reforms (judicial reform, decentralization, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises) - 23 
 
LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
 
1. Private sector development (strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial sector) – 
15 
2. Agriculture (development of value rice chains, agriculture market infrastructure project) - 
45 
3. Urban development and poverty reduction (urban roads improvement, support for young 
entrepreneurs and urban job creation) 26 
4. Support to development strategy (national development strategy, poverty reduction 
strategy) - 13 
 
CONFLICT AND RECOVERY 
 
1. Crisis response and recovery (food crisis, financial crisis, avian flu, disaster risk 
management and reconstruction, sanitation and supply) – 51 
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2. Recovery from conflict (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; sexual and 
reproductive health and rights of war-affected youth; integration of returning refugees 
and displaced persons) - 20 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
1. Environmental sustainability (coastal resources co-management, forest and nature 
conservation, biodiversity management) – 25 
2. Climate proofing/climate resilience (e.g., climate resilient transport, catastrophe 
insurance) - 5 
 
PEACEBUILDING (long-term process, cuts across) 
 
1. Support to peace process (national solidarity program) - 5 
2. Support to peacebuilding strategy (National Framework Peacebuilding, Peacebuilding for 
Development) - 2 
 
IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
 
Social 
 
1. Health (health sector development support, multisectoral HIV/AIDS) – 32 
2. Education (strengthening higher education, education sector reconstruction) – 30 
3. Child protection (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child ex-combatants; 
street children project) – 5 
4. Gender equality (e.g., protection from gender-based violence, economic empowerment 
for women) – 9 
5. Social security (pension, safety nets) – 2 
 
Economic 
 
1. Rural infrastructure development (rural roads rehabilitation, rural electrification) – 17 
2. Economic and financial policy management and reforms (e.g., debt reduction, improving 
business climate, economic diversification) - 63 
3. Infrastructure development (energy, water, transport, ICT) - 135 
4. Physical security (security plan for project implementation) - 1 
 
Connectivity 
 
1. Community participation (participatory rural development) – 2 
2. Support to NGOs (Support to NGO Network) - 1 
3. Community empowerment (microfinance, rural finance expansion, livelihood and skills 
program for the youth, household development) - 60 
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Participant 5: Focal Point for Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations 
 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
 
1. Community empowerment (microfinance, rural finance expansion, livelihood and skills 
program for the youth, household development) - 60 
2. Community participation (participatory rural development) - 2 
 
CAPACITY BUILDING/REFORMS 
 
1. Private sector development (strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial sector) – 
15 
2. Institutional capacity building (customs and trade, results facility, statistics, civil registry, 
mineral sector - 50 
3. Support to development strategy (national development strategy, poverty reduction 
strategy) - 13 
4. Governance, transparency and accountability (Extractive industries transparency 
initiative, strengthening governance [civil service reform and accountability])- 50 
5. Public sector reforms (judicial reform, decentralization, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises) - 23 
6. Economic and financial policy management and reforms (e.g., debt reduction, improving 
business climate, economic diversification) - 63 
 
CONFLICT/POST-CONFLICT INTERVENTIONS 
 
1. Support to peacebuilding strategy (National Framework Peacebuilding, Peacebuilding for 
Development) – 2 
2. Recovery from conflict (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; sexual and 
reproductive health and rights of war-affected youth; integration of returning refugees 
and displaced persons) – 20 
3. Support to peace process (national solidarity program) – 5 
4. Physical security (security plan for project implementation) – 1 
5. Child protection (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child ex-combatants; 
street children project) – 5 
 
NORMAL INTERVENTIONS 
 
1. Infrastructure development (energy, water, transport, ICT) – 135 
2. Rural infrastructure development (rural roads rehabilitation, rural electrification) – 17 
3. Urban development and poverty reduction (urban roads improvement, support for young 
entrepreneurs and urban job creation) 26 
4. Agriculture (development of value rice chains, agriculture market infrastructure project) 
– 45 
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VULNERABILITY TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
1. Environmental sustainability (coastal resources co-management, forest and nature 
conservation, biodiversity management) – 25 
2. Climate proofing/climate resilience (e.g., climate resilient transport, catastrophe 
insurance) - 5 
 
SOCIAL SECTOR INTERVENTIONS 
 
1. Gender equality (e.g., protection from gender-based violence, economic empowerment 
for women) – 9 
2. Education (strengthening higher education, education sector reconstruction) – 30 
3. Social security (pension, safety nets) – 2 
4. Health (health sector development support, multisectoral HIV/AIDS) - 32 
 
STAND ALONE 
 
1. Research 
2. Crisis response 
3. Support to NGOs 
 
Participant 6: Vice-President for Operations 
 
174 
 
Appendix 3: Similarity Matrix from One Person’s Pile Sorting of the 26 Aid Interventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGR CHILD CLI CEMP CPAR CRI ECON EDUC ENV GEN GOV HE INFRA INST PSEC PRIV PUB REC RES RUR SSEC DSTRAT NGO PP PSTRAT URB
Agriculture 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Child protection 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Climate proofing and resilience 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Community empowerment 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Community participation 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Crisis response and recovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Economic and financial policy 
management and reforms 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Education 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Environmental sustainability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gender equality 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Governance transparency and 
accountability 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Health 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Infrastructure development 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Institutional capacity building 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Physical security 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Private sector development 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Public sector reform 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Recovery from conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Research 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Rural infrastructure development 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Social security 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Support to development strategy 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Support to NGOs 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Support to peace process 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Support to peacebuilding strategy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Urban development and poverty 
reduction 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Appendix 4: Aggregate Similarity Matrix from Six Persons’ Pile Sorting of the 26 Aid Interventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGR CHILD CLI CEMP CPAR CRI ECON EDUC ENV GEN GOV HE INFRA INST PSEC PRIV PUB REC RES RUR SSEC DSTRAT NGO PP PSTRAT URB
Agriculture 6 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 0 5
Child protection 0 6 0 2 2 0 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 4 0 1 1 1 0
Climate proofing and resilience 2 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
Community empowerment 0 2 0 6 6 0 1 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 0 0
Community participation 0 2 0 6 6 0 1 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 0 0
Crisis response and recovery 0 0 1 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 3 0 0 1 1 2 2 0
Economic and financial policy 
management and reforms 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 0 0 1 3 0 1 3 1 3 3 0 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 0
Education 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 6 1 4 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
Environmental sustainability 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2
Gender equality 0 4 0 3 3 0 1 3 0 6 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 4 0 2 0 0 0
Governance transparency and 
accountability 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 5 0 1 6 0 1 0 1 5 1 1 1 0
Health 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 5 1 4 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
Infrastructure development 4 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 6 0 2 1 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 5
Institutional capacity building 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 1 0 6 0 2 0 1 5 1 1 1 0
Physical security 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 6 1 0 4 1 2 0 0 0 4 4 1
Private sector development 2 1 0 2 2 0 3 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 6 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 2
Public sector reform 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 0 1 6 0 2 0 1 5 1 1 1 0
Recovery from conflict 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 4 4 0
Research 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 6 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
Rural infrastructure development 5 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 4
Social security 0 4 0 1 2 0 1 4 0 4 1 4 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 6 1 1 1 1 0
Support to development strategy 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 2 5 0 1 0 1 6 1 1 1 1
Support to NGOs 0 1 0 4 4 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 2 0 1 1 6 0 0 0
Support to peace process 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 1 4 1 0 1 1 0 6 6 0
Support to peacebuilding strategy 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 1 4 1 0 1 1 0 6 6 0
Urban development and poverty 
reduction 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 6
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Appendix 5: Average – Aggregate Similarity Matrix from Six Persons’ Pile Sorting of the 26 Aid Interventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGR CHILD CLI CEMP CPAR CRI ECON EDUC ENV GEN GOV HE INFRA INST PSEC PRIV PUB REC RES RUR SSEC DSTRAT NGO PP PSTRAT URB
Agriculture 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83
Child protection 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00
Climate proofing and resilience 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
Community empowerment 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
Community participation 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
Crisis response and recovery 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.00
Economic and financial policy 
management and reforms 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00
Education 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Environmental sustainability 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
Gender equality 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
Governance transparency and 
accountability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00
Health 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Infrastructure development 0.67 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83
Institutional capacity building 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00
Physical security 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.67 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.17
Private sector development 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33
Public sector reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00
Recovery from conflict 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.00
Research 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.17
Rural infrastructure development 0.83 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67
Social security 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.17 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00
Support to development strategy 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.33 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Support to NGOs 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Support to peace process 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.67 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Support to peacebuilding strategy 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.67 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Urban development and poverty 
reduction 0.83 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
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Appendix 6: Distances Measured in the Representation Space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGR CHILD CLI CEMP CPAR CRI ECON EDUC ENV GEN GOV HE INFRA INS PSEC PRIV PUB REC RES RUR SSEC DSTRAT NGO PP PSTRAT URB
AGR 0 0.669 0.386 1.061 1.055 1.021 1.057 0.643 0.265 0.841 1.213 0.666 0.085 1.201 0.706 0.800 1.205 0.858 0.588 0.109 0.726 1.140 1.145 0.894 0.894 0.034
CHILD 0.669 0 0.966 0.473 0.465 1.147 0.799 0.157 0.894 0.180 1.028 0.143 0.745 1.034 1.053 0.473 1.026 1.174 0.540 0.740 0.108 0.979 0.644 1.127 1.127 0.680
CLI 0.386 0.966 0 1.261 1.256 0.815 1.071 0.983 0.138 1.115 1.158 1.002 0.308 1.138 0.423 0.915 1.148 0.563 0.647 0.277 0.992 1.083 1.282 0.645 0.645 0.406
CEMP 1.061 0.473 1.261 0 0.007 1.113 0.567 0.614 1.231 0.317 0.789 0.591 1.121 0.808 1.189 0.391 0.793 1.265 0.646 1.101 0.372 0.772 0.221 1.172 1.172 1.081
CPAR 1.055 0.465 1.256 0.007 0 1.113 0.569 0.606 1.225 0.310 0.791 0.584 1.115 0.811 1.186 0.388 0.795 1.263 0.643 1.095 0.364 0.774 0.227 1.170 1.170 1.075
CRI 1.021 1.147 0.815 1.113 1.113 0 0.601 1.264 0.918 1.186 0.514 1.266 0.993 0.482 0.406 0.747 0.502 0.322 0.611 0.946 1.091 0.459 0.988 0.190 0.190 1.055
ECON 1.057 0.799 1.071 0.567 0.569 0.601 0 0.952 1.106 0.752 0.234 0.941 1.078 0.248 0.821 0.330 0.235 0.839 0.470 1.040 0.705 0.206 0.399 0.717 0.717 1.089
EDUC 0.643 0.157 0.983 0.614 0.606 1.264 0.952 0 0.892 0.300 1.178 0.027 0.726 1.184 1.129 0.623 1.176 1.260 0.654 0.731 0.263 1.127 0.796 1.226 1.226 0.646
ENV 0.265 0.894 0.138 1.231 1.225 0.918 1.106 0.892 0 1.054 1.217 0.913 0.181 1.199 0.542 0.911 1.208 0.688 0.654 0.163 0.933 1.141 1.275 0.758 0.758 0.279
GEN 0.841 0.180 1.115 0.317 0.310 1.186 0.752 0.300 1.054 0 0.986 0.276 0.914 0.998 1.151 0.454 0.987 1.259 0.608 0.905 0.123 0.949 0.516 1.195 1.195 0.854
GOV 1.213 1.028 1.158 0.789 0.791 0.514 0.234 1.178 1.217 0.986 0 1.169 1.220 0.032 0.835 0.555 0.012 0.810 0.634 1.178 0.936 0.076 0.598 0.675 0.675 1.246
HE 0.666 0.143 1.002 0.591 0.584 1.266 0.941 0.027 0.913 0.276 1.169 0 0.748 1.175 1.139 0.614 1.167 1.268 0.655 0.752 0.246 1.119 0.776 1.232 1.232 0.669
INFRA 0.085 0.745 0.308 1.121 1.115 0.993 1.078 0.726 0.181 0.914 1.220 0.748 0 1.206 0.655 0.839 1.212 0.807 0.609 0.047 0.796 1.146 1.192 0.854 0.854 0.099
INS 1.201 1.034 1.138 0.808 0.811 0.482 0.248 1.184 1.199 0.998 0.032 1.175 1.206 0 0.808 0.562 0.021 0.780 0.627 1.164 0.944 0.062 0.622 0.645 0.645 1.234
PSEC 0.706 1.053 0.423 1.189 1.186 0.406 0.821 1.129 0.542 1.151 0.835 1.139 0.655 0.808 0 0.799 0.823 0.152 0.553 0.610 1.034 0.764 1.135 0.224 0.224 0.737
PRIV 0.800 0.473 0.915 0.391 0.388 0.747 0.330 0.623 0.911 0.454 0.555 0.614 0.839 0.562 0.799 0 0.554 0.875 0.271 0.809 0.385 0.507 0.367 0.786 0.786 0.828
PUB 1.205 1.026 1.148 0.793 0.795 0.502 0.235 1.176 1.208 0.987 0.012 1.167 1.212 0.021 0.823 0.554 0 0.798 0.628 1.169 0.935 0.066 0.604 0.663 0.663 1.238
REC 0.858 1.174 0.563 1.265 1.263 0.322 0.839 1.260 0.688 1.259 0.810 1.268 0.807 0.780 0.152 0.875 0.798 0 0.652 0.763 1.146 0.745 1.187 0.136 0.136 0.889
RES 0.588 0.540 0.647 0.646 0.643 0.611 0.470 0.654 0.654 0.608 0.634 0.655 0.609 0.627 0.553 0.271 0.628 0.652 0 0.572 0.498 0.565 0.637 0.590 0.590 0.620
RUR 0.109 0.740 0.277 1.101 1.095 0.946 1.040 0.731 0.163 0.905 1.178 0.752 0.047 1.164 0.610 0.809 1.169 0.763 0.572 0 0.786 1.103 1.165 0.808 0.808 0.133
SSEC 0.726 0.108 0.992 0.372 0.364 1.091 0.705 0.263 0.933 0.123 0.936 0.246 0.796 0.944 1.034 0.385 0.935 1.146 0.498 0.786 0 0.891 0.536 1.088 1.088 0.741
DSTRAT 1.140 0.979 1.083 0.772 0.774 0.459 0.206 1.127 1.141 0.949 0.076 1.119 1.146 0.062 0.764 0.507 0.066 0.745 0.565 1.103 0.891 0 0.595 0.612 0.612 1.173
NGO 1.145 0.644 1.282 0.221 0.227 0.988 0.399 0.796 1.275 0.516 0.598 0.776 1.192 0.622 1.135 0.367 0.604 1.187 0.637 1.165 0.536 0.595 0 1.078 1.078 1.169
PP 0.894 1.127 0.645 1.172 1.170 0.190 0.717 1.226 0.758 1.195 0.675 1.232 0.854 0.645 0.224 0.786 0.663 0.136 0.590 0.808 1.088 0.612 1.078 0 0.000 0.927
PSTRAT 0.894 1.127 0.645 1.172 1.170 0.190 0.717 1.226 0.758 1.195 0.675 1.232 0.854 0.645 0.224 0.786 0.663 0.136 0.590 0.808 1.088 0.612 1.078 0.000 0 0.927
URB 0.034 0.680 0.406 1.081 1.075 1.055 1.089 0.646 0.279 0.854 1.246 0.669 0.099 1.234 0.737 0.828 1.238 0.889 0.620 0.133 0.741 1.173 1.169 0.927 0.927 0
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Appendix 7: Code Sheet for Inter-coder Reliability Test 
 
I. Please read the following before coding. 
 
Human Development 
UNDP coincides with Sen’s definition of development as a form of freedom. The Human 
Development Report 2016 focuses on the inclusiveness of such freedom, wherein every human 
being should be able to realize his or her full potential. “Human development is the process of 
enlarging people’s choices,” according to UNDP (2016, p. 2). UNDP’s (2016) framework 
involves providing capabilities and opportunities for all individuals to experience good health, 
access to knowledge, human rights, human security, decent standard of living, non-
discrimination, dignity, and self-determination. 
Good Governance 
Guy Peters (2012) defines governance as the “capacity of government to steer the 
economy and society toward collective goals.” It involves “setting goals for the society, finding 
the means to reach those goals, and then assessing the success or failure of those efforts as the 
precursor to a subsequent round of governance activities” (p. 2). Within the context of a fragile 
state, I define governance as setting up policies and processes to improve a country’s economy, 
raise human development levels, and strengthen state institutions. I have drawn this definition 
from the four clusters of criteria used in donors’ country policy and institutional assessment—
economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion/equity, and public sector 
management and institutions. Economic management involves debt policy and management, 
fiscal policy, monetary and exchange. Structural policies pertain to business regulatory 
environment and policies on finance and trade. Policies for social inclusion/equity refer to 
policies and institutions for environmental sustainability, social protection and labor, building 
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human resources, equity of public resource use, and gender equality. Public sector management 
and institutions include transparency and accountability, and corruption in the public sector; 
quality of public administration; efficiency of revenue mobilization; quality of budgetary and 
financial management; and property rights and rule-based governance (Safran and San Gabriel, 
2016). 
Economic Growth 
Hudson (2015) defines economic growth as “the continuing increase in per capita 
incomes or purchasing power.” Economic growth is typically measured by a country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, particularly when economies are compared. GDP is the total 
value of goods and services produced by individuals, groups, and institutions in a country; and 
GDP per capita is the GDP value divided by the country’s total population. An exemption to this 
is the black economy, such as illegal businesses, as well as personal services by friends and 
relatives, that cannot be traced by the government. The conventional theory of economic growth 
posits that the increase of inputs in labor and capital and of productivity raises the GDP (Hudson, 
2015). Adam Smith and David Ricardo are two of the most influential thinkers on economic 
growth. Adam Smith (2013) believes that the wealth of a nation is characterized by its ability to 
produce useful goods and services (now known as the GDP), and not the amount of treasure it 
possesses. He spouses the importance of division of labor, innovation in technology, and capital 
investments as keys to greater productivity. David Ricardo (Hudson, 2015), on the other hand, 
introduced the law of comparative advantage. Countries gain mutual benefit from trade by 
concentrating on what they are good at (that which they can produce with the most minimum 
opportunity costs), export that good, and import goods in which other countries are doing 
relatively better. 
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Peacebuilding 
According to Galtung (1969), like a coin, peace has two sides—the negative peace and 
the positive peace. He defines negative peace as “the absence of personal violence” (or absence 
of violence and war) and positive peace as the “absence of structural violence” (or the absence of 
social injustice) [p. 183]. The sustainable form of peace is now being widely recognized in the 
international community. The UN Peacebuilding Commission (n.d.) defines peacebuilding 
through its mandate of “bringing together various actors, both national and international, to 
ensure that countries affected by conflict do not lapse or relapse into conflict…and building 
effective partnerships for sustaining peace.” While the three other variables (human 
development, good governance, and economic growth) are part of the peacebuilding process 
toward sustainability, this study treats this variable as having the goal of enabling the state 
recover from conflict and preparing it for the development process. 
 
II. Codes 
 
Human Development (HD): health; education; child protection; social security; gender equality 
Good Governance (GG): private sector development; economic and financial management and 
policy reforms; support to development strategy; governance, transparency, and accountability; 
institutional capacity building; public sector reforms; community empowerment; community 
participation; support to NGOs 
Economic Growth (EC): infrastructure development; rural infrastructure development; urban 
development and poverty reduction; agriculture; environment sustainability; climate 
proofing/climate resilience 
Peacebuilding (PB): physical security; recovery from conflict; support to peace process; support 
to peacebuilding strategy; crisis response and recovery 
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Appendix 8: Cohen’s Kappa Test – Detailed Results 
1. Economic Growth 
C
o
d
er
 1
 
Coder 2 
 A B Total 
A 53 9 62 
B 7 139 146 
Total 60 148 208 
 
• Number of observed agreements: 192 (92.31% of the observations)  
Number of agreements expected by chance: 121.8 (58.54% of the observations) 
• Kappa= 0.814  
• SE of kappa = 0.044  
• 95% confidence interval: From 0.727 to 0.902  
• The strength of agreement is considered to be 'very good'. 
 
2. Governance 
C
o
d
er
 1
 
Coder 2 
 A B Total 
A 84 11 95 
B 4 109 113 
Total 88 120 208 
 
• Number of observed agreements: 193 (92.79% of the observations)  
Number of agreements expected by chance: 105.4 (50.67% of the observations) 
• Kappa= 0.854  
• SE of kappa = 0.036  
• 95% confidence interval: From 0.783 to 0.925  
• The strength of agreement is considered to be 'very good'. 
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3. Human Development 
C
o
d
er
 1
 
Coder 2 
 A B Total 
A 33 3 36 
B 7 165 172 
Total 40 168 208 
 
• Number of observed agreements: 198 (95.19% of the observations)  
Number of agreements expected by chance: 145.8 (70.12% of the observations) 
• Kappa= 0.839  
• SE of kappa = 0.049  
• 95% confidence interval: From 0.742 to 0.936  
• The strength of agreement is considered to be 'very good'. 
 
4. Peacebuilding 
C
o
d
er
 1
 
Coder 2 
 A B Total 
A 14 0 14 
B 6 188 194 
Total 20 188 208 
 
• Number of observed agreements: 202 (97.12% of the observations)  
Number of agreements expected by chance: 176.7 (84.95% of the observations) 
• Kappa= 0.808  
• SE of kappa = 0.076  
• 95% confidence interval: From 0.660 to 0.957  
• The strength of agreement is considered to be 'very good'. 
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Appendix 9: Institutional Review Board Approval 
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